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CONTENTS

Ideological Work: Improvement in Methods Discussed
(A. Shurygin; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 1

Wartime Operations: Troop Regrouping During the War
(M. Kozlov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 9

Wartime Operations: Maneuver of Armored and Mechanized Troops
(O. Losik; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 18

Wartime Operations: River Crossing by Tank Units
(K. Petrov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 27

Wartime Operations: U.S. and English Amphibious Landings
(L. Ol'shtynskiy; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 35

Soviet Comments on Israeli Military Policy
(V. Solov'yev; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 43

Khalkhin-Gol Operation: Logistical Support Features
(V. Odintsov, V. Ovsyannikov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80) 50

Khalkhin-Gol Operation: Party-Political Work
(V. Starodubtsev; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 58

Wartime Operations: Party-Political Work in Naval Infantry Battalion
(V. Sologub; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 65

Editor's Mailbag: Replies to Questions on Military History
(VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 70

Academy of Armored Troops: 50th Anniversary Marked
(I. Krupchenko; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Sep 80)..... 73

Wartime Operations: Generalizing Combat Experience
(VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Oct, Nov 80)..... 76

Naval Forces: Training Activities
(Various sources, various dates)..... 94

Training on Board Nuclear Submarine, by A. Aleshkin
Sonar Training Exercise Described, by A. Graborov
SAM Exercise Described, by A. Shkurkin

Ground Forces in the Mountains
(ZNAMENOSETS, various dates)..... 101

Motorized Rifles, by A. Tarlykov
Motorized Rifles, Small Subunit Tactics, by R. Dukov
Infantry Tactics, by M. Mordas
Reconnaissance in Mountains, by N. Ivanov

Military Discipline: Violations Discussed
(N. Goncharenko; ZNAMENOSETS, Jan 80)..... 114

Soviet Views on U.S. Equipment, Personnel
(ZNAMENOSETS, various dates)..... 117

Cruise Missiles, by B. Fedorov
Artillery-Launched TV Camera, by V. Nazarenko
Naval Infantry, by Z. Moseyev

NCO Training in Field Exercise
(Yu.Baskalov, Ye. Chernyshov; ZNAMENOSETS, May 80)..... 124

Automatic Grenade Launcher Training
(V. Deputat; ZNAMENOSETS, May 80)..... 129

Military Discipline: Weapons Use, Maintenance
(V. Belyavskiy, A. Khalin; ZNAMENOSETS, May 80)..... 133

IDEOLOGICAL WORK: IMPROVEMENT IN METHODS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 80 signed to press 26 Aug 80 pp 3-9

[Article by Prof, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col A. Shurygin: "The CPSU on the Ways for Improving the Quality and Effectiveness of Ideological Work." Portions in italics originally in bold face]

[Text] The decision of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to convene the 26th CPSU Congress in February of next year was greeted by the personnel of the Army and Navy, like all the Soviet people, with profound satisfaction and unanimous approval. The supreme party body must elaborate and approve a specific program of communist construction for the next 5 years, and outline the basic areas of its activities in the organizational, political and ideological realms.

The party's ideological work is an important front in the struggle for communism. Its scientific principles elaborated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism are being creatively developed by the Communist Party. One of the central places in the ideological work of the CPSU is held by the problem of increasing the effectiveness of the ideological impact on the awareness and conduct of the Soviet people.

V. I. Lenin, in disclosing the advantages of the Soviet socialist system over the bourgeois one, emphasized that a worker-peasant state is strong in the consciousness of the masses. "The development of the consciousness of the masses," he pointed out, "remains, as always, the basis and main content of all our work."[1] Lenin established the enormous importance of scientific theory and the ideological factor in the victory of the proletarian revolution, in building a new, socialist society and in the armed defense of its victories.

In being guided by Lenin's instructions, the Communist Party has creatively developed revolutionary theory, it has constantly led the ideological work in the masses, and has improved its forms, methods and means. The CPSU proceeds from the view that the great cause of building communism cannot make headway without the all-round development of man himself. Without a high level of culture, education, and social awareness, without the inner maturity of people, communism is impossible just

as it is impossible without the appropriate material and technical base. For precisely this reason the 25th CPSU Congress pointed out that "in the report period *the questions of the ideological indoctrination of people and the problems of shaping a new man as the builder of communism held an important place in all our work.*"[2]

The congress outlined new, increased demands in the ideological and indoctrinational work of the party and all its organizations, and pointed to the necessity of further developing Marxist-Leninist theory and strengthening its ties with the practices of communist construction. It gave great attention to the developing of a communist ideology in the Soviet people, to their patriotic and international indoctrination, and in this regard, to improving the political education system. The congress advanced the task of developing an active vital position in all Soviet people as one of the urgent tasks in ideological indoctrination.

In carrying out the decisions of the 25th Party Congress, the CPSU Central Committee has approved a number of decrees on the following: The experience of the comprehensive solving of questions related to ideological indoctrination, the tasks of party training, improving the role of oral political agitation, measures to improve lecture propaganda and economic education of the workers, the leadership of the mass information and propaganda media, the further development of amateur artistic activities, and improving cultural services for the rural population.

A new manifestation of the party's concern for improving the communist indoctrination system for the Soviet people was the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." The materials of the 25th Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 contain a scientific analysis of what has been done in the area of ideology, they outline the ways, forms, methods and means for increasing the effectiveness of the communist indoctrination of the workers, they formulate the fundamental provisions on the essence and criteria for the effectiveness of ideological work, and disclose the content of the comprehensive approach to this.

The theoretical conclusions and the practical recommendations contained in the materials of the 25th Party Congress and in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 are the basis for the activities of the Army and Navy ideological cadres and for organizing all ideological indoctrination in the units and on the ships under present-day conditions.

Ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces is organized in accord with the tasks outlined by the Party Program, by the decisions of the CPSU congresses, and by the decrees of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government. Its tasks in the army also stem from the orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The basic content of ideological work in the Armed Forces is the developing of a Marxist-Leninist ideology in the personnel, and the instilling in them of a communist awareness, moral-political and psychological strength, and the high combat qualities required for defending the socialist fatherland.

Ideological-political work in the army and navy is aimed at indoctrinating the men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism and military cooperation with the men of the armies in the socialist countries. The military councils,

the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations must see to it that these noble ideas are turned into profound convictions and become the moral law, the vital position and rule of conduct for the men.

The most important task of ideological work in the army is to instill in the younger generation a *feeling of historical responsibility* for the fate of socialism, for defending its victories, for indoctrinating in the men class hate for the imperialists, high political vigilance, and a profoundly felt need to maintain constant combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

One of the areas of this work is the struggle for the effective carrying out of combat training tasks and for further strengthening military discipline and organization.

At the present stage, the importance of ideological and political indoctrination of the personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces has immeasurably risen. This is caused by the scope of communist construction, by the increase and greater complication of the tasks confronting the Army and Navy, and by the exacerbation of the ideological struggle between the two social systems. It is also caused by the fundamental changes in military affairs, by the rise in the role of the moral factor in all the spheres of life and the activities of the troops, by the profound qualitative changes which have occurred in the Army and Navy personnel, and by the broadening of the international missions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The 25th CPSU Congress drew an important conclusion on the *comprehensive approach* in ideological indoctrination as the main way for improving its effectiveness. The essence of this consists in employing a scientifically based system in ideological and organizational activities.

The instructions of the 25th Congress on a comprehensive approach to organizing ideological work and achieving a close unity in the ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination considering the various groups of workers have the most direct bearing on the Armed Forces. "In terms of army and navy conditions," said the Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "this means a close link and unity between the processes of instruction and indoctrination."[3] Only a broad and systematic ideological influence on all areas of life and military labor can provide stable positive results.

In carrying out ideological indoctrinational tasks, a comprehensive approach presupposes systematic, interrelated *long-range, current and specific* planning of ideological work encompassing the elaboration of theory, as well as the organizational, indoctrinational and educational functions of propaganda and agitation. A comprehensive, systematic approach to the organization of ideological work means the integrated use of the entire instrumentarium of its means, forms and methods. The unity of the content and forms of propaganda and agitation as well as the time and place of the effect provides a constant and purposeful political influence on each man. An organic combination of mass forms with individual ones noticeably increases the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination which without fail must involve the commanders, the political workers and the engineer and technical personnel, as well as all levels of party bodies and party and Komsomol organizations. At the same time, in some places there still is the opinion that it is not essential for individual categories of officers to participate in the ideological and political indoctrination of the men.

The experience of many commanders, political workers and party organizations indicates that the comprehensive carrying out of ideological indoctrination provides an opportunity to more successfully carry out the tasks of military and political training, the strengthening of military discipline, and a rise in the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops. The personnel shows great responsibility to carrying out their military duty, the requirements of the USSR Constitution, the military oath, the combined-arms regulations and the orders of commanders and chiefs. Particularly high activeness by the men was shown in the development of the socialist competition in the course of preparing to celebrate the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War under the motto "to sacredly carry out Lenin's legacy, to improve military and political training, to increase vigilance, and to always be ready to defend the motherland and the great victories of socialism."

At present, in accord with the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 27 July 1980, the Army and Navy have widely developed a socialist competition to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 is continuing the party's course of a steady ideological and moral growth of the builders of a new society. "Under the conditions of developed socialism," it states, "more than ever before there is a timeliness of Lenin's thesis that the state is strong in the consciousness of the masses, it is strong when the masses know everything, can judge everything and go into everything consciously."[4]

The all-Union conference of ideological workers held in October 1979 was still another proof of the growing attention of the CPSU Central Committee to the urgent questions of communist indoctrination. In the report of M. A. Suslov entitled "The Cause of the Entire Party" and in the speeches of other comrades, there was a thorough analysis of the first results in the activities of the nation's party organizations to carry out the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979, and the ways were reviewed for further raising the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination.

The indoctrination of the personnel of the Armed Forces is inseparable from the indoctrination of all the Soviet people. The commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations, in being guided by the requirements of the decree, are making every effort on a scientific basis, considering the acquired experience, to further improve with even greater energy and tenacity the entire system of ideological indoctrination so that it is constantly replenished with a new content.

The conference held in June 1980 for the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy gave certain results and generalized the acquired experience of the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and party organizations in carrying out the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee to further strengthen the indoctrinational role of our Armed Forces.

In working for a rise in the effectiveness of ideological work, the party has demanded from everyone who is engaged in propaganda and agitation, to ensure its *high scientific level, concreteness, completeness and timeliness of information,* and to make each printed or oral statement maximally *effective, closely linked with life, and a solution to economic and political tasks.*

The core of ideological and political indoctrination work has been and remains the the developing in the Soviet people and in the men of the Army and Navy a *scientific ideology, wholehearted loyalty to the party's cause, to communist ideals, to the socialist fatherland, and to proletarian internationalism.*

The scientific level of ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces is higher the better the commanders and political workers organize the study by the personnel of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, the history of the CPSU, the documents of the party congresses and the works of L. I. Brezhnev and the other party leaders.

In speaking about the study of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, M. I. Suslov at the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers emphasized that it is a question "of their profound and integrated study and propagandizing, and not a cursory and superficial familiarization with individual provisions...."[5]

In line with the promulgation of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 110th Birthday of V. I. Lenin" and in the process of the preparations to celebrate the jubilee of the revolution's leader, the personnel has shown a greater interest in Lenin's military theoretical heritage.

A new and effective form for mastering Lenin's heritage has been the open meetings held in the party organizations with the agenda "to live, work and struggle in the Leninist, communist manner." They have contributed to a more profound mastery of Lenin's theses, to an elucidation of practical tasks, and to a closer rallying of the communists and nonparty persons around the CPSU.

A most important component in the great effectiveness of ideological indoctrination in the army is the *unity of word and deed.* V. I. Lenin pointed out that "if we are not afraid to say even a bitter and difficult truth outright we will learn, we will learn continuously and unconditionally to conquer over all and any difficulties."[6] But, unfortunately, there still are commanders and political workers who in practice are not guided by these Leninist instructions. And where words are not reinforced by concrete deeds the effectiveness of indoctrinational measures is sharply reduced.

For this reason precisely the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers emphasized that a specific action and a real deed are not only the higher result of indoctrinational work, but also a very strong factor in indoctrination itself. The unity of word and deed and agitation by deed are of decisive significance in effectively influencing the consciousness and mood of a man.[7]

Concern for raising the effectiveness of ideological, political indoctrination work in the army is incompatible with the fear of openly discussing urgent questions of social life and our reality. The attempts to skirt difficult-to-solve problems or to remain quiet about actually existing shortcomings and difficulties do not aid the cause of indoctrinating the people and cause harm. "Party propaganda and party agitation," pointed out L. I. Brezhnev at the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "should be as specific as possible, and should convincingly and knowledgeably answer all questions which are of concern to the people."[8]

Among the important ways of increasing the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination as proposed by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 was a *further strengthening of the offensive nature of propaganda and agitation.* The aggressiveness and militancy of the political indoctrination measures carried out are manifested primarily in the support of all that is new and progressive and in the struggle against all that impedes our advancement.

Under the conditions of the sharp exacerbation of the ideological struggle on the international scene, the commanders and political workers should be particularly concerned for indoctrinating a rejection of bourgeois ideology and morality in the men. "Our duty," states the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979, "is to oppose the subversive political and ideological activities of the class enemy and its evil slander of socialism with unshakable solidarity, the strong ideological unity of our ranks, and the profound conviction and political awareness of each Soviet man and his readiness to defend the motherland and the revolutionary victories of socialism."[9]

The struggle against bourgeois ideology and the ideology of modern opportunism is a concrete manifestation of the offensiveness of our propaganda and agitation in the foreign policy aspect. At the present stage of world development, when the clash between the two systems of socialism and capitalism is continuing, it is important to devote special attention to explaining to the men the foreign policy course of our party, and the international situation with is characterized by complexity, contradictions and dynamicness.

As is known, as a result of the peaceful offensive undertaken by the CPSU together with the parties of the fraternal nations, the international climate has taken a turn for the better. However, in recent years the international situation has become noticeably more complex. The reasons for this have been brought out in the decree of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It states: "Imperialism would like to halt the objective process of the renewal of the world. The leaders of the NATO military bloc and above all the United States have set out to disrupt the military equilibrium existing in the world in their favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and to the detriment of international detente and security of peoples."[10] The imperialists are increasing military budgets at an unprecedented pace. Thus, while in 1978, in the United States the Pentagon was allocated 116.7 billion dollars, over the next 5 years, the fantastic amount of a trillion dollars is being planned for militaristic purposes.[11]

In endeavoring in some manner to justify the policy of a further rise in military might and achieving military superiority, the imperialists and bourgeois propaganda have intentionally constantly exaggerate the myth of the so-called "Soviet military threat."

There has never been nor is any "Soviet threat." But in agitation and propaganda work it is very important to disclose the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR, and using specific examples show the struggle of the CPSU to create a climate of peace and confidence in the world, to explain the provisions and conclusions of the decree of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at it, his replies to questions by the editorial staff of PRAVDA, as well as the contents of the documents approved in May 1980 in Warsaw by a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States, and to

bring out the importance of the new peace initiatives by the countries of the socialist commonwealth and aimed at strengthening peace and detente.

In his report at the meeting of the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy, the chief of the Main Political Directorate, Gen Arm A. A. Yepishev, emphasized the importance of the work aimed at making the personnel of the Armed Forces fully aware of the danger which is to be found in the aggressiveness of the present policy of certain U.S. circles as well as the hegemonistic policy of the Beijing rulers, and pointed to the necessity of achieving by the entire complex of indoctrinational measures a strong moral-political and psychological strength and determination of the men to withstand the harshest testings, if the situation demands.[12]

In examining the problems of raising the effectiveness of political indoctrination, it is essential to stress that their successful resolution is directly dependent upon an *improvement in the leadership of ideological work by the political bodies and party organizations.*

Experience indicates that the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination in the units and on the ships is higher when the military councils, the commanders and the political bodies systematically analyze and discuss specific questions of political indoctrination and political training, and work out and firmly carry out measures aimed at raising the level of the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers, the political training of the warrant officers ["praporshchik"], and the political exercises with the soldiers and sergeants.

It is very important to constantly generalize the advanced experience of ideological and political indoctrination of the personnel, to introduce it more steadfastly, to involve all the communists, particularly among the leadership, in this work, and improve the practice of holding uniform political days every month.

An important role is played by the party organizations in the struggle to raise the effectiveness of ideological work in the troops.

Finally, it must be said that a rise in the quality and effectiveness of ideological work depends largely upon the *procedural level of the propagandist personnel.* It is well known that the ideological level and effectiveness of propaganda to a decisive degree are determined by the membership of lecturers and propagandists. In emphasizing this, V. I. Lenin pointed out that in any school the most important thing is the ideological and political focus of the lectures and this is completely determined by the composition of the lecturers.[13]

For this reason, the recruitment, placement, instruction and indoctrination of the propagandists should be a matter of particular attention for the commanders, political bodies and party organizations.

And it must be pointed out that the level, forms and methods of ideological work with the personnel do not everywhere meet the increased demands. For this reason we can understand how urgent was the statement by L. I. Brezhnev at the 18th Komsomol Congress on the style of indoctrinational work: "It is time for all workers on the ideological front to put an end to the still-encountered practice of the mechanical, thoughtless repetition of hackneyed truths and verbal twaddle. It is time to

make it a rule to speak to people in a simple and accessible language, and to write investing a lively thought and feelings into each phrase. This also is a question of quality and efficiency, and in such an important area of building communism as the indoctrination of a new man."[14]

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" is a program for years to come. The commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations, in preparing for the 26th CPSU Congress, must be constantly guided by the demands of the Central Committee decree, they must achieve an improvement in the quality and effectiveness of ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces, and with high indicators in military and political training greet the opening of the historic forum of Soviet communists.

FOOTNOTES

[1]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 13, p 376.

[2]"Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp 71-72.

[3]D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 324.

[4]"O Dal'neyshem Uluchshenii Ideologicheskoy, Politiko-Vospitatel'noy Raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 Aprelya 1979 g." [On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 4.

[5]M. A. Suslov, "Delo Vsey Partii" [A Cause of the Entire Party], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 16.

[6]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 44, p 210.

[7]PRAVDA, 17 October 1979.

[8]KOMMUNIST, No 17, 1979, p 18.

[9]"O Dalneyshem Uluchshenii...," p 9.

[10]PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

[11]Ibid., 30 May 1980.

[12]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 June 1980.

[13]See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 47, p 194.

[14]L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 570.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: TROOP REGROUPING DURING THE WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 80 signed to press 26 Aug 80 pp 10-17

[Article published under the heading: "Soviet Military Art in the Great Patriotic War," by Chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, Gen Army M. Kozlov: "Regrouping of Troops in the Course of the War (Concluding the Discussion of the Problem)"; passages in italics originally printed in bold face]

[Text] The problem of regrouping men and equipment, in often arising in preparing for and in the course of operations and engagements, has long occupied the minds of military leaders, commanders and military theoreticians. A comprehensive study carried out for the first time by this journal of the various aspects of the problem in a series of articles[1] has helped to draw the necessary conclusions and extract certain lessons from the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The timeliness of the given published works consists precisely in this. Such a good undertaking, in our view, should be continued and other urgent problems examined for the purpose of a more profound and thorough elaboration of the chosen subjects. This will help in making better use of the very rich experience of the war in the theory of military art and in the practice of the military and political training of the troops.

As a whole, the problems raised by the authors can be divided into two groups. The first of them encompasses the published articles devoted to the immediate organization and execution of the regrouping of formations and field forces under various combat conditions, while the second deals with the questions of the operational and material support as well as party political work. In the articles one can spot an undisputed opinion that the very rich experience of the previous war has disclosed a number of particular features and directions for improving the preparations for and implementation of the regrouping and moving up of troops. The authors, in generalizing and analyzing specific combat examples, have been able, undoubtedly, to draw a number of practical conclusions and recommendations which can be of benefit in the development of modern military art. The given article attempts to briefly make certain generalizations and additions to the question of the organizing and execution of the regrouping of troops and forces.

Regroupings compiled an inseparable part of the combat activities of the command, the staffs and the troops. They were carried out when the necessity arose of shifting efforts from one axis to another, changing the composition or creating new groupings. They differed in the following: in terms of scale into strategic

(intercontinental, intertheater, and in certain instances also interfront), operational (interfront within one operational sector, intrafront and intra-army) and tactical (in the formations and units); in terms of the methods of movement by own power (march), by the moving of troops by rail, motor, water and air transport, and combined.

The success of any scale of regrouping was ensured primarily by the use of a favorably developing situation, as well as by the following: by the prompt preparation, careful planning and clear organization; by the effective use of all types of transport and lines of communications; by speed, by concealment of the movement of the troops and by reliable cover for them and vulnerable objects on the lines of communications; by all-round support; by steady and uninterrupted command and by constant control from the command and the staffs. *The main and most important condition for any regrouping was always the prompt arrival of the troops at the designated area with the maintaining of combat readiness to enter the engagement (battle).*

Strategic regroupings, as is known, were the prerogative of Hq SHC and the General Staff which provided overall leadership and supervision of their execution. The basic role was assigned to the strategic reserves which were moved up into the theater of war from the interior of the nation and from the military districts adjacent to the fronts from one sector to another. Thus, for thwarting the Nazi plan for a Blitzkrieg, for restoring the strategic front, for winning and retaining the strategic initiative and decisively crushing the enemy, from the Reserve of Hq SHC to the Soviet-German Front in 1941-1945, the following were moved up (considering that many field forces, formations and units were regrouped several times: 94 army headquarters (77 combined-arms and 17 tank); 98 tank and mechanized and 2 artillery corps; 834 divisions, including 60 artillery; 938 brigades (141 rifle, 305 tank, and 492 artillery and mortar); 918 separate regiments (432 tank, 486 artillery and mortar).[2] In terms of their effective strength this equaled approximately 15-18 full front field forces.

The largest number of formations from the Reserve of Hq SHC (40 percent of the total volume) was regrouped in the first period of the war, of which 32 percent were destined for restoring the strategic front during the summer-autumn campaigns of 1941 and 1942. Under conditions where the enemy possessed strategic initiative and was superior in the air, Hq SHC brought up reserves for the operational army from the interior of the nation over a distance up to 350-400 km. As a result of the constant operations of enemy aviation, the maneuvering of troops along the front was restricted. They were basically moved up by rail, and over short distances on foot. The summer-autumn campaign of 1941 was particularly difficult for regroupings, as around 1,500 enterprises and millions of workers and their families were being moved to the east, to the interior of the nation, impeding the rail traffic of troop trains.

In the second and third periods of the war, after there had been a fundamental change in its course and the Soviet Armed Forces seized strategic initiative, the conditions for regroupings changed for the better. Now a significant portion of the Reserves of Hq SHC were comprised of field forces and formations which previously had been taken out of the effectives of the operational fronts. They were positioned near the areas and sectors of the most active operations in such a manner that when necessary a minimum time would be spent on their regrouping. Such a disposition sharply increased the possibilities for maneuvering along the front

with the availability of lateral lines of communications in the theaters of war. The combined method of moving the troops began to be used more and more.

With an increase in the scope of the strategic offensive operations, the scale of the intertheater and intratheater regroupings increased, particularly in the third period of the war. Indicative in terms of scale and aims was the regrouping of 4-18 April 1945 of virtually all the troops of the Second Belorussian Front (Commander, Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy) from the Eastern Pomeranian sector to the Berlin one (300-350 km). Participating in it were five combined-arms armies, one tank army and one air army, three tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps and a large amount of artillery. These men and equipment were moved by the combined method. Here motor vehicle (1,200 vehicles) and rail transport were used. In the regrouping of the combined-arms armies, 5-8 days were spent (the rate of advance was 40-60 km per day). This was an original form for maneuvering to a new strategic sector as the front of troop operations turned by 180°.

From the viewpoint of the preparations for and execution, the great spatial scope and the amount of resources to be shifted, the unprecedented and most instructive example was the intertheater strategic regrouping of the Soviet Armed Forces from the Western to the Far Eastern theater of war from May through 8 August 1945 over a distance of 9,000-12,000 km. Over this time, 2 front, 4 army and 19 corps headquarters, around 100 formations and other personnel and equipment arrived in the Far East. They numbered 403,355 men, 2,119 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], 7,137 guns and mortars, and 17,374 trucks.[3] Many questions and problems solved in this regrouping are presently of great theoretical and practical interest. Thus, we should note the regrouping for the first time in the war of large air forces over such a great distance, including 2 bomber corps (4 divisions) and 2 air transport divisions, the particular features of planning the regrouping, the organizing of its control, the operational (combat) and transport support, the arrival of the incoming troops and the moving of them up into the jump-off areas, the ensuring of concealment, and so forth.

Operational regroupings comprised an inseparable part of any front (army) operation. Their experience enriched Soviet military art in a diversity of forms and methods for preparation and implementation. They were ordinarily carried out with the permission or upon the instructions of Hq SHC and the General Staff, and often involved formations and units of all echelons in the operational troop formation. In this regard, one should point to the very covert surprise maneuver for the enemy from the Riga to the Memel axis carried out by the troops of the First Baltic Front (Commander, Gen Army I. Kh. Bagramyan) in preparing for the Memel Operation which was carried out on 5-22 October 1944. During a period of 6 days, virtually all the troops of the front executed a maneuver from the right to the left wing of the front over a distance of 80-240 km. The troops included 4 combined-arms armies (the 4th Assault, 6th Guards, 43d and 51st), the 5th Guards Tank Army, the I and XIX Tank Corps and the III Guards Mechanized Corps, and all artillery reinforcement.[4]

Prior to the Iasi-Kishenev Operation, in the entire 300-km zone of the Second Ukrainian Front (Commander, Gen Army R. Ya. Malinovskiy), from 7 through 20 August 1944, 60 percent of the combined-arms formations covertly changed their areas completely, and 23 percent partially did this. The troops moved a distance from 20 to 110 km (the artillery up to 170 km).[5]

As a characteristic trait in the operational regroupings, one can point to the broadening of their scale in the preparation for and carrying out of a series of sequential offensive front and army operations or in those instances when the direction of the main thrust was abruptly changed. And virtually during the entire war, the basic method of shifting the troops was the combined one which entailed the moving of troops by their own power (a march) with transporting by motor, rail and in a number of instances also water transport. For example, in preparing for the Eastern Pomeranian Operation in 1945, the command of the First Belorussian Front (Commander, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov) successfully carried out major regroupings of the troops under their own power (by a march). When the L'vov-Sandomir Operation was being prepared in the First Ukrainian Front (Commander, Mar SU I. S. Konev), the 1st Guards Tank Army of Col Gen Tank Trps M. Ye. Katukov was regrouped by the combined method over a distance of 250 km. A portion of the troops moved under their own power, while the equipment of the tank and the self-propelled artillery formations and units as well as the other tracked vehicles and heavy freight were transported by rail.

Tactical regroupings were carried out by the commanders of formations and units upon instructions from the command of a front or army, or independently. They ordinarily were carried out by their own power (by a march), and their effectiveness was also determined by the precise organization, high speed and strict concealment. In this regard, of definite value were the materials published for the first time on the regrouping of the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Battle of the Dnepr and the 292d Rifle Division in the mountainous-desert terrain of the Transbaykal area.[6]

Their instructive example has allowed the authors to make a completely correct judgment that the preparations for an carrying out of any scale of grouping required rigid centralization and a single plan for the regrouping-related measures. Also required were: the readiness of the headquarters bodies to respond flexibly to changes in the situation and incorporate adjustments in the plans and promptly give the new missions to subordinate commanders and staffs; prompt reconnaissance of the routes (zones of advance); strict consideration of the economic, natural, climatic and other particular features in the theater of war.

The preparation of a regrouping on any scale was one of the complicated processes which included a range of measures related to the taking and planning of the decision, all-round support, preparation of the troops, means of transport and lines of communication, and the organizing of command and control. Let us focus attention only on those which had a definite tendency to develop and provided an opportunity to establish the relationship of the past with the present.

The immediate organizers of the troop regroupings in a theater of war were the commanders of the fronts and armies, and also within their competence, the headquarters of the central personnel. The most important duty of the commanders, staffs and political bodies was to carefully plan the regrouping, since this often predetermined the success of not only the regrouping itself, but also to a certain degree, the pending operation. With sufficient available time, the planning was carried out sequentially, initially at the senior staff, and then in the subordinate ones. With a lack of time, it was done simultaneously (in parallel) on the operational and tactical levels on the basis of preliminary instructions. This made it possible to reduce the time and provide more time for subordinates to prepare the troops. In a majority of instances, the regrouping plan was worked out on

a map. Appended to it were an explanatory note, the necessary calculations and feasibility studies which could not be depicted graphically. At the same time detailed plans were worked out for air defense, the rear and remaining types of support, troop command and other documents.

All types of support were aimed at making certain that the troops under any conditions could promptly and covertly reach the designated areas in maximally maintaining battleworthiness. For the purpose of maintaining concealment of the move, the appropriate conditions for the behavior of the troops en route were carefully worked out. To exclude any possibility of the leaking of information on the aims, missions and scope of the regrouping to be carried out, the armies prepared a plan of measures for camouflage, and this was approved by the commander of the front. The plan provided for the following: The intended change in the groupings of troops during the course of the march; the simulating of the movement of columns in false directions; and misleading the air, ground and agent reconnaissance of the enemy. For the immediate camouflaging of the troops, their movement was also planned at night and in bad weather. Use was to be made of forests and terrain folds for the concealment of men and equipment. The march formations were to be split up along the front and in depth, and measures were carried out for camouflage discipline en route and during halts, as well as to combat enemy air reconnaissance and agents in the zone of the regrouping.[7]

Strict control was instituted over the observance of the designated measures along the entire route in the course of the march (move). The elaborated group of measures and their unswerving execution by the General Staff, by the bodies of the Central Directorate of Military Lines of Communications (TsUP VOSO) and by the command of the fronts made it possible not only to keep secret the scale and nature of the troop regrouping to the Far East in the summer of 1945, but also to promptly complete it. In his article Gen Arm I. Tret'yak in instructive examples has shown how the measures were carried out for operational support, and in particular for air defense, for the regrouping of the troops to the Far East.[8]

Of the other types of support for the regrouping of men and equipment, transport was of important significance. This was aimed at increasing invulnerability and the carrying capacity of the railroads, and their uninterrupted and stable operation during the period of the greatest intensity of regroupings. The prompt operational equipping of the theater of war and its preparation in transport terms largely determined the success of the various-scale regroupings. The given question both in the prewar period and during the years of the war was a concern of the Communist Party which was guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin that for a war "preparations must be extended and serious, starting with an economic rise in the country and the organizing of railroads (for without them modern warfare is an empty phrase)...."[9]

During the Great Patriotic War with the mass regrouping of men and equipment, particularly over long distances, rail transport became the basic type in the continental theater, and the volume of troop rail shipments was approximately 230,000 trains.

Considering the necessity of rigid centralization and coordination of the movements in line with the pending broad offensive operations, in 1942 the Transport Committee was set up under the State Defense Committee (GKO). It included members of the

GKO, the chief of the Armed Forces Rear Services, as well as the chief of the Directorate of Military Lines of Communications (VOSO), the staff of which was entrusted with the planning of all types of shipments on the basis of monthly limits. It must be pointed out that the rail troop movements related to regroupings were completely provided with rolling stock.

In comparison with motor transport, rail transport had a higher carrying capacity, a longer daily run, and was independent of weather conditions and the time of year. However, it also had inherent shortcomings, including: the vulnerability of the railroads with an enemy air attack, and the enemy systematically made strikes to a depth of 350-400 km, particularly against key stations, bridges and tunnels, for the purpose of disrupting traffic and preventing our troop movements. That the railroad lines were one of the key objectives for enemy aviation can be seen from the fact that the enemy dropped 44 percent of the total bomb tonnage on them. Nevertheless, traffic on the damaged sections was restored in no longer than 5-6 hours.

The situation was somewhat more complicated with the rebuilding of the track destroyed by the enemy in retreating. The rate of rebuilding the railroads (in 1941-1943, 3-4 km per day, and in subsequent years 10-12 km) lagged sharply behind the rate of the offensive, and this told seriously on the regrouping of men and equipment. However, the experience of certain offensive operations, and in particular the Belorussian one, showed that with a high rate of advance, when the mobile troops seized bridges, key stations and major sections of the railroads, the Nazis ordinarily did not succeed in destroying them.

With an increase in the scope and dynamicness of operations, motor transport in the immediate proximity of the front assumed ever-greater significance.

Undoubtedly, motor transport in the past war demonstrated its indisputable advantages in hauls over comparatively short distances, but at the same time was dependent upon the development and condition of the road network, the weather conditions, the season and time of day. For this reason only the integrated use of all types of transport could provide the greatest effect in the regrouping of troops.

During the war experience was also gained in using aviation not only for covering the troops en route, but also for ferrying men and equipment by air. This contributed most to the rapid and unexpected reinforcing of individual groupings. For example, in October 1942, in carrying out the Orel-Bryansk Offensive Operation for holding up the advancing enemy 2d Tank Army, upon instructions of Hq SHC, the V Airborne Corps (5,500 men) in 3 days was ferried to the region of Orel with their weapons and ammunition.[10] In the Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation (23 June-29 August 1944), the air transport regiments of the Civil Air Fleet airlifted around 43,000 men, and the long-range military aviation carried 11,000 men.[11]

From the examples it can be seen that, regardless of the complexity of organizing and providing all-round support for air troop movements, aviation was a mobile and promising means in carrying out the regroupings. The skillful use of troop experience in this question can provide substantial he'p solving present-day urgent problems.

Precise organization and continuous troop control in carrying out the regroupings predetermined their success. This was achieved, as was rightly pointed out in the article "Certain Questions of Troop Control in Regroupings in the Third Period of the Great Patriotic War," by the prompt taking or adjustment of a decision and the issuing of missions, by the presence of uninterrupted communications with subordinates and cooperating troops and the senior commander (chief); also by able and prompt moving of the command points.[12]

Characteristic of the strategic and operational regroupings was a high degree of leadership centralization, and this made it possible to most specifically plan the times for moving up the field forces and formations, and to rationally utilize the lines of communications and the means of transport. This became particularly important with mass troop movements and a limited number of routes. In this regard, the most instructive was the regrouping of the men and equipment in preparations for the 1945 Far Eastern Campaign. It was carried out under the overall leadership of Hq SHC and the General Staff. Within its competence, control over the regrouping under the supervision of the General Staff was also carried out by the Air Force commander and staff (the rebasing of aviation), by the corresponding bodies of the TsUP VOSO, by the rear services headquarters of the commander-in-chief in the theater, and by the commanders and staffs of the fronts within the limits of their field forces.

The Directorate for the Representative of the TsUP VOSO headed by the deputy chief of VOSO of the Red Army, Gen A. V. Dobryakov, was established for the immediate leadership of troop movements in the theater in the Special Railroad District. It planned and coordinated the operations of the line and field VOSO bodies, and directed the mass flow of trains through their diverse network of railroad military commendant's offices which were not only the executive and controlling body for the movements, but also probably the sole connecting link in the system of command over the troops which were being moved by rail over long distances.

In the course of the interfront and intrafront regroupings, troop control was usually exercised from the basic, rear, emergency and auxiliary command posts set up, as a rule, in the areas of day-long halts, in crossing barrier perimeters (rivers, passes and so forth) as well as in moving from one type of conveyance to another. For solving particular problems, wide use was made of operational groups which were assigned from the basic command post. Communications centers were prepared ahead of time on the routes. Ordinarily the use of radios was prohibited.

In rail movements, control was as follows: en route through the communications network of the military commendant's offices, and during loading, unloading and concentration, through a network that was specially organized in these areas or by personal contact and conveyances.

For supervising the regrouping and for providing practical help, representatives of the superior command, staffs and political bodies were sent out to the troops. For the same purpose often staff officers made inspection flights over the routes where the troops were to be moved.

As a whole, in discussing the problems of organizing and carrying out the regroupings of troops and resources, the authors of the articles using new archival materials again convincingly showed how the Great Patriotic War enriched Soviet

military art with diverse experience in organizing and conducting troop regroupings of varying scale. The experience has not lost its significance at present, although the capabilities of the nation for all types of transport over the 35 postwar years have immeasurably risen, and the ability of the ground forces to carry out marches over long distances by their own power has sharply increased.

Speed and concealment of the movement and the constant readiness of the troops to enter an engagement (battle) were always indispensable conditions for success in a regrouping of any scale. But speed required a maximum effort by the troops, clear and continuous operation of the transport, as well as the use of daytime, and this, as combat experience showed, was clearly contradictory to the requirements of concealment. As can be seen, the problem remains even now. During the war it was solved by shortening the time for organizing and carrying out the regrouping, and in particular by the following: By the prompt orientation of the generals and officers in the field headquarters; by giving preliminary instructions which made it possible to carry out parallel planning in the staffs of the field forces and formations; reducing the depth of the march formation by organizing the movement over many routes and at close distance and by the rational choice of the method for moving the troops. Undoubtedly, the integrated use of the means of transport in all instances provided a positive result. This is also particularly important under present-day conditions with the rapid development of motor and air transport which has largely altered the notion of regroupings, in opening up new opportunities for them.

The Great Patriotic War clearly disclosed the indisputable advantages of a socialist economy and military organization, the great dynamicness of Soviet transport and its potential opportunities. Precisely due to these advantages, the Communist Party and the Soviet government mobilized the entire transport system of the nation in the interests of the front, including for the regrouping of troops. This again affirmed the leading and organizing role of the Communist Party and its Central Committee which intelligently, consistently and efficiently directed the efforts of the state and military bodies to carry out the tasks related to the regrouping of large masses of troops.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1979, pp 9-16; No 9, pp 39-44; No 11, pp 10-15; No 1, 1980, pp 13-19; No 2, pp 22-28; No 3, pp 16-24; No 4, pp 27-34; No 6, pp 10-16, 23-30.

[2] TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 15-A, inv. 2158, file 14, sheets 1-2; file 24, sheet 12; file 32, sheets 1-2; inv. 2145, file 85, sheets 170-192.

[3] "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1980, p 193.

[4] "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopaedia], Vol 5, Voyenizdat, 1978, p 239.

[5]"Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Vol 3, Voyenizdat, 1958, p 467.

[6]See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1980, pp 16-24; No 2, pp 22-28.

[7]"Polevoye Ustav Krasnoy Armii. Proyekt" [Red Army Field Manual. Draft], Voyenizdat, 1943, pp 339, 340.

[8]See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1979, pp 10-15.

[9]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 395.

[10]"Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya Istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. Concise History], Voyenizdat, 1970, p 116.

[11]"Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941-1945" [The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voyenizdat, 1968, p 310.

[12]See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1980, p 13.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: MANEUVER OF ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS

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[Article published under the heading "Soviet Military Art in the Great Patriotic War," by Chief of the Military Academy of the Armored Troops imeni Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union, Prof and Mar Armd Trps O. Losik: "Methods of Conducting Highly Maneuverable Combat Operations of Armored and Mechanized Troops from the Experience of the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder Operations"]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War has convincingly shown that one of the basic factors for achieving success in the front and army offensive operations is the rapid and decisive maneuvering of the men and equipment. Soviet military science has always paid great attention to the questions of conducting fluid combat operations. But these were worked out most completely in the middle of the 1930's in the theory of an operation in depth. Its essence consisted in the simultaneous suppression of enemy defenses by the weapons to the entire depth in the course of the artillery and air softening up and the breaking through of the tactical defensive zone by the infantry together with the tanks with the subsequent rapid exploitation of the tactical success into an operational one by committing the mobile troops to the engagement and landing airborne parties.

The breakthrough of a prepared enemy defense was to be carried out by the forces of the armies of the first echelon in the front, while the development of the offensive was to be carried out by the echelon for exploiting the success, and this included mechanized and cavalry corps. The necessity of creating the latter was explained primarily by the fact that the basic mass of infantry troops at that time was little motorized, and on the battlefield operated dismounted and this, naturally, could not ensure a high rate of the offensive as well as rapid and highly maneuverable operations.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, there was also a sharp difference in mobility and strike force between the armored and mechanized and the rifle troops. This necessitated the presence of mobile groups in the fronts and the combined-arms armies advancing on the major axes.

The basic provisions of the theory of an operation in depth were employed and further developed in the operations of the Great Patriotic War. However, it is essential to point out that due to a number of factors, the effectiveness of their actual use differed in the various stages of the war. In offensive operations during

virtually the entire first year of the war, our troops did not possess sufficient capability for rapid and highly maneuverable operations due to the absence of large formations and field forces of armored and mechanized troops. At that time the nation was still unable to supply the army with the required number of tanks, motor vehicles and armored personnel carriers, that is, the equipment which comprised the material and technical base of the mobile troops. By the spring of 1942, the production of all types of combat equipment and their supply to the Armed Forces had significantly increased. This made it possible for the Soviet command to carry out a series of organizational measures which had a great impact on raising the striking force and mobility of the ground troops. And of particularly important significance was the creation of tank corps using new equipment and the recreation of the mechanized corps in September 1942, as well as the formation of tank armies in the summer of 1942.

During the offensive operations of the second period of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces possessed significantly greater opportunities for successfully breaking through the prepared enemy defenses and for exploiting the success in the operational depth. However, there still was not the commitment of the mobile groups of the combined-arms armies and fronts to the fully completed breakthrough. Beginning with the Stalingrad counteroffensive, these groups, as a rule, were employed for completing the breakthrough in the tactical defensive zone. This was explained by the still insufficient density of tanks for direct infantry support.

The operations of 1944-1945 enriched Soviet military art with a number of new theses on the breaking through of a deeply echeloned defense and the exploitation of success. Their scope significantly increased. In the armies and fronts, powerful assault groupings were organized capable of rapidly breaking through enemy defenses, quickly pursuing it, in surrounding, breaking up piecemeal and rapidly destroying the major enemy forces, and routing the approaching reserves. Here the leading role was played by the highly maneuverable armored and mechanized troops.

The operations of the latter can be shown most vividly from the example of such outstanding operations as the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder. They were carried out on a broad front and to a great depth reaching 400-600 km. In the course of combat operations, the Soviet troops overcame enemy defenses in multiple lines and crushed its major groupings. Without exaggeration it can be said that the skillful maneuvering of the troops was one of the most important conditions for the attaining of success in these operations. However, before taking up the questions of conducting the highly maneuverable combat operations of the armored and mechanized troops in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations, let us examine certain factors which determined their success.

As is known, the main and decisive mission of any offensive operation--the breaking through of the tactical defensive zone--is achieved by the decisive massing of men and equipment in the breakthrough sectors and by the skillful formation of the assault groupings for the purpose of making maximum use of their combat capabilities.

In the Belorussian Operation, the assault groupings of the fronts included up to 70 percent of the rifle divisions, up to 80 percent of the guns and mortars, and virtually 100 percent of the tanks, SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], and aviation. In the Vistula-Oder Operation, the assault groupings of the fronts numbered

84-85 percent of the guns and mortars, over 90 percent of the tanks and SAU, and 75 percent of the aviation. It should be pointed out that there were 5,200 tanks involved in the Belorussian Operation and over 7,000 in the Vistula-Oder.

The high concentration of personnel and equipment in the breakthrough areas of the fronts which comprised 14-15 percent of the total offensive zones in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations made it possible to have the following operational densities: 1-1.5 km per division, from 180 to 310 guns and mortars, and 45-104 tanks and SAU per km of front.[1]

In order to strengthen the initial thrust and quickly break through the enemy tactical defensive zone, a significant portion of the tanks and SAU available on the fronts (in the armies) were assigned to the first operational echelon were direct infantry support. In the Belorussian Operation, for these purposes around 44 percent of the total number of combat vehicles was used, and in the Vistula-Oder one, 32 percent of the tanks and SAU. This made it possible to create average densities which equaled 22-25 units per km of breakthrough area. The overall operational tank density was significantly higher. In the Belorussian Operation in the breakthrough sectors of the Third and First Belorussian fronts, this reached 44-45 tanks and SAU, and in the Vistula-Oder 95-104.

After completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone, chief attention was focused on one of the basic problems of military art, the problem of exploiting the success. Its solution consisted in the prompt and skillful intensifying of the efforts of the assault groupings of the armies and fronts in the sectors of the main thrust and the rapid exploitation of the success of the offensive in the operational depth of the enemy defenses.

The decisive means for exploiting the success of an offensive was the mobile groups of the fronts and combined-arms armies, the role of which was performed by the tank armies and the separate tank (mechanized) corps. They comprised a separate echelon in the operational formation of the troops, and were used for exploiting the offensive and countering the enemy reserves. In the Belorussian Operation, they included 3,200 tanks and SAU, that is, more than 62 percent of the tanks and SAU available on the fronts. In the Vistula-Oder Operation, 4,800 tanks and SAU were used for this purpose, or 68 percent of their total number. The individual tank corps being, as a rule, the echelon for exploiting the success of the armies, were used for completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone. The tank field forces comprised the echelons for exploiting the success of the fronts, and they were were to be committed to battle when the combined-arms armies of the first echelon had already broken through the tactical defenses. It is essential to stress particularly that in the Belorussian Operation the mobile groups of the Third Belorussian Front were used in two echelons: in the first the cavalry mechanized group (KMG) and the II Guards Tank Corps, and in the second the 5th Guards Tank Army. When necessary the KMG and the tank corps could participate in completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone and thereby create favorable conditions for throwing the 5th Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough.

In analyzing the combat operations of the armored and mechanized troops in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations, it is essential first of all to note the decisive and rapid operations of the tank armies and corps for the purpose of encircling or splitting the large enemy groupings.

In the Belorussian Operation, the breakthrough of the enemy defenses on six operational axes and the rapid exploitation of the success in depth by the formations and field forces of the armored and mechanized troops supported by aviation created favorable conditions for executing the maneuver to encircle and destroy the Vitebsk and Bobruysk enemy groupings and its large grouping to the east of Minsk. Here the encirclement, the destruction of the enemy groupings and the exploitation of the success occurred simultaneously.

The highly maneuverable operations of the I and II Guards Tank Corps and the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the encirclement of the Minsk grouping can serve as an example. As a result of the successful exploitation of the Belorussian Operation, the mobile formations of the Third and First Belorussian Fronts by 29 June had wedged deeply into the enemy operational defenses and had skirted the flanks of the Nazi 4th Field Army which was retreating under the strikes by the troops of the Second Belorussian Front in the direction of Minsk. It was apparent that the encirclement of its main forces could best be carried out by a rapid operational pursuit of the enemy. This mission was successfully carried out by the I and II Guards Tank Corps which were part, respectively, of the 11th Guards and 65th armies.[2]

The II Guards Tank Corps after crossing the Berezina River in the region of Chernyavki on the morning of 2 July 1944 resumed the pursuit of the enemy, in developing a rapid offensive toward Minsk. The formations of the corps under the command of Gen A. S. Burdeynyy in routing the retreating enemy troops on the move, caused them heavy losses and in the morning of 3 July were the first to break into the capital of Belorussia from the northeast. Units of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached the northern outskirts of the city, followed by the forward detachments of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. At 1300 hours, the I Guards Tank Corps entered Minsk from the south. Behind it from the southwest came the formations of the 3d Army of the First Belorussian Front. The ring of encirclement around the enemy grouping was closed to the east of the city. Along with the inside front, a mobile outside encirclement front was formed. The carrying out of this mission initially involved troops from the 5th Guards Tank Army, the cavalry-mechanized groups of the fronts and the III Guards Mechanized Corps, and later on the extenal encirclement front, formations of the I and II Guards Tank Corps and the IX Tank Corps were also active. The rapid advance of the armored and mechanized troops on the external front made it possible to securely seal off the surrounded groupings and ensured their rapid liquidation.

In the Vistula-Oder Operation, the tank armies and the separate tank corps, in exploiting the success, employed another form of operational maneuver. They deeply split and destroyed piecemeal the opposing enemy groupings, and anticipated the enemy in occupying important lines and objectives. Under these conditions, of crucial significance was the high rate of advance which reached 40-50 km a day, and on individual days 90 km.[3]

The operations of the tank armies, the tank and mechanized corps in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations were characterized by great dynamicness, by broad maneuvering, and by frequent changes in the directions of the offensive. Here of important significance were the raids by the forward detachments as well as by the tank and mechanized formations which were significantly ahead of the main forces and struck at the flanks and rear of the enemy groupings. Convincing proof of this would be the maneuver of the III Guards Mechanized Corps during the second stage of

the Belorussian Operation. Being a mobile group in the First Baltic Front, the formation, after capturing a major enemy center of resistance in Shyaulyay, was turned to a new, Riga axis, and was given the mission of advancing to the north along the Shyaulyay--Yelgava highway. In advancing in isolation from the combined-arms armies, the corps successfully carried out the mission of the operational encirclement of the enemy Baltic grouping and the capturing of major communications centers. Over the 6 days it advanced 250 km, and cut off the overland enemy lines of communications between the Baltic and East Prussia. On 28 July 1944, the formations of the corps began the battles for Yelgava. Considering that the battle for the city would be drawn out and the situation necessitated the rapid reaching of the Bay of Riga by our troops, the commander of the front ordered a portion of the forces in the corps to head north, to Tukums. The commander of the formation, Gen V. T. Obukhov, entrusted this mission to the 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade which carried out a rapid 125-km forced march, it captured Tukums without a halt, and its reinforced forward detachment reached Klapkalis on the shore of the Bay of Riga. As a result, the seaside highway was cut linking the Baltic grouping with East Prussia.[4] Thus, the highly maneuverable combat operations of the III Guards Mechanized Corps in the second stage of the Belorussian Operation provided an opportunity for the first Baltic Front to rapidly shift its efforts to the Riga axis and cut the last overland line of communication for the German Army Group North.

One of the difficult tasks which confronted the troops of the fronts after the breaking of the enemy defenses was the defeat of counterstrike groupings and the enemy reserves which were being moved up. The carrying out of this was entrusted primarily to the tank armies, the tank (mechanized) corps and the aviation.

The experience of the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations indicates that the reaching of the flank and rear of the enemy operational groupings and their rapid defeat were achieved basically due to the broad maneuvering by the tank formations and field forces, and this often led to a change in the directions of the strikes and to a turning of the tank armies and corps. An example of the creative use of maneuvering for carrying out suddenly arising missions in the operational depth of the enemy defenses was the operations of the 2d Tank Army in the second stage of the Belorussian Operation.

The field force was committed to battle in the Lublin sector on 22 July 1944. In pursuing the retreating enemy units, by the end of 25 July it had reached the Vistula, and together with the troops of the 8th Guards Army, without stopping captured the cities of Pulawy and Diemblin. In the morning of 27 July, in accord with the plan of the commander of the front, the 2d Tank Army began a drive to the north in the direction of Warsaw with the mission of capturing the suburb of this city, Praga.[5] The basic aim of such a turn was to defeat the enemy operational reserves being brought up to the north of Warsaw and to support the crossing of the Vistula by the main forces of the front. The operations of the 2d Tank Army also created the threat of breaking into the rear of the Brest enemy grouping. It must be pointed out that the army had only 15 hours for preparing the offensive on the new axis. The commander of the field force took the decision to strike against the reserves using the forces of the III and VIII Tank corps. The latter by this time was in the second echelon of the army and was not participating in battles. The small-scale intra-army regrouping of the troops was to be carried out under the cover of the XVI Tank Corps which temporarily, before the arrival of the combined-arms armies, defended the eastern bank of the Vistula in the area of Diemblin. Reconnaissance was immediately sent out to the new sector, and from the first echelon

corps, forward detachments were sent out for the purpose of capturing roads in the region of Ceglow and Sonnica.[6]

Equally interesting and instructive is the maneuver of the 3d Guards Tank Army in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945. Upon the order of the commander of the First Ukrainian Front, it was turned to the southwest in the direction of Oppeln, and then to the rear of the Silesian enemy grouping. Its bold and decisive actions played an important role in the rapid defeat of major enemy forces and in the liberation of the Silesian industrial region.

In the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations, great importance was given to the pursuit of the enemy by armored and mechanized troops. This was caused by the development of favorable conditions for it brought about by the rapid breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone. The mission of pursuing the enemy was entrusted to the tank armies and corps. Thus, in the Vistula-Oder Operation, the First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts, having in their effectives four tank armies, six separate tank and mechanized corps, as well as powerful air armies, went over to pursuit (basically parallel) on the second-third day of the operation, and conducted it continuously during the day and night for 14-16 days to a depth up to 500 km. This made it possible to anticipate the enemy in reaching important defensive lines, to deprive it of convenient routes of retreat, and to create a threat to the flanks and the rear as well as conditions for the successful encirclement of the enemy groupings.

Success was achieved due to the high rate of the operational pursuit of the enemy by the troops of the 1st, 2d and 3d Guards armies and the 4th Tank Army, and the separate tank corps, as well as by their skillful and highly fluid operations. The average rate of advance for the troops of the 1st and 2d Guards Tank armies, for example, was 50-60 km, and on individual days 90 km per day. The gap between the tank field forces and formations and the combined-arms armies reached 40-60 km and more. As a result, breaches were formed in the enemy defenses, and it was unable to promptly close them and was forced to retreat in depth.

The development of the offensive by the tank armies and corps in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations was also related to the crossing of the enemy's intermediate defensive lines. Thus, in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation the troops of the 1st, 2d and 3d Guards and 4th Tank armies had to cross four-six lines each along a broad front on the move or after short preparations. Here they made skillful use of the weak points and openings in the formation of the enemy's defenses.

Highly maneuverable combat operations by the tank armies and corps in the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder operations also occurred in the crossing of water obstacles. The crossing of the numerous rivers was also carried out, as a rule, on the march and along a broad front.

One of the indicators of the highly maneuverable combat operations of the tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps in the designated operations was the ability of the formations to immediately shift from one type to another and to quickly reform from march columns into approach-march and battle formations and back again.

The most important trait in the highly maneuverable combat operations of the tank armies and corps, both in the Belorussian as well as in the Vistula-Oder operations,

was the broad use of forward detachments. Without engaging the enemy in extended battles, they boldly outflanked the centers of enemy resistance, they found the weak spots in the enemy defenses, reached the lines of retreat for its main forces, they captured and held bridgeheads, bridges, fords and crossings on numerous rivers, they captured airfields and road junctions, advantageous lines and areas, thereby creating the most favorable conditions for the main forces of the tank armies and corps. In the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the forward detachments also crossed fortified areas (the Mezeritz and Poznan). As a result of their bold and decisive actions on a broad front the planned enemy retreat was interrupted and a favorable situation arose for the rapid exploitation of the operation. The distance between the detachments and the main forces of the tank armies, for example, in the Vistula-Oder Operation was 40-50 and sometimes 100 km. Very characteristic were the actions in this operation of the forward detachment from the VI Guards Tank Corps of the 3d Guards Tank Army consisting of the reinforced 51st Guards Tank Brigade.

During the night of 13 January, the brigade reached the Nida River in the area of Sobkowa, and on a broad front (6-8 km) conducted reconnaissance for places of possible crossings. Having located fords to the south of this population point, it crossed the water obstacle and by the end of the day had enlarged the bridgehead up to 6 km along the front and 4 km in depth. By 2100 hours, the main forces of the VI Guards Tank Corps had arrived, and during the night they crossed to the bridgehead captured by the forward detachment. By this time a 60-ton bridge had been built in the area of Sobkowa, and the artillery and rear services of the corps crossed over this.[7]

The Vistula-Oder Operation was given a highly maneuverable nature by the forward detachments of not only the tank armies and corps, but also by the detachments which were created with the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone in the combined-arms armies, the rifle corps and even divisions. The latter consisted predominantly of tank units attached to the corps and divisions for supporting the infantry. Thus, the forward detachment of the 5th Assault Army included the 220th Separate Tank Brigade, the 89th Heavy Tank Regiment, the 1006th Rifle Regiment, the 360th Separate Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion, the 507th Tank Killing Artillery Regiment, a battalion of field rocket launchers, a mortar battalion and a company of combat engineers.[8] The forward detachment of the 8th Guards Army consisted of the 516th Tank Regiment, a rifle battalion and the 38th Separate Tank Killing Artillery Brigade.[9]

The attached forces of the forward detachments shows that the army commanders, after breaking through the tactical defensive zone, endeavored to move the tank and self-propelled artillery units forward. In possessing great strike and fire power as well as high mobility, they incessantly pursued the enemy and thwarted the plans of the enemy to take up the defensive on prepared lines.

Thus, in speaking about the highly maneuverable combat operations of the tank armies, the tank and mechanized corps in the course of the Belorussian and Vistula-Oder offensive operations, it is essential to stress that these were achieved primarily by the deep operational and tactical echeloning of the troops and by the creation of high densities of artillery and direct infantry support tanks on narrow sectors of the front for the purpose of the prompt and effective breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone. The successes of the armored and mechanized

troops were achieved by rapidly changing the axis of operations for carrying out new missions which arose in the course of the operation; by the broad use of forward detachments; by the crossing of lines and water barriers which were hurriedly occupied by the enemy along a broad front and without a halt; by conducting operational pursuit at a high pace on a broad front predominantly parallel to the routes of the enemy retreat; by the encirclement, breaking up and destruction of enemy groupings; by the broad use of raid operations, outflankings and the sealing off of centers of resistance; by the rapid transition from one type of combat operations to another.

The experience of conducting highly maneuverable combat operations by the armored and mechanized troops in the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War indicated that the increase in the scope of armed combat and the mass use of various types of military equipment (predominantly armored) on the battlefields significantly increased the role of the maneuver which was to become one of the most important conditions for achieving success.

The tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps comprised the echelons for exploiting the success, respectively, of the fronts and armies. They solved one of the most important problems of offensive operations, namely the increasing of efforts by the troops of the first echelon and the exploitation of the success of an offensive operation in close cooperation with the combined-arms formations, the aviation and airborne troops.

The high mobility and great strike force of the tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps made it possible to make strong and effective strikes against the flanks and the rear of enemy operational groupings, to surround and destroy them piecemeal, and thwart the enemy's attempts to stabilize the front on intermediate lines. The field forces and formations of the armored troops deprived the Nazis of the opportunity to promptly restore the integrity of their front, they disrupted command and the supply system, and contributed to the seizing and retaining of initiative by our troops. The tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps developed the front of combat in the enemy rear and ensured the success of the offensive by the main forces of the fronts and the combined-arms armies, and they increased the scope, maneuverability and decisiveness of the front and army operations during the war years.

Undoubtedly the experience of their conducting of highly maneuverable combat operations is of enormous cognitive significance in our days. Its study and creative application in combat and operational training will help to further increase the level of troop combat readiness.

FOOTNOTES

[1]A. I. Radziyevskiy, "Proryv" [Breakthrough], Voyenizdat, 1979, pp 99, 126.

[2]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 241, inv. 2658, file 25, sheets 226-300.

[3]A. I. Radziyevskiy, "Tankovyy Udar" [Tank Strike], Voyenizdat, 1977, p 132.

[4]TsAMO, folio 605, inv. 13658, file 4, sheets 1-31.

[5]Ibid., folio 307, inv. 17011, file 8, sheet 2.

[6]Ibid., inv. 4148, file 226, sheet 94.

[7]Ibid., folio 51, inv. 1, file 2, sheet 131.

[8]Ibid., folio 333, inv. 4885, file 347, sheets 10-11.

[9]Ibid., folio 345, inv. 5497, file 93, sheets 237-238.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: RIVER CROSSING BY TANK UNITS

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[Article published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Lt Col K. Petrov: "Tanks Make a Forced Crossing of the Western Bug"]

[Text] The L'vov-Sandomir Operation holds an important place among those of 1944. It provides instructive examples for the organization and implementation of a breakthrough of a strong deeply-echeloned enemy defense, and the consecutive crossing of such water obstacles as the Western Bug, Zolotaya Lipa, Dnestr, San and Vistula. The tank units, formations and field forces operating on the tip of the main thrust played an important role in the rapid development of the offensive by the Soviet troops. One of the most instructive examples was the crossing of the Western Bug by the 44th Guards Tank Brigade, and this was carried out in the course of combat operations under a difficult situation by a portion of the forces without a halt, and by the remainder with brief preparations.

The XI Guards Tank Corps was ordered to enter the breakthrough in the area of the XXII Rifle Corps,[1] to cross the Western Bug without a halt, and exploit the success on the Rawa Ruska access.[2] In accord with this, the commander of the XI Guards Tank Corps, Lt Gen Tank Trps A. L. Getman, made his decision and issued missions to the formations and units.

The 44th Guards Tank Brigade under the command of Col I. I. Gusakovskiy and reinforced by the 1454th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment under Lt Col P. A. Mel'nikov, the 1018th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment of Maj I. S. Savchenko and by two companies from the 14th Separate Mining Engineer Battalion, was to enter the breakthrough from the line of Zboisk--Nowa--Vies, to rapidly exploit the success in the direction of Rozdzalow and Komarow, to cross the Western Bug without a halt in the section of Zawisznia and Klosow, and by the end of the day occupy the areas of Zuzel, Boratyn and M. Biele (see the diagram). Subsequently it was to advance on the Rawa Ruska axis. The jump-off area for the crossing was the forest to the southeast of Zawisznia. On the right the 40th Guards Tank Brigade was to advance. The second echelon of the corps was made up of the 45th Guards Tank Brigade and the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. The absence of an adjacent unit on the left demanded that the brigade commander and staff make provision for securing an exposed flank.



Combat Operations of the 44th Guards Tank Brigade.
17-19 July 1944 in the L'vov-Sandomir Operation

In a supplementary order, the corps commander ordered the commander of the 44th Guards Tank Brigade to assign a forward detachment consisting of a reinforced tank battalion with the task of crossing the Western Bug, seizing and holding a bridgehead in the region of the population point of Dobraczin.

By the start of the combat operations, the brigade had: 1,301 personnel, 37 T-34 tanks, 4 76-mm cannons, 6 82-mm mortars.[3] In the attached units were: the 1454th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment with 12 85-mm SAU [self-propelled artillery mount],[4] and in the 1018th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, 16 37-mm antiaircraft guns.[5]

The staffs of the formation and battalions had acquired significant experience in organizing the combat operations involved in pursuing the enemy and crossing water obstacles. Also a major role was played by the measures conducted in the preparatory period. Thus, from 17 through 23 June 1944, the entire personnel of the brigade was in training, crossing the Dnestr River. The motorized infantry crossed on the DSL collapsible landing boat and using available equipment, while the artillery and motor transport crossed on ferries and rafts. A portion of the tanks crossed over a ford which had been built. As a demonstration, two tanks in the presence of the tank crews from all the brigades in the corps crossed along the river bottom, the depth of which was around 2.5 m. Exercises were conducted with the officers to organize cooperation in the crossing of the Western Bug and the area of the forthcoming battles was studied.

The men of the brigade had great experience in crossing water obstacles. All the vehicles were prepared for fording the river.

By 13 July 1944, the 213th and 291st enemy infantry divisions were on the defensive in the area of operations of the XI Guards Tank Corps. They had been reinforced by two artillery regiments, by a battalion of assault guns and by other subunits. These forces occupied the tactical defensive zone consisting of two strips with a total depth of 12-16 km.

The third defensive zone of the Nazis in the Rawa Ruska section was prepared along the western bank of the Western Bug.[6] Three lines of trenches had been built on certain areas of it. The first was 150-200 m from the bank, the second was 1.5-2 km from the first, and the third 1.5-2 km from the second.

The presence of a previously prepared and solidly occupied tactical defensive zone as well as a large tank grouping directly behind the second defensive line made it possible for the Nazis to actively influence the course of the operation in its initial stage.

The Western Bug was one of the largest water obstacles in the zone of the offensive. Its valley, largely narrow, in individual areas broadened to 2.5 km, in places it was swampy, and covered by brush and cut by branches of the old channel. The width of the floodplain was 1-1.5 km and the banks were broken by ravines and washes. In the sector from Sokal to Krystynopol, the river width was 50-70 m and a depth to 1 m with sandbanks. The speed of the current was 0.3-0.5 m per second, and the river bottom was sandy, in places silty, and in certain areas stoney.[7] During the summertime, many different types of fords were formed.

The banks had steep bluffs. Special engineering work was carried out for crossing them. On the sector from Dobraczin to the south, the eastern bank of the river was covered by a solid wooded area, and this provided for the concealed concentration of the troops before the crossing. The western bank over a significant distance was swampy, but in the dry season became passable for all the branches of troops.[8] Such a water barrier made it possible for the tank formations to cross it on a broad front, but at the same time complicated the crossing of the artillery and motor transport, as in the shallow areas it was difficult to put up raft bridges or use portoons.

The brigade commander, Col I. I. Gusakovskiy, after studying the mission received and assessing the situation, decided to commit the brigade to the breakthrough in the following manner: the reconnaissance group, the support detachment, the forward detachment, the main forces and the rear.[9] Such a formation provided an opportunity for flexible maneuvering, for rapid deployment of the men and equipment for combat, for a dependable cover of the units and formations against enemy air strikes, for the carrying out of systematic pursuit, for crossing the water obstacles without a halt, and for dependable command. The success of the formation was largely determined by the actions of the forward detachment to which had been assigned the 3d Tank Battalion under the command of Capt A. P. Ivanov and reinforced by a company of submachine gunners, a battery from the 1018th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, an antitank battery, a platoon of antiaircraft machine guns and a combat engineer platoon.[10]

To outrun the infantry and rapidly advance to the Western Bug over the route of Zobkow, Komarow and Zavishnia, but not to engage in battle; if centers of resistance were encountered they were to be skirted; the main thing was to anticipate the retreating enemy and not allow it to dig in on the other bank, to capture a bridgehead in the region of Dobraczin and hold it until the basic forces arrived--this was the mission of the forward detachment.

In accord with the order of the corps commander, the brigade initiated combat operations. Its forward detachment moved up to the line of entering battle on the morning of 17 July and at 1000 hours, having outpaced the rifle subunits, continued to exploit the success achieved by them. At 1300 hours, at the approach to the population point of Zobkow, it encountered a swamp up to 200 m wide which was impassable for the tanks.

Having reported this to the formation commander, Capt Ivanov received orders to turn back through Zabawa, and in moving along the route of the adjacent 40th Guards Tank Brigade, to skirt the impassable area of terrain. The forward detachment followed by the main forces of the brigade, having crossed to the western bank of the Mlynowka River, skirted Perespa on the south over a bridge which had been reinforced by the combat engineers, and reached their route (Zobkow, Komarow). The way was open for the brigade to the Western Bug, its right flank was covered by the adjacent 40th Guards tbr [tank brigade], and the left by the swampy valley of the Mlynowka.

By 1300 hours, the Nazis had moved units from the 17th Tank Division up into the region of Perespa and had strengthened resistance. The attack of the 40th Guards tbr on Perespa was unsuccessful. The center of resistance was skirted on the south, and the formation captured the population point of Kolenia, but was unable to advance further to its goal.

In developing pursuit and without engaging the retreating enemy subunits and individual groups, the forward detachment of the 44th Guards tbr by 1700 hours had skirted Komarow on the right, and by 1900 hours of 17 July was the first in the corps to reach the eastern bank of the Western Bug, and concentrated in the forest to the southeast of Zavishnia for the crossing. Having made his way under cover to the river and having studied the ford, Capt A. P. Ivanov gave the missions to the commanders of the tank companies and the submachine gun companies for the crossing, and to the commanders of the antitank and antiaircraft artillery batteries and the antiaircraft machine gun platoon for supporting the combat operations of the tank troops. By 1930 hours, the subunits had begun the crossing in the area to the north of Dobraczin.[11] By this time, the enemy had been able to pull back a portion of the forces of the 291st Irfantry and 17th Tank divisions to the western bank, and hurriedly went over to the defensive on the previously prepared line, endeavoring to prevent the crossing of the river by our troops. Each time the tanks appeared by the water's edge, the enemy opened up with heavy artillery fire. Regardless of this, at 2000 hours, the detachment had forded the river and had begun the battle for Dobraczin which had been turned by the enemy into a center of resistance.[12]

The submachine gunners were the first to cross the Western Bug by swimming and with any available equipment, and their actions were directed by the deputy commander of the 3d Tank Battalion V. S. Yudin. In overcoming fierce Nazi resistance, they, regardless of the heavy artillery and mortar fire, entered Dobraczin. The communists and Komsomol members were in the front ranks, and they led the remaining soldiers. For able actions, courage and heroism, Sr Lt Yudin was given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union,[13] and many soldiers received orders and medals.

In benefiting from the success of the submachine gunners, the main forces of the forward detachment began to cross. The tanks forded the river, while the antitank artillery came across on rafts. Immediately after coming out on the opposite shore, they engaged in battle. The guardsmen fought courageously and skillfully. Thus, a chemical warfare squad from the 172d Separate Chemical Defense Company of the corps which had been assigned to the 3d Tank Battalion fought as a landing party on one of the tanks. Regardless of the heavy enemy fire, the men immediately after the crossing rushed into the attack. They destroyed a machine gun crew and ten Nazis.

By 2000 hours, the 2d Tank Battalion (Commander, Capt A. A. Karabanov) had reached the river. Having assessed the existing situation, Col I. I. Gusakovskiy decided, without waiting for the arrival of all the forces of the formation to reach the water obstacle, to cross the second Tank Battalion to the western bank and commit it to battle for broadening the bridgehead. The tanks were to ford the Western Bug and the attached antitank artillery would cross on rafts. The bold and enterprising actions of the forward detachment made it possible for units of forces from the 2d Tank Battalion by the end of the day to cross the river and broaden the captured bridgehead along a front of up to 3 km and in depth to 2 km. The Nazi resistance increased. Their aviation made bombing and straffing attacks against our tanks and impeded the main forces of the brigade from fully crossing the river.[14] The bridgehead came under fire by enemy artillery and mortars.

By the end of 17 July, the main forces of the formation were already concentrated in the woods to the southeast of Zavishnia. The routes of approach to the river had already been reconnoitered and prepared, and the places and condition of the fords

had been clarified. The combat engineer subunits prepared the parts for wooden bridges on frame supports, the rafts for ferrying the artillery, and concentrated the crossing equipment on the bank. Particular attention was given to the setting up of a standing barge on the probable routes of enemy counterattacks from the region of Boratyn, Dobraczin and Ostrow. During the night of 18 July, a portion of the corps artillery conducted battery fire against the enemy firing positions and supported the combat of the 2d and 3d Tank battalions. Fire was corrected by artillery spotters who were with the forward detachment.

At 0400 hours on 18 July, the enemy counterattacks intensified. In the region of Dobraczin, up to 30 tanks were involved in them from the 17th Tank Division with the support of several assault guns, and in the region of Klosow up to an infantry battalion with 13 tanks. For reinforcing the troops defending the western bank, the Nazi command shifted the 4th Infantry Regiment from the region of Chelm to the region of Sokal. This substantially complicated the actions of the subunits on the bridgehead.

The situation required a more rapid crossing by the brigade units remaining on the eastern bank. At dawn, after artillery softening up involving the self-propelled artillery and a portion of the tanks, the main forces of the formation began the crossing. During this period the 1454th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment operated successfully, and its batteries frequently changed firing positions without allowing the enemy artillery to get a fix on them. In shifting firing positions in the region 1 km to the northeast of Dobrzeczin, they used smoke.[15]

By 2000 hours,[16] the 44th Guards tbr had crossed the river and had reached the northern outskirts of Dobraczin. The tanks of the 2d and 1st Tank battalions forded the river and without halting entered battle. Under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, the men of the motorized submachine gun battalion under the command of Capt K. Ya. Usanov waded across as well as with available equipment and DSL.

The antitank artillery having crossed on rafts made by the combat engineers, immediately took up firing positions for repelling the enemy tank and infantry counterattacks. The antiaircraft gunners of the 1018th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment covered the units of the brigade during the crossing.

In the course of fierce battles, the forward detachment suffered heavy casualties. This forced Capt A. P. Ivanov in the middle of the day to pull back his subunits from the northeastern edge of Dobraczin to an area 1 km to the east of Klosow and dig in there.[18] As a result of the fierce battles just three tanks remained in the forward detachment, and these, in maneuvering skillfully, just in repelling one of the numerous enemy counterattacks, destroyed two "Tiger" T-VI heavy tanks, one T-IV medium tank, two guns and up to 60 soldiers and officers.[19]

In the battle for Klosow, the commander of the 3d Tank Battalion, Capt A. P. Ivanov, distinguished himself, and with his crew with accurate fire destroyed two armored railway trucks and in eight places put the railway embankment out of commission.[20]

With the forces of the retreating subunits of the 291st Infantry Division and with the support of tanks from the 16th and 17th Tank divisions, the enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance. On the morning of 19 July, the enemy again went over to the counterattack. Up to 22 tanks with infantry, with the support of artillery

and mortar fire, endeavored to crush our units on the bridgehead. The crew of Sr Sgt I. N. Dymnikov particularly distinguished itself in the stubborn battles which were initiated. Having boldly chosen a firing position, the guardsmen prepared to repel the counterattack of enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. They focused basic attention on the approaching "Tiger" which, was lumbering forward. Letting it come to a distance of 500 m, Dymnikov gave the command to open fire. The track was hit with the first round. The "Tiger" halted, continuing to fire sporadically. Dymnikov set the enemy vehicle afire with the second and third round. In the course of the battle all the shells were spent, but the enemy was continuing the attack. Seeing that the tank on the left had been hit and had stopped firing, Dymnikov made his way to it, took out the remaining 15 shells and carried them to his vehicle. The crew opened fire again against the fascists.

During the night of 20 July, the brigade skirted Boratyn on the north and south, and the enemy, fearing encirclement, abandoned it.

The successful combat operations of the 44th Guards tbr in crossing the Western Bug were determined by the thorough preparations of the personnel for the offensive, by the high combat skills, and by the ability to act decisively under the conditions of a woody-swampy terrain as well as in population points. The tanks operated boldly and at maximum speed deep in the offenses and on the bridgehead in order to prevent the enemy from catching its breath and putting up organized resistance, and in detecting insurmountable obstacles, these were skirted and advance was continued.

Important factors in the attaining of success were: the preliminary study of the region of the forthcoming battles by the guardsmen, the skillful organization of reconnaissance, the precise cooperation between the tank battalions, the artillery and other attached weapons, a solid knowledge of their equipment and its able use in combat.

We should also note the clear and constant control over the subunits of the forward detachment and the main forces by the brigade commander and the staff. Thus, regardless of the complex situation, Col Gusakovskiy was able to organize prior support for the 2d and 3d Tank battalions which were engaged in heavy battles for holding and broadening the bridgehead.

The combat operations of the formation are an example of combining two methods of crossing a river--by the forward detachment without a halt, and by the main forces with brief preparations. Here great work was carried out by the combat engineer subunits. They provided engineer reconnaissance and equipped the fords, and they built the rafts for the crossing of military equipment, and later the bridges.

The motherland had high regard for the courage and heroism of the men in the 44th Guards tbr. Col I. I. Gusakovskiy, Capts A. P. Ivanov and K. Ya. Usanov, and Sr Lt V. S. Yudin were given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Many men of the brigade were awarded high governmental decorations.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The corps was under the command of Maj Gen F. V. Zakharov.

[2]TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 299, inv. 20541", file 5, sheet 13.

[3]Ibid., inv. 3070, file 478, sheet 89.

[4]Ibid., folio 615, inv. 49295, file 2, sheets 8-9.

[5]Ibid., folio 299, inv. 3070, file 843, sheet 90.

[6]Ibid., folio 290, inv. 52944, file 6, sheet 141.

[7]Ibid., inv. 3070, file 523, sheet 19.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., folio 3136, inv. 214696, file 7, sheet 4.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., folio 299, inv. 3070, file 478, sheet 93.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid., inv. 20542, file 1, sheet 99.

[14]Ibid., folio 3136, inv. 214696, file 7, sheet 3.

[15]Ibid., folio 299, inv. 3070, file 478, sheet 134.

[16]Ibid., file 444, sheet 234.

[17][No footnote]

[18]Ibid., file 523, sheet 27.

[19]Ibid., inv. 20542, file 1, sheet 94.

[20]Ibid.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: U.S. AND ENGLISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS

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[Article published under the heading "In Foreign Armies" by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank L. Ol'shtynskiy: "Amphibious Landing Operations of the U.S. and English Armed Forces from the Experience of World War II." Portions in italics originally in bold face.]

[Text] During the years of World War II, the U.S. and English armed forces conducted amphibious landing operations which were of operational or, in certain instances, operational-strategic significance. They were carried out by the joint efforts of the ground troops, the navy and aviation, and represented operations coordinated and interrelated by a common concept and plan for organizing, transporting by sea and landing a party on enemy-defended territory, as well as the carrying out of combat missions on the shore.

In the present article which does not claim to be a complete coverage, the author examines only certain questions related to the preparations for and conduct of the amphibious landing operations.

Preparations for the amphibious landing operations included: the taking of the decision; the setting of missions; planning; the organization of the forces, command, interaction and all types of support; preparation of the troops and forces; the equipping of the concentration areas for loading on the vessels, and other measures. The operations were carried out, as a rule, under favorable conditions of a significant distance away from the enemy home territory, and with a sufficient time reserve for carrying out the basic measures. In a number of instances the readiness of the landing party determined the final dates for the landing.

On 8-11 November 1942, Anglo-American troops (more than 108,000 men[1]) landed in North Africa (Operation Torch). Participating in the operation were around 450 naval ships and transports under the overall command of the English Admiral E. Cunningham.[2] Preparations had been underway for 6 months, and the operation was carried out when the basic forces of the Nazi army were tied down on the Soviet-German Front. The Allied Command had a full knowledge of the grouping and plans of

the Italo-German troops in North Africa, as it had systematically intercepted and decoded the enemy radio traffic[3] and had reached an agreement with the leadership of the French forces that they would not put up resistance. At sea the Allied fleet exceeded the Italo-German forces by many-fold. In subsequent operations both in Europe and on the Pacific, already prepared enemy antilanding defenses had to be crossed, and this told on the duration and increased the scope of preparatory measures. The long preparatory times (from several months to 18-24 months, for example, for the Normandy Operation) made it possible for the Anglo-American leadership to carefully plan the operations and concentrate superior resources. Thus, in the Sicilian Operation (10 July-17 August 1943), the ratio of forces in the ground troops was almost 2:1, and in aviation more than 8:1,[4] and in the Normandy Landing (6 June-24 July 1944), respectively, 3:1 and 61.4:1.[5] Here, in all the operations the naval forces operated under exceptionally favorable conditions and had predominant superiority. Approximately the same picture was observed in the U.S. operations on the Pacific.

The decision to conduct an operation with the landing of major operational-strategic forces was taken by the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. They set the goals of the operation, the composition of the landing forces and the support forces, the landing area, the approximate times for the preparations and conduct of the operation, they organized the forces and the command, and set the basic methods for carrying out the given mission. After the approval of the decision by the strategic leadership, the high command and the staff of the "Allied Expeditionary Forces" were set, as well as the command and staffs of the Allied land, naval and air forces and these began the detailed planning of the operation. Ordinarily they worked out a general plan of the operation and numerous particular plans for the use of the services of the armed forces and branches of troops (forces) for the stages and even days, as well as plans for the various types of support. Particularly important significance was given to the questions of determining the optimum areas and time for the landing of the troops. For the purposes of massing the men and equipment for breaking through the antilanding defenses, the landing was planned, as a rule, in one region on several related sectors which should then be quickly linked up into a common beachhead. The large number of specially built landing craft made it possible for the Anglo-American command, beginning in 1943, to land the troops on an unequipped shore at a rapid pace. But even after this, in advancing from the land, it would be possible to capture nearby ports. In selecting the landing areas, consideration was given to the following: The state of the antilanding defenses, the availability of good beaches for landing the troops and equipment, the network of roads and ports for supplying the troops and the convenience of the offensive, the depth, relief of the bottom and tidal conditions, and the possibility of covering the landing forces from the sea and the air. The beginning of the landing was often set at nighttime for the purpose of achieving surprise. However this involved a number of difficulties. From 1944, the landing forces began to land in the morning. Here the chances for attaining surprise were reduced, but a number of other advantages were achieved. These included: easier landing of the troops and equipment, and a higher pace of it, greater effectiveness of the artillery and air support, and the landing troops nad the night for a covert approach to the shore and an entire day for digging in on it. A landing in the morning hours was ensured by enormous superiority of forces and by the preliminary neutralization of the antilanding defenses. As a whole, it must be pointed out that the Allied landing operations were carried out under a favorable situation, with a predominant superiority of men and equipment and with a sufficient amount of time for the most careful and detailed planning.

The organization of command. One of the most important principles in the organization of landing operations was the centralization of command for the formations involved in them from the various services of the armed forces. This was expressed in the creation of a single Allied command over all the expeditionary armed forces and directing the operational-strategic landing. As a rule, they were headed by a combined-arms general who had under him the commanders of the operational field forces from the services of the armed forces. A landing operation, on the one hand, included the loading of the troops on the vessels, the crossing by sea and landing, as a rule, under enemy fire, and on the other, the development of the offensive on the shore. In the first instance, leadership was provided by the commander of the expeditionary naval forces, and in the latter, by the commander of the army or army group.

The most developed were the special assault operational formations the basis of which was comprised of a division of ground troops or marines and the formations of landing craft. These were led by an admiral who ordinarily had a trained staff located on a specially-built ship. Here also were the commanders of the marine formation and the supporting air group.

The organization of cooperation and all types of support. The basis for the organization of cooperation was the decision of the commander for the operation and its plan. Cooperation was worked out in detail in the plans for the joint operations of the ground troops and naval forces, and these reflected in detail all their actions for the stages and days of the operation indicating the methods for the joint execution of the missions. In addition, instructions were compiled for artillery support, the landing of troops, the unloading of equipment, and so forth. Special military games and exercises were conducted for the purpose of working out cooperation.

Great attention was given to the questions of operational, special and material-tactical support. The main task of reconnaissance was to disclose the antilanding defense system and the opposing groupings of ground forces, aviation and naval forces and to determine the enemy's plan to use them. With the start of the preparations for the operation, reconnaissance was focused on the target zone for supporting the landing of the force. Here its basic objectives were the troop groupings, the systems of observation and defensive works, the mine fields and antilanding obstacles and the enemy reserve.

Reconnaissance was conducted by aviation, by submarines, radio, by agents and by special reconnaissance groups. Aerial photographing assumed the greatest scope and significance. For example, in the course of preparing for the Normandy Operation, aviation took more than 700,000 photographs of installations in Northern and Northwestern France, and this made it possible for the command to gain a rather complete picture of the defenses.

As a rule, reconnaissance succeeded in disclosing the basic enemy groupings and the nature of their defenses. However, in a number of operations there were also serious oversights. Thus, the American forces in August 1943 for 3 days bombed and straffed the island of Kiska (the Aleutian Islands), while the landing party on shore discovered that there was no enemy on the island. An analogous situation developed in December 1944 on the island of Mindoro (the Philippine Operation). In instances when the enemy forces were not fully detected, the landing parties

suffered significant losses (the landing of the American troops on the island of Okinawa).[7] In capturing the island of Iwojima (19 February-16 March 1945), the American command did not have the necessary data on the nature of the ground, and the landed troops became stuck in volcanic ash which greatly reduced the rate of the advance and increased casualties.

Operational camouflaging and deception were carried out skillfully, and these were aimed at concealing the start of the operation, as well as the main axis and time of the landing. For this a broad range of measures was carried out. The basic ones were: the conducting of reconnaissance on a broad front, the concealed concentration of the troops in the jumping-off areas, the scattering of forces over ports and bases over a broad front and their separate moving to the landing area, extensive feint and diversionary actions on spurious axes, training sorties to sea under the pretext of actual operations, the maintaining of constant radio communications conditions, the creation of jamming for the enemy observation radars, and the transmitting of false information by agents.

As a whole the preparation of landing operations included an extensive range of measures. In the first landing operations, a great deal of time was spent on planning, the creating of material supplies, operational support, as well as the formation and training of the forces and the command. Subsequently, preparations were carried out more rapidly. This was achieved by setting up special staffs which worked out ahead of time the operational plans; by maintaining permanent commands for the operational formations of the landing forces; by conducting systematic reconnaissance and camouflage in the theater of war in the interests of landing operations; by using in subsequent operations the same formations and units which had previously participated in landing operations; by constantly maintaining material supplies on the necessary level.

The times for preparing the operations were shortened by creating operational landing formations which included troops (chiefly marines), aviation (in the United States, marine aviation), landing craft, their security and artillery support forces, and formations of escort carriers. All these forces were in constant combat readiness, particularly on the Pacific, where the process of creating the combat-ready landing forces was completed by the formation also of a special ship-borne rear services with the necessary supplies and the means for rapidly delivering them. It must be pointed out that this area has continued to be developed in the United States in the postwar period.

The conducting of landing operations involves interrelated combat operations of the naval forces, the aviation and ground forces in transporting the landing force by sea and capturing the designated area of the coast with the crossing of enemy defenses on land, at sea and in the air. The basic stages of the operations were: the build-up of the forces and the embarking of them on the vessels; the crossing by sea; the battle for landing and capturing a beachhead.

A particular feature of conducting landing operations was that they usually started after an extended preliminary softening up of enemy defenses by air strikes. Thus, prior to the landing in Normandy, the Anglo-American aviation for 2 months made systematic attacks against the French railroad communications, as a result of which the capacity of the railroad by the start of July had declined and the volume of traffic was just 20 percent in comparison with January.[8] The preliminary air

softening up also contributed to the winning of complete air and sea superiority in the area of the operation. For example, as a result of the systematic raids by Anglo-American aircraft before the Sicilian Operation, the Italo-German leadership was forced to shift its aviation from the island of Sicily to the Appenine Peninsula not long before the Allied landing.[9]

The build-up of troops and embarkation on vessels required particular concealment. This was achieved by camouflage, by the high rate of embarkation and loading and by using several ports (up to 13) simultaneously for this and along a broad front. Ordinarily the loading ports for the troops were a significant distance away from the landing areas, and sometimes even on different continents (the North African and Sicilian operations). The build-up of troops in the jumping-off areas located 15-20 km from the ports started not earlier than 2-3 days before their embarkation on the vessels, and embarkation began 24 hours before setting to sea. In a majority of instances all these measures provided rapid and covert embarkation of the first landing wave, and this largely contributed to the achieving of surprise.

The crossing by sea was one of the most crucial and complicated stages of the operation. Each division, usually located on vessels of one landing detachment, followed its own route. A landing detachment numbered 20-40 transports with strong ship and air security. Great attention was given to concealment and camouflage. As a rule, the leaving of the ports and the arrival in the landing area were carried out at night, and the routes of the crossing and the composition of the landing detachments were concealed as ordinary convoys. The Anglo-American command often succeeded in confusing the enemy on the time and area of the landing of the force, and this was largely aided by the concealment of the crossing by sea. But when the German command in September 1943 was able ahead of time to detect the leaving of the landing force from the bases as well as determine the area of its landing in the Bay of Solerno the Anglo-American troops which landed on the shore came under attack by German tank divisions.[10] Only the massed use of greatly superior air and naval forces made it possible to avoid the complete destruction of the first wave of the landing.

The battle for the landing of the force was an important and complicated part of an operation. Its essence consisted in breaking through the enemy antilanding defenses in the water and on the shore, and in capturing landing areas which would provide for the further deployment of the basic landing forces.

In a number of major landing operations (Sicilian, Normandy, in the South of France in August 1944), the amphibious landing was preceded by the dropping of an airborne force which captured airfields, ports, road junctions, bridges, and strongpoints, and destroyed the lines of communications, preventing the enemy reserves from being brought up. It was dropped 4-8 hours before the amphibious landing at a distance of 4-12 km behind the shoreline.

In breaking through the antilanding defenses and in capturing beachheads, of decisive significance were the firing capabilities of the various forces. In having a great superiority in forces and in possessing a large amount of landing equipment, the Anglo-American troops, as a rule, successfully crossed the enemy antilanding defenses.

The capturing of a beachhead and the carrying out of the missions by the force on the shore were the concluding stage in the landing operation. After the capture of individual areas of the coastal zone, the landing troops supported by the ships and aviation endeavored to enlarge them in depth and along the front and link them up into a single common operational beachhead from which later on, having built up forces, it would be possible to continue the offensive.

One of the main conditions for success in capturing beachheads and then in the course of creating and broadening the beachhead was the rate at which the number of landing troops increased. If they surpassed the rate of the build-up of troops on the defensive in the landing area, then they succeeded in carrying out successful offensive operations.

The change in the balance of forces on the shore depended on the following factors: The degree of enemy counteraction, the pace of landing the first wave and its tenacity in the battle for the landing, the time of the embarkation of the second-wave troops on the landing craft and their delivery to the captured beachhead, upon the area of the captured area of land, the casualties and the stability of the sea communications of the force.

For achieving a high build-up rate for the troops on the shore, the operational plan made provision primarily for an increase in the composition of the first landing wave. This was transported on specially built landing craft and landed on unequipped shore. Here at the same time there was an increase in the length of the landing front and the escort forces were bolstered designed for covering the landing detachments and supporting the troops. The first wave captured the beachhead and ensured the safe and rapid disembarkation of the second wave of troops. For divisions the size of the area was 4 x 6-5 km and for a corps, 10-12 x 6-8 km.

The second operational wave was brought in on transports to special areas from where, a certain time later after the landing of the first wave of troops, it was moved to the beachhead. The areas of the landing force communications and embarkation areas had a developed system of all types of defense including air, antimine, antilanding and antitorpedo boat defense.

One of the missions of the first wave was to capture adjacent enemy ports, and this significantly increased the disembarkation rate of the troops, the unloading of equipment and materiel. In certain instances artificial harbors and piers were built, and for this, in particular, old ships and naval vessels were sunk (the Normandy Operation).

The troops in the first wave carried, as a rule, 3-5 ammunition loads, 15 refuelings, and 30 days worth of food. Subsequently materiel was delivered by transports on schedule to specially equipped depots and dumps.

The command and the staffs in the course of landing operations supported the cooperation of the forces. The basic content of this was the coordinating of the operations of the landing troops, the naval forces and aviation in terms of targets, place, the time and objectives in the interests of the landing of the force and the carrying out of their missions on the shore.

During the stage of the moving of the force by sea, usually air strikes against enemy ships and airfields were increased and direct air preparations for the landing commenced. The forces in the operational cover patrolled over the major operational sectors, they simultaneously carried out feints according to a special plan, and sometimes dropped an airborne force (the Sicilian and Normandy operations).

The close coordination of all types of the armed forces was carried out during the battle for the landing. This ensured the effectiveness of direct air and artillery softening up and the support for the landing troops, a clear sequence of the landing, the covering of the troops by enemy strikes from the sea and air and the repelling of land counterthrusts, and a rapid build-up of forces.

After the landing of the first wave during the stage of broadening the beachhead, cooperation was often disrupted. Particularly difficult was the problem of the cooperation of the paratroopers with the naval and air forces. Thus, the aircraft which dropped troops in the Sicilian Operation twice came under attack by their own air defense forces and suffered great losses from this.[11] During the Normandy Operation, the airborne force came under bomb strikes of friendly aviation.

One of the characteristic traits of the last war was the increase in the role and scale of landing operations by the Anglo-American armed forces. The basic factors which determined their development were the following: The geographic position of England and the United States which were separated from the enemy by seas and oceans; the development of naval forces capable of covering the landing forces in the move at sea and successfully fighting on land and sea for the landing on equipped and unequipped coasts; the availability of a large shipbuilding base which provided mass construction of specially built landing craft; the acquiring of experience and the increase in the skill of combined operations by the services of the armed forces. All these factors remain valid at present. This has determined the further development of landing operations in the course of local wars and exercises.

Characteristic of the Anglo-American landing operations were extended preparations, the creation of multiple superiority of forces, the preliminary softening up of the opposing enemy grouping and antilanding defenses, as well as the winning of air and sea superiority.

For an extended time, in conducting limited combat operations in the secondary theaters of war, the Anglo-American leadership by landing forces carried out the tasks of capturing advantageous strategic positions in various parts of the world and drew out the opening of a second front in Europe. This was done in their own interests. Only after a fundamental change in the struggle against the Nazi army had occurred as a result of the heroic actions of the Soviet Armed Forces and it became clear that the USSR could achieve victory over Nazi Germany, did the U.S. and English leaders decide to open a second front by a landing in Normandy.

The basic trends in the development of landing operations were: an increase in the fire power of the landing forces, the development of special landing equipment for landing on an unequipped coast, the creation of multiple superiority in forces, the reduction in the time for preparing the landing forces and the creation of constantly combat-ready diverse landing formations, the centralization of command over diverse forces and the improving of cooperation between the aviation, navy and ground forces.

Landing operations were further developed in the postwar period (the Korean War, in Cuba, and elsewhere). The American military under present-day conditions has continued to widely use landing forces for conducting aggressive wars. This has necessitated greater vigilance by the Soviet Armed Forces and the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth and all peace-loving forces of the world.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Morskoy Atlas" [Naval Atlas], Vol 3, Military History, Part 2, Descriptions for Maps, Moscow, 1966, p 315.

[2]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1976, p 218.

[3]F. Winterbotham, "Operatsiya 'Ul'tra'" [The Ultra Secret], translated from the English, Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 115-127.

[4]"Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopaedia], Vol 7, Voyenizdat, 1979, p 366.

[5]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 9, 1978, p 243.

[6]The losses of the American Armed Forces were 49,100 men, including 12,500 lost or missing in action. Some 33 ships and auxiliary vessels were sunk and 370 damaged. Air losses were 1,000 aircraft ("Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 11, Voyenizdat, 1980, p 73).

[7]E. G. Kingston-MacClory, "Rukovodstvo Voynoy" [Leadership of the War], translated from the English, Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1957, p 159.

[8]V. S. Strel'nikov, N. M. Cherepanov, "Voyna bez Riska" [A War Without Risk], Voyenizdat, 1965, p 62.

[9]Charles B. MacDonald, "Tyazheloye Ispytaniye" [A Severe Trial], translated from the German, Voyenizdat, 1979, p 107.

[10]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 7, pp 375-376.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON ISRAELI MILITARY POLICY

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[Article by Maj V. Solov'yev: "The Israeli Army in the Service of World Reaction"]

[Text] An important element in the overall strategy of imperialism is the Zionist policy of Israel and its armed forces which have been created with the direct support of the reactionary circles in the West.

The class essence of Zionism consists in the fact that its nationalistic ideology, its diversified system of organizations and policy express the interests of the upper European bourgeoisie which is closely linked with the monopolists from other imperialist states. This class essence also determines the content of modern Zionism which is characterized by militant chauvinism, racism, anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. In carrying out the general course of its policy, Israel follows the main imperialist powers.

Monopolistic capital has directed and continues to direct each step of the Zionists. The English were their first masters. In solving the question of where to establish the "national homeland of the Jews," the interests of the monopolies and not the biblical testimony of Judaism were considered. Cynical calculation of the British monopolies prevailed in determining the place of settlement. Ultimately the choice fell on Palestine which particularly attracted the attention of the English Crown.

The Near East was rich chiefly in oil. Its importance in energy was continuously growing in keeping with the development of capitalism. Moreover Britain gained much profit from the operation of the Suez Canal.

In turn, the Zionist leaders perfectly realized what their English protectors were expecting from them. Thus, the Zionist leader Weizmann expressed in the following manner the unity of the interests of Great Britain and the movement headed by him: "With certain grounds we can say that England will encourage the creation of a Jewish settlement in Palestine that is independent of England, and we will be able to settle a million Jews there in 20-30 years, and maybe even more. They will develop the country, they will bring civilization back to it and provide the most effective security for the Suez Canal."[1]

With the connivance of the imperialist forces, even long before the formation of the state of Israel, armed Zionist formations were created and used in the land of Palestine. Without an increase in military might, Zionism would have been deprived of one of its attractive qualities for the monopolies, that is, aggressiveness and militancy. The former chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Armed Forces, I. Allon, in his research on the Israeli army commented that the prototype for it was the armed formations of "Bar Jiora" (1907), and subsequently "Gashomer" (1909).[2] These terroristic groups were widely used, in particular, by the ruling circles of Great Britain for conquering lands in the Near East.

In the course of World War I, the Zionists and their British protectors achieved definite results. After the establishing of the British mandate over Palestine, the Israeli extremists began to implement their nationalistic plans of eliminating and expelling the Palestinians from their homelands and settling the latter with Jews. During this period, various militarized Zionist formations continued to appear and these were brought together under the flag of the largest illegal military organization "Hagana" formed in 1920.

Being supported by the imperialist circles, the leadership of the Zionist movement began to broaden the scale of its military activities. Hagana was turned into a major military force. Through the Jewish agency in London, it established contact with the English security forces. Moreover, in pursuing primarily colonialist aims, the British government organized the so-called special night detachments which consisted of subunits of the regular British army and extremists from Hagana.

Other extremist organizations were spawned from Hagana. In 1931 there appeared Irgun Tsvai Leumi, in 1940, Stern, in 1941, Palmakh, and others. They all operated in one direction, that is, the expelling of the Arabs from the lands occupied by them. In the prewar and war periods, they "won" and established over 40 Jewish settlements or kibbutz[3] which were assault forces designed to expel the Arabs from Palestinian territory.

At the end of the 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's, the link of the Zionist leadership with fascism began to be clearly apparent. In 1940, the members of the paramilitary Stern and Irgun Tsvai Leumi organizations established direct contacts with the Italian and Nazi leadership. There is numerous evidence that the Zionist military upper clique and the leaders of the fascist regimes were class allies. Thus, during the war years, the Zionists ransomed rich Jews from the Nazis, while showing indifference to the destruction of around 6 million simple Jewish workers by the SS. As was stated by the member of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) Landau "it is well known that in 1942 the Jewish Agency knew about the extermination of the Jews, and it not only kept silent but forced others who knew about this to keep silent."[4]

These facts have been carefully overlooked in Israeli historiography and in other bourgeois military history research, as they unmask the antipopular, reactionary essence of the Zionist military leadership.

The ploy of the Zionists of relying on the Nazi clique failed, and they shifted to the United States. From the middle of the 1940's, Zionism has grown closer and closer to the American monopolies and finally established its headquarters in New York. Here cooperation has been maintained with the upper Jewish bourgeoisie of Great Britain, France and the other imperialist powers.

In November 1947, the United Nations approved a resolution according to which in May 1948, the British mandate to Palestine was to end, and two independent states--Jewish and Arab--were to be formed on its territory.

But the Zionist leadership had other ideas about the division of Palestine. During the 6 months prior to the coming of the UN decision on the Palestinian question into force (from November 1947 through May 1948), the terroristic organizations such as Irgun Tsvai Leumi, Stern, Hagana and others carried out more than 15 acts of mass extermination of the Arabs, including the bloodiest in the village of Deir Yasin, where during one night the entire population was cut down, more than 240 persons.[5]

In the newly created Jewish state, the Zionists immediately seized the commanding heights. This was largely aided by the behind-the-scenes political activities of the American monopolists.

With the formation of the state of Israel, the imperialist circles immediately assigned it the role of the "Near Eastern policemen." Such a military-political goal coincided with the aggressive aspirations of the Israeli extremists. Thus, the first Israeli premier Ben Gurion, in the course of debates on setting the frontiers of the nation, decisively stated that the size of the Jewish state would be determined as a result of war.

During the first days of its existence, Israel, with the encouragement of the forces of international reaction, began an aggressive war against the Arab peoples. By this time it possessed a well-trained army numbering 30,000 men. The young state already had its air force, the pilots of which had been trained for combat in the English Royal Air Force. The imperialist powers not only trained military personnel for Israel but also supplied it with weapons.[6]

In the course of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949, the Israeli armed forces captured a territory with an area of over 6,000 km^2 assigned by the United Nations to the Arab state of Palestine. Around 40,000 Arabs were driven out of their homes. Thus the problem of Palestinian refugees arose.

After this war, the Zionist ruling upper clique in Israel undertook intensive preparations for new military actions. The General Staff worked out a "strategic plan" which provided for the capture of extensive oil areas and the enslavement of the Arab population. A pretext for implementing these plans was found in 1956, when the Egyptian government announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. England and France, the basic owners of the canal, feverishly worked out joint "retaliatory measures." The Israeli army was chosen as the main strike force. It hurriedly prepared for war. Israeli officials held secret talks in London and Paris. Military equipment began to arrive in enormous consignments to arm the Israeli army. On the eve of the war, France alone supplied Israel with around 100 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, over 300 other military types of transport, more than 60 ultramodern fighter-bombers for those times, and other weapons. In a short period of time an Israeli army of 200,000 men was deployed.[7]

The "triple aggression" of 1956 by Israel, England and France against Egypt was a failure. The political support provided by the Soviet Union to the Egyptian people in their just struggle to a significant degree predetermined the collapse of the Zionist plans. Real conditions were created for a further rise of the national liberation movement.

The lamentable consequences of the aggression, however, did not cool the militant ardor of the Israeli Zionists. With the aid and support of the imperialist circles, Israel intensely built up its military might. By the start of 1967, it could mobilize and outfit 23 first-line brigades and 15 second-line brigades. They were armed with up to 900 tanks, with a third of them very modern, American-produced M-48's, up to 800 armored personnel carriers, a large number of antitank guided missiles, and around 600 combat aircraft.[8]

Having secretly mobilized the troops, the Israeli military in June 1967 treacherously attacked the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan. As a result of this next aggression, Israel occupied over 60,000 km^2. Israeli territory, along with the captured Arab lands, became 6-fold larger than what had been allocated to the Jewish state in accord with the partition plan approved by the United Nations in November 1947. Almost 1.5 million Arabs were deprived of their rights.[9]

This war was viewed in Israel as an intermediate step in achieving the adventuristic goals of the Zionist generals. The escalation of aggression continued. Paramilitary settlements were created on the occupied territories. The lines occupied by the Israeli troops were equipped in engineering terms for developing the expansionistic war into the interior of Arab territories. The army was equipped with new models of weapons and military equipment.

Due to provocations by the Israeli military, the situation remained explosive. From the beginning of 1972 through October 1973, Israel undertook around 40 large-scale armed provocations against the neighboring Arab peoples.[10] These included raids on the territories of neighboring Arab states with a large number of casualties among the indigenous population, air raids and bombing of population points located many kilometers beyond the frontiers of Israel, systematic artillery shelling of the border territories, and a series of assaults on prominent Arab political leaders.

By October 1973, the tension had reached its high point, and the result of this was the fourth Arab-Israeli war. Directly prior to its start, the fighting strength of the Israeli ground troops numbered 33 brigades (including 10 armored ones), 1,700 tanks (including the American M-60, M-48 Patton, Sherman and Super Sherman, and the English Centurion), around 500 aircraft and 55 fighting ships. With the start of combat operations, around 300,000 men were mobilized.[11]

The U.S. ruling circles, as before, provided active assistance to the aggressor. The U.S. Armed Forces were in a state of increased combat alert. The Pentagon supplied Israel with over 100 combat aircraft, 500 tanks, 2,000 antitank guided missiles, as well as a large quantity of missile and rocket weapons and other military equipment. In the interests of the Israeli General Staff, at this time two American spy satellites were launched. Such extensive aid from the United States and the other capitalist states and their intelligence bodies clearly shows the close interaction of the Israeli army and its intelligence with the U.S. CIA and the NATO special services, and this is carefully concealed from the public.

As a result of the armed struggle of the Arab people for national liberation and the decisive support from the Soviet Union, a strong blow was made against the Israeli aggressor. The Israeli losses in armored equipment were around 60 percent, 30 percent for aviation, and 10 percent in the nary.[12] The number of casualties was the highest over all the history of Israel. The myth which had been created over the decades of the invincibility of the Israeli Army was broken.

Israel was forced to pull out its troops from a portion of the occupied territories and sit down at the conference table in Geneva. However the sessions of the Geneva Conference for an all-encompassing peace settlement of the Near East conflict involving all the concerned parties were broken off in December 1973 by the Zionist leadership. It had endeavored to replace the decisions in Geneva with partial treaties with the Arab states and thus gain the best conditions for itself. A long search started for a weak link in the chain of unity among the Arab states. With the connivance of the U.S. administration, Egypt was finally enticed into the network of Zionist traps.

In March 1979, a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed under U.S. pressure in Washington. Remaining outside the framework of the agreement were such cardinal questions in a Near East settlement as the fate of the Palestinian Arab people, the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and other territories. For returning the sands of the Sinai Desert to Egypt, Israel gained freedom of actions and new military handouts from the United States. In addition, the Pentagon, using this agreement, endeavored to put together a new military bloc aimed at defending the interests of imperialism in the Near East, where Israeli armed forces would be given one of the main roles. Thus, the military importance of Israel as the Near East policemen increased further with the signing of the separate agreement.

Sadat was virtually an assistant of Tel Aviv, and after the signing of the separate agreement, he expressed a desire to replace the English colonial subunits in a number of areas of the Persian Gulf. By his actions Sadat disclosed to the entire world the treacherous essence of his political course which was sharply condemned by a majority of the Arab states and by peace-loving progressive public opinion.

The Zionist upper clique of Israel continued to intensely carry out a campaign of annexation of the occupied territories. The web of kibbutz--the militarized Israeli settlements--more and more covered the occupied Arab lands. As of today, their number has reached 109. As is clear from the long-range government program, in 1978-1992, another 186 new settlements will be created on the captured Golan Heights, on the left bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip.[13] As has been pointed out by the Zionist leaders themselves, this policy is being carried out to make impossible the return of the given areas to the Arabs.

The Zionist military leadership, in creating the appearance of an interest in settling the Near East problem, in actuality sabotaged this question and with the aid of military force have endeavored not only to dig in on the occupied territories, but also to extend them. Thus, the Israeli military has constantly intervened into the internal affairs of Lebanon, and has undertaken actions fraught with military intervention.

In the apt expression of the Italian magazine EUROPEO, Israel has not taken its finger off the trigger. It is stepping up the arms race in the Near East to a new level. Its military expenditures on a per capita basis over the last few years have remained the highest in the world, over 400 dollars. Military aid from abroad has been constantly growing. According to the data of the American press, over the last 6 years, Tel Aviv has received 7 billion dollars worth of weapons from the United States. Militaristic and aggressive moods are maintained in the country by the efforts of the propaganda services, and this is particularly so among the

military. In the armed forces there is an extensive apparatus for brainwashing, the chief elements of which are the information department, the personnel administration of the General Staff, the intelligence agency, as well as the military rabbi service. With their aid the Zionist ruling clique has instilled in the barracks anticommunism, militarism, racism and Judaism which help to fan among the soldiers aggressiveness and cruelness, and hate for the revolutionary forces of modern times, and in particular, the national liberation movement. As can be seen, the Israeli army is being developed as an army of murderers and executioners.

Thus, the policy of the Zionist circles has been and is based on flagrant military force. The army serves as the chief weapon of the aggressive, expansionistic policy of the Israeli rulers, and this, as the history of Zionism and its armed formations has shown, is subordinate to the rapacious interests of the international monopolies.

The CPSU and the Soviet government view the situation in the Near East as a serious center of international tension. "...The interests of detente are in no way contradicted by the struggle of the Arab peoples to return the lands which belong to them but which have been seized by Israel and to the right of the Palestinians to create their own state, nor does it run counter to the actions of those who support these just demands of the Arabs," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in an interview with the American magazine TIME. "Precisely those who stand on the side of the aggressor, encouraging its expansionistic drives, act contrary to the interests of detente in the Near East."[15] Our party sees the basis for a guarantee of peace in the Near East, in the establishing of the principles of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by wars and in the rights of all states in this region to independent existence and self-determination.

Along with this, as was emphasized in the CPSU documents, the presence of a center of tension in the Near East requires constant vigilance against the dangerous intrigues of international Zionism and the reactionary imperialist forces.

FOOTNOTES

[1]POLITICAL AFFAIRS, No 7, 1971.

[2]I. Allon, "Child of David," New York, pp 13-24.

[3]"History from 1880," Jerusalem, pp 75-81.

[4]MA'ARIV, 24 June 1966.

[5]Tarionman, "Zionism and Peace," Syria, 1968, p 21.

[6]"History from 1880," pp 110-155.

[7]N. Safran, "From War to War," New York, pp 23-36.

[8]Ibid., pp 82-141.

[9]MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, No 10, 1974.

[10]TRICONTINENTAL MAGAZINE, No 33/34, 1974.

[11]ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, 1974, pp 10-11.

[12]TIME, No 12, 1974.

[13]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 March 1978.

[14][Not in text.]

[15]KOMMUNIST, No 2, 1979, p 6.

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KHALKHIN-GOL OPERATION: LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FEATURES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 80 signed to press 26 Aug 80 pp 55-60

[Article published under the heading: "Scientific Information" by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col V. Odintsov, and Candidate of Military Sciences Col V. Ovsyannikov: "Some Features in Rear Service Support in the Soviet-Mongolian Troops in the Battles at Khalkhin-Gol"]

[Text] Along with other factors, uninterrupted supply of the troops with everything required for life and combat was of important significance in achieving victory over the Japanese aggressors in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. Rear support for the Soviet-Mongolian troops was carried out under the particular natural and climatic conditions of Mongolia and actually with the absence of a front supply element. All of this told on troop supply, and largely determined the particular features of its organization. We will examine the most essential of them.

Combat operations on the Khalkhin-Gol River[1] developed, as is known, in an area that was little equipped in operational and rear services terms and up to 800 km distant from a railroad. This greatly complicated operational deployment as well as troop supply. In natural and climatic terms, the terrain was a desert with a large number of impassable salt bottoms and a limited number of sources of fresh water without virtually any populatic- points. The nearest regions for securing the fuel needed for preparing food and other housekeeping needs were up to 600 km away from the troops. As for food, only meat could be procured on the spot.

Prior to the start of military operations (May 1939) the formations and units of the LVII Separate Corps were stationed on Mongolian territory. They were supplied by two routes: the southern (Ulan-Bator) with the supply station of Naushki on the Ulan-Ude--Naushki spur and the eastern (Bain-Tumen) with the supply station of Solov'yevskoye on the narrow gauge spur of siding No 79--Solov'yevskoye. Here the basic road support resources as well as the dumps with supplies were concentrated on the southern route. Thus, of the 14 stationary dumps of the corps with material supplies, there were only 3 on the eastern route where combat operations started. Two had ammunition and one had fuels and lubricants. Motor transport was also basically on the southern routes.

Road service on the dirt roads was stood by the road commandant [provost] companies (dkr). On the eastern sector, the section of the road between Solov'yevskoye and Bain-Tumen of some 240 km in length was served by 500 dkr (commander, Lt D. S.

Gorbunov), and beyond, to the Khalkhin-Gol River, the sections of a total length of up to 600 km by 502 dkr (commander, Mil Tech 1st Rank Ya. D. Barzhin). Due to the shortage of men and equipment, here there were no equipped stages at all. The staff of the chief of the dirt road section (NGU) of road No 2 (chief, Maj T. M. Tsygashino) was located in Solov'yevskoye.

Each company manned from three to four road-commandant points (stages). At the basic stages there was the possibility of feeding (one dish) 3,000-4,000 soldiers a day and provide lodging for 200-400 men.

The corps staff was located in Ulan-Bator, and the deputy chief of staff for rear services for the corps (he was also the chief of the 5th Separate Staff), Maj I. G. Khomus'kov, did not have direct contact with the rear units and facilities in the eastern sector. For traffic control communications between the points (stages) on the dirt roads, the permanent telegraph lines of the local authorities were used and this impeded control of the troops and the rear units and facilities. The supply of the corps with materiel was carried out from the central depots, while food and fuel were delivered from the dumps of the ZabVO [Transbaykal Military District] according to the quarterly and adjusted monthly requests of the chiefs of the food supply department (Intend 2d Rank N. A. Shestakov), artillery supply (Intend 3d Rank I. K. Terekin), uniform supply (Intend 3d Rank V. A. Platonov), and fuel supply (Maj A. M. Kravchenko).

Thus, under conditions when the southern part of Mongolia was being readied in operational and rear support terms for repelling aggression and military operations to defeat the Japanese militarists had to be conducted in its eastern part, the existing procedure had to be changed for allocating the peacetime rear resources.

The necessity arose of rapidly strengthening the eastern sector. And this was done gradually, as the scale of combat operations broadened, as the number of troops increased, as well as their needs for materiel. Thus, the made-up detachment and the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade at the end of May was supplied from dumps which had been located even in peacetime in Bain-Tumen. Subsequently, with the arrival of the 149th Rifle Regiment, the second battalion of the 85th Artillery Regiment and other subunits in the combat area, dump departments had to be set up in Tamtsak-Bulak, including for artillery, fuel, food, motor-armored and heating fuel. As a result the hauling distance was shortened by 285 km, and the organization and delivery of materiel were made easier.

For supplying the troops in the field of the above-indicated composition, each day 103 tons of dry cargo and 54 tons of fuel had to be delivered. Ammunition and fuel was hauled from Solov'yevskoy to Tamtsak-Bulak over a distance of 525 km by through motor vehicle runs without reloading in Bain-Tumen. Since there were not enough men and equipment for manning the sections of the long road in the 502d dkr, the organizing of the food points for the personnel of the motor vehicle columns and individual vehicles on its sections had to be signed to the 19th Engineer Airfield Construction Battalion, and for feeding wounded, the hospital of the MNA [Mongolian People's Army] located in Matat-Somon had to be used. From the dump divisions set up in Tamtsak-Bulak to the divisional and brigade dumps (DOP and BROP) located a distance of approximately 110-120 km away, the troops hauled the materiel "for themselves" using their own resources, as had been envisaged by the prewar views.

In the period from 2 through 6 June, all the supply departments and the rear services division of the XVII Separate Corps were moved from Ulan-Bator to Tamtsak-Bulak. The rear services of the corps were given the mission, in utilizing the breathing space, to replenish the supplies at all the dumps and create primarily a sufficient supply of ammunition and fuel in Tamtsak-Bulak.

At the beginning of July, the Japanese resumed combat operations in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. In order to more rapidly defeat the Japanese aggressors, the Soviet government, considering the developing situation, took a decision to help Mongolia on an even broader scale. On 19 July, the LVII Separate Corps was changed into the 1st Army Group. By the middle of August, the Soviet-Mongolian troops numbered around 57,000 men, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, 2,255 machine guns and 515 combat aircraft.[2] In line with the increase in the number of Soviet troops in Mongolia, the need for hauling materiel increased sharply. Thus, on 1 August, the 1st Army Group required daily deliveries of 600 tons of artillery ammunition, 200 tons of aviation ammunition, 130 tons of food, 240 tons of firewood, and up to 260 tons of other freight, for a total of 1,450 tons of dry freight and 500 tons of liquid.[3]

The rear services personnel existing at that time in the eastern sector found it difficult in handling and processing such an amount of freight. In addition, it was necessary to deploy the new dumps and other rear units and facilities which were being shifted from the southern sector as well as those arriving from the ZabVO and the rear services of the Center.

Due to the absence of a front rear services element[4] and the sharp increase in the volume of deliveries, the need arose to establish responsibility for hauling within Mongolian territory. Thus, the fifth department of the rear services staff of the ZabVO (chief, Brig Cmdr G. T. Danilov) was responsible for deliveries to Bain-Tumen, and the rear services of the 1st Army Group (chief of the 5th department of the group staff, Maj I. G. Khomus'kov) from Bain-Tumen to Tamtsak-Bulak. In accord with this, the motor transport was reallocated. Three motor vehicle battalions from the 1st Army Group which had been stationed in Solov'yevskoye were put under the rear bodies of the ZabVO which already had three battalions here. In addition, another six motor vehicle battalions arrived here from the Center.

As a result, by the beginning of the August operation, the cargo carrying capacity of the motor transport from the ZabVO concentrated in Solov'yevskoye (12 motor vehicle battalions with 3,275 motor vehicles) was 5,688 tons of bed cargo and 2,340 tons of liquid cargo, while for the transport of the 1st Army Group located in Bain-Tumen (9 motor vehicle battalions and 1 separate motor vehicle company), in Matat-Somon (2 motor vehicle battalions) and Tamtsak-Bulak (1 motor vehicle battalion) was 5,000 and 1,298 tons, respectively. Each day this transport could carry on the 4-day run on the leg of Solov'yevskoye--Bain-Tumen 1,422 tons of dry cargo and 585 tons of liquid cargo, and on the leg Bain-Tuman--Tantsak-Bulak, respectively, 1,250 tons and 325 tons.[5] Since from the divisions of the army dumps (Tamtsak-Bulak) the troops transported materiel in their own transport (110 km), by an order for the rear services of the army group of 17 August, 240 sided vehicles and 80 tank trucks were allocated from the army transport for strengthening organic rear services.[6]

Units and facilities of the other rear services such as engineer-airfield and others also arrived and were deployed. Thus, for meeting the needs of aviation, four other air bases arrived in addition to the existing two.

First surgical aid to the wounded was planned for 40-50 km behind the front line. Here the chief of the group medical service, the same chief of the medical department (Maj V. G. Mazin), set up two mobile field hospitals. One of them was organized on the basis of the medical company of the 11th Tank Brigade and a portion of personnel from the surgical department of the Military Medical Academy. For providing specialized medical aid and further evacuation of wounded, a hospital with 1,100 beds was set up in Tamtsak-Bulak, one with 200 beds in Bain-Tumen, as well as an evacuation hospital in Solov'yevskoye (with the forces of the medical services from the ZabVO).

All the designated measures were carried out for the purpose of supporting the combat operations of the troops, and derived from the specific operational and rear situation. However they went beyond the provisions made at that time for the organization and operation of the army rear services.

According to these views, the army rear services should be rail based. Each army was assigned a rail section in which they designated the managing station, the basic army station, the supply stations according to the number of rifle corps, and the supply stations for the air formations. The depth of the army rear was envisaged at up to 175 km. Further, on the territory of the front rear services, front dumps were to be deployed with material supplies, the means of transport for delivering them and other rear units and facilities brought up and deployed in the theater of war for the purpose of ensuring the required autonomy of the army rear services.

In organizing the rear support for the 1st Army Group, there was no such structure for the army rear services, let alone the front rear services. This was caused by the scope of the missions related to rear support of the 1st Army Group and stemming from its fighting strength, the missions set to defeat the aggressor, as well as from the prewar views according to which it was assumed that the front rear services would be stationary. But the combat conditions in the area of Khalkhin-Gol excluded such a possibility.

At that time there were no railroads on Mongolian territory. For this reason, instead of a rail section with the corresponding stations, the rear services of the army group initially were based at siding No 79 (station commandant, Intend 2d Rank I. P. Osinenko) on the Transsiberian Mainline and assigned for the group rear services as a supply station. However its capabilities did not meet the demands placed on the supply stations.

At the same time siding No 79 was a transloading point to the narrow gauge railroad (110 km long) which ran as far as Solov'yevskoye. The capacity of this railroad was 800-1,000 tons of freight per day, but because of the insufficiently organized transloading from the broad to the narrow gauge, it handled only 300-400 tons.

The first track of the siding was set aside for unloading freight which was to be dispatched by the narrow gauge line. The second was the switching track. The third and fourth served for the passing of through-trains, and the fifth for

unloading building materials and fuel. In peacetime in the area of the siding there were just two warehouses (fuel and food) which were manned by one worker company (No 284). And in July-August 1939, this siding had to handle the mass flow of freight for Mongolia for the troops of the 1st Army Group.

The freight arrived under the central and district plans from virtually all areas of the Soviet Union. Since the railroad administration of Chita, Borzya, Khaylar and Kharbin, where the siding was located, was operating under peacetime regulations, the military cargo arrived here extremely irregularly, in small batches, and along with national economic freight. All of this required great switching work.

The absence of a managing station and the corresponding apparatus of supply services at it created a difficult situation and above all confusion in accounting for the freight arriving by wide gauge and being sent off on the narrow gauge. The unloading and dispatching of this freight were the concern of the commandant of the railroad siding. Such freight was dispatched without the proper handling of the corresponding documents, as the commandant had no personnel for this.[7]

Because of the different capacity of the broad and narrow gauges on the siding, much military freight awaiting dispatch piled up. Thus, in August, 2,937 cars arrived over the broad gauge, but only 1,409 were sent off on the narrow gauge. The remaining 1,528 cars were waiting their turn.

Considering the difficulties in delivery and evacuation with the absence of railroads in the area of combat operations, construction was started on a rail line from the station of Borzya to the town of Bain-Tumen, some 324 km long. Several railroad and track-building units were sent out to build it.

Due to the insufficient number of storage facilities for temporarily housing and storing the materiel as well as due to the too small capacity of the unloading areas, a difficult situation developed not only at the siding itself. Work was impeded on the entire railroad section. Thus, on 25 August in the 5th department of this railroad section, 128 transports (381 cars) incorporated in small groups in 29 trains had to be unloaded, with another 33 trains already underway.[8]

The designated difficulties were caused, on the one hand, by the particular features of the theater of war, that is, by its poor preparations in military rear services terms, and on the other, they were the result of the fact that the rear support for the 1st Army Group had been organized without considering the specific local features. According to wartime provisions, here only inferior rear service elements were functioning (troop and army), and these were located directly in the area of combat operations and supplied the troops with everything necessary. But the superior elements (the rear services of the ZabVO and the Center) operated, in essence, under peacetime regulations. When necessary, they moved up into the area of combat operations or onto the troop lines of communications only the required part of their men and equipment from the available peacetime resources.

Since the rear support of the troops involved both the first (troop and army rear services) as well as the second elements of the rear services (the rear services of the Center and ZabVO), they functioned in different legal areas and were guided by different principles and provisions.

For the normal functioning of such a mixed system of rear support, reliable successiveness of its individual elements was required at their connecting points. Under the conditions of the absence of a front element which in the overall system of rear support for the Armed Forces was the connecting link between the rear services of the Center and the army rear services, in the operation to defeat the Japanese troops on the Khalkhin-Gol River, its functions were carried out by the rear services of the ZabVO. But since the district had not been fully converted to military status, it could not completely carry out the missions assigned to it. For this reason, a significant gap formed on the boundary of the rear services of the Center and the rear services of the army group with a portion of the men and equipment from the rear services of the ZabVO. In order to eliminate this and bring the possibilities of the rear services of the army group and the rear units of the ZabVO into accord with the possibilities of the rear services of the Center, a number of measures had to be carried out.

First of all, the front was enlarged for the receiving and unloading of incoming rail transports heading for the army group. Instead of the single siding No 79, an unloading section was organized at Borzya station, as well as sidings No 80, 79 and 78 at Khadabulak station. Measures were quickly taken at them to develop the track system. Here siding No 78 was a sort of holding tank for trains for siding No 79 which was the most heavily loaded. Various storage facilities were provided for temporary storage of materiel at the unloading sections. Thus, at siding No 79, additional artillery, air-technical and engineer dumps were set up, and at Borzya station, a dump for motor vehicle and armored equipment; this dump had been moved from Ulan-Ude. In Solov'yevskoye, in addition to the fuel and lubricant dump and the combined dump, on the basis of the non-T/O divisions of the air-technical and artillery dumps, additional dumps were set up. There was an increase in the number of dumps at Bain-Tumen (food) and Tamtsak-Bulak (chemical, engineer, uniform, communications and fuel). In addition, in Tamtsak-Bulak there was a medical platoon, a bakery for all the units, a bath and laundry detachment, field repair shops, and in the area of Lake Buyr-Nur, a field mobile hospital, a medical platoon and a slaughterhouse.

For accounting and control of military cargo arriving at the unloading section and for promptly informing the commandant of the supply station of them, a commandant's office was organized at Andrianovka station (to the southeast of Irkutsk). For the purposes of accelerating freight handling, four additional worker companies with a total of 900 men were assigned from the troops of the group.

Leadership over the operations of the supply station was strengthened. At siding No 79, they organized an administration of the supply station commandant (ZKS). Maj I. P. Shakhov was appointed the commandant. He was also given the duties of the garrison chief for this station. The unification under a single command of all the dumps, the men and equipment for loading and unloading freight as well as the narrow gauge railroad provided positive results and was subsequently further developed. Thus, in the first months of the Great Patriotic War (on 2 September 1941), by the order of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense], field army bases (PAB) were organized and these in organizational terms combined under a single command all the army dumps and the necessary resources for freight handling work as well as security and defense.

In order to accelerate the delivery of materiel to the operational troops, in addition to the narrow gauge railroad, motor and cart transport was also widely used. The number of motor vehicles employed in transporting freight to Solov'yevskoye increased from 73 (7 August) up to 1,181 (13 August). Loaded motor vehicles traveled in columns of 50 vehicles in each. On this section, in addition, 1,000 carts were also put into service for transporting freight. The total freight-carrying capacity of the horse-drawn transport was approximately 400 tons. In order to unload the incoming military supplies from siding No 79, the army and a portion of the organic transport began to be used which was arriving for freight in Solov'yevskoye.

The absence of front rear services and the great remoteness of the combat area from the railroad necessitated the creation of increased material stocks, and in particular ammunition, at the army dumps. For example, in the course of the full deployment of all the rear services elements (front, army and organic) in the theater of war, according to the prewar views, up to two units of fire were to be kept at the army dumps. But in the given operation, by an order for the rear services of the 1st Army Group of 17 August, the army dumps were to have 4 battle scales of ammunition, 3.5 in the troops, and a total of 7.5 in the group. And it was figured that the operation would be carried out in 3 days.[9] In actuality it, as is known, lasted 10 days.

Regardless of the difficult natural conditions, the poor preparation of the combat area in military rear services terms, and the unique system for the rear support of the troops in the 1st Army Group, the Soviet-Mongolian command, in creatively carrying out the given missions, and with the active aid of the rear service bodies of the Center and the ZabVO, were able to dependably organize and supply the troops with everything required. Thus, by the start of the August Operation, the rear service workers had supplied the troops with everything needed for combat. They had stockpiled 6-7 battle scales of ammunition (9-10 for aviation), fuels and lubricants for 5-6 refuelings, and food for 13-16 daily rations.[10] Of the 15,000 tons of materiel expended by the troops of the army group over the 10 days, ammunition comprised over 7,000 tons, or 46 percent of the total volume of expended materiel. The prompt supply of the troops with the necessary materiel, and primarily ammunition, was of decisive significance for the successful outcome of the operation in defeating the Japanese militarists.

The experience of rear support gained by the troops in defeating the Japanese aggressors in August 1939 in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River was successfully employed by the Soviet Army in defeating the strikeforce of Japanese militarism, the Kwantung Army, in August 1945.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For the situation in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River, the plans of the sides, the balance of forces, and the course of combat, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1979, pp 67-73.

[2]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1974, p 217.

[3]TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 23113, inv. 2, file 373, sheet 162.

[4]The front headquarters created on 5 July 1939 in Chita did not have supply functions. According to the regulations it carried out only control over material supply for the troops of the front group in peacetime and wartime (see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1979, p 48).

[5]TsGASA, folio 32113, inv. 2, file 373, sheet 165.

[6]Ibid., file 373, appendix No 71.

[7]The staff of the commandant of siding No 79 consisted of a deputy commandant, a secretary and two clerks (TsGASA, folio 25871, inv. 9, file 206, sheet 16).

[8]Ibid., sheet 12.

[9]Ibid., folio 32113, inv. 2, file 373, appendix No 71.

[10]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 2, pp 217-218.

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KHALKHIN-GOL OPERATION: PARTY-POLITICAL WORK

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Col V. Starodubtsev: "Party-Political Work in the Period of Combat Operations at Khalkhin-Gol"]

[Text] In the victory won by the Soviet-Mongolian troops over the Japanese imperialists in the Khalkhin-Gol area, an important role was played by the high skills of the command and by the effective and specific party-political work in the troops. Its organizers were the commanders, the commissars, the political bodies, and the party and Komsomol organizations of the units and formations of the LVII Separate Corps, and later the 1st Army Group of Soviet troops in Mongolia. In their activities they were guided by the Party Program, by the decisions of the 18th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress, by the treaty of mutual aid between the USSR and Mongolia of 12 March 1936, as well as by the directives of the party Central Committee and the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Political Directorate.

The party-political work carried out in the troops was aimed primarily at instilling in the personnel a spirit of Soviet patriotism, total love and loyalty to the socialist motherland, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and a spirit of unbreakable unity and friendship between the peoples of the USSR, proletarian internationalism and hate for the enemies of the Soviet and Mongolian peoples, for the Japanese imperialists.

Under the conditions of the commenced military operations on the frontier of Mongolia in May 1939, the commanders, commissars and political bodies of the LVII Separate Corps undertook measures to bring the units and formations to full combat readiness, and to move them up into the area of the battles. Here was sent a group of workers from the corps political department and this provided help in organizing party-political work in the subunits of the 11th Tank Brigade and the 149th Rifle Regiment, it coordinated the activities of the political apparatus of the units, it provided cooperation in the area of political work with the workers of the 6th Cavalry Division of the MNRA [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army], it propagandized combat experience and examples of courage and heroism, and also undertook measures to eliminate the discovered shortcomings in the organization of troop supply.[1]

In mobilizing the personnel to carry out the combat mission of repelling Japanese aggression against Mongolia, the commanders and political workers explained to the

men the essence of the expansionistic policy of imperialist Japan in the Far East, particularly in terms of the USSR and fraternal Mongolia. This work helped to develop high moral-combat qualities and political awareness and vigilance among all the personnel which well realized that to defend the integrity of the Mongolian frontiers meant to defend the victories of socialism.

After the decisive rebuff dealt to the Japanese aggressors in May, in the activities of the command and political personnel, a major place was given to generalizing and practically using the experience of the first battles against the Japanese. Here great attention was given to conducting continuous reconnaissance of the enemy, to concealing our own positions and military equipment, to working out the elements of close combat, to prompt party political information in a combat situation, as well as to correctly determining the place of the political worker in combat.

Intensive military training and the effective party political work with the personnel further increased the battleworthiness of the Soviet Mongolian troops, and increased the fighting and moral qualities of the men. For this reason, in the course of the fierce battles to repel the July Japanese offensive, our men and commanders again demonstrated exceptional [illegible]ity, courage and will to victory. The Japanese assault units which crossed to the western bank of the Khalkhin-Gol were completely routed in the famous Bain-Tsagan engagement.

In line with the broader scope of combat operations and the arrival of new troop formations, the Soviet government undertook a number of measures to improve the troop command bodies in the Far Eastern theater of war.

The creation in July of 1939 of the military council of the 1st Army Group made it possible to improve control over all the formations and units, and to raise the ideological-organizational level of party political work in the troops. Upon its instructions, the group political department defined a system of leadership over the political bodies during the period of preparing for and carrying out an offensive operation, it established the communications procedures with the political workers from the MNRA formations, it assigned the political personnel and party activists to the formations and individual units, and worked out draft documents for the military council on the organization of party political work under combat conditions. Effective measures were taken to keep the very preparations for the offensive a secret.

The RKKA Political Directorate sent 130 senior political workers and 287 middle-level ones into the area of Khalkhin-Gol. This made it possible to fully man the party political apparatus and the positions of commissars of the rifle battalions and artillery battalions of the rifle divisions, as well as create the necessary reserve under the political department of the army group.[2] In all units and subunits, there were two deputy commissars, two political leaders, and two secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations.[3]

There was a sharp increase in the number of communists and Komsomol members both from the newly arrived reinforcements as well as from the admission of the best soldiers to the party and Komosmol ranks. The number of communists and party organizations in the Soviet troops involved in the battles in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River is shown in the table.[4]

Name	June 1939	July 1939	August 1939
VKP(b) members	2,281	2,653	2,766
VKP(b) candidate members	2,888	3,562	4,156
Total	5,169	6,215	6,922
Primary party organizations	138	148	150
Company party organizations	71	230	221

The Komsomol organizations were significantly strengthened. While on 1 January 1939, there were 129 primary and 493 company Komsomol organizations with a membership of 15,726 Komsomol members, in the third quarter of 1939, the figures, respectively, were 217 and 1,170, with a total Komsomol membership of 36,588 persons.[5]

The political department and the party bureaus of the unit party organizations instructed the secretaries of the subunit party and Komsomol organizations in the forms and methods of intraparty and intra-Komsomol work, and in the ability to mobilize the men to carry out the combat mission. Meetings were held directly in the company organizations on the question of the vanguard role of the communists (Komsomol members).

In the lectures and talks which were given by the commanders, political workers and agitators, they showed the aggressive plans of imperialist Japan to seize foreign lands for the purpose of plundering the natural riches and for cruel exploitation of the enslaved peoples. Convincingly shown was its desire to create a colonial empire from Mongolia, China and the Soviet Far East. Particular attention was given to indoctrinating hate for the Japanese militarists. The political department in a special directive gave facts about the humiliation by the Japanese officers and soldiers of the captured wounded Soviet and Mongolian soldiers, and demanded that there be more showing of the misdeeds carried out by the Japanese military.[6]

Widely propagandized were the examples of the combat cooperation of the subunits and units of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, and the messages from Soviet and Mongolian workers, and meetings were organized for exchanging combat experience among the men. The personnel was informed of the order by the command of the Eastern Group of the MNRA of 8 August 1939. It contained high praise for the actions of the Soviet tank troops in the 11th Tank Brigade, and congratulated it on the occasion of its winning of the Order of Lenin and the naming of the brigade after M. P. Yakovlev (the former brigade commander who had died heroically in combat). "I express certainty," the order pointed out, "that all the men, commanders and political workers from the units of the Eastern Group...will follow the example of courage and intrepidness of the personnel (from the brigade.--editors), and will follow in the footsteps of the heroic friendly Tank Brigade imeni M. P. Yakovlev. Forward, loyal sons of the Mongolian people, to a new complete victory over the bestial band of Japanese samurai...."[7]

Of great importance was the speech by the First Secretary of the MNRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party], the Marshal of Mongolia Kh. Choybalsan, to the troops of the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment, his high praise for the combat operations of the Soviet-Mongolian troops and his appeal to crush the Japanese

aggressors.[8] This placed great responsibility on the Mongolian and Soviet troops, and caused in them a desire to further strengthen combat cooperation and defeat the enemy.

For more specific and effective leadership over party-political work during the period of preparing for and conducting the offensive, the political department of the 1st Army Group set up under the commander of each of the three sectors of the August Operation, operational groups of political workers headed by deputy chiefs of the political department (in the north, Regimental Commissar S. I. Mel'nikov, in the south Battalion Commissar V. K. Tsybenko, and in the central, Battalion Commissar G. P. Slesarev[9]).

On the eve of the offensive, the political departments, the operational groups as well as the political workers in the units and subunits focused their main efforts on the moral and political preparation of the men, on creating an offensive spirit among them, explaining the missions of the forthcoming battle, and on ensuring cooperation with the MNRA units and the supplying of everything necessary for combat. Great work was done to inform and explain to the personnel the Appeal of the Military Council of the Frontal Group of Soviet Troops which stated that the hour had come for a crushing blow against the Japanese aggressors. The appeal called for a rapid offensive and the cooperation of all the branches of troops, the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. It pointed out that the colors of the Soviet troops were wreathed in the glory of Khasan and Bain-Tsagan, and it emphasized the importance of carrying out the international duty of defending Mongolia. This document was welcomed with great enthusiasm. The men vowed to crush the Japanese aggressors.

On 18-19 August, meetings and assemblies of the personnel were conducted in the units and subunits under the slogan "Forward, Comrades! Death to the Provocaters! For the Motherland, for the Fraternal Mongolian People!"[10] After the announcement of the combat order for the offensive, brief party and Komsomol meetings were held in the subunits, as well as the instructing of the party and Komsomol activists.

In raising the offensive spirit, a significant place was held by propagandizing the heroism and combat experience of the Soviet and Mongolian soldiers. For these purposes extensive use was made of leaflets, congratulatory letters, combat leaflets, express leaflets, the periodic press, radio communications, and so forth. From 18 through 30 August alone, the group political department issued 25 leaflets, and 2 of them gave the appeal and challenge to the men of the MNRA to strengthen combat cooperation by combat deeds.[11] The commanders and political workers showed constant concern for commending the outstanding units, subunits and men. Upon the proposal of the group political department, the military council issued an order to the troops of the 1st Army Group of 21 August 1939 with a statement of graditude to all the personnel of the MNRA 6th Cavalry Division for the valorous carrying out of the given mission, for the courage and heroism of the men in the battles against the Japanese invaders.[12]

In the political support for the offensive operation, a major role was played by the army and divisional press. The political bodies were concerned for the continuous publishing and prompt delivery of this to the troops. The newspaper GERIOCHESKAYA KRASNOARMEYSKAYA (editor-in-chief, Reg Commissar D. O. Ortenberg) effectively described the course of combat operations and propagandized the feats

of Soviet and Mongolian troops. "In each issue," wrote G. K. Zhukov, "it popularized the combat deeds of the men and the troop commanders of the army group and the combat traditions of the Red Army."[13] The active involvement in the newspaper of the writers V. Stavskiy, K. Simonov, L. Slavin and Z. Khatsrevin, the news photographers M. Bershteyn, V. Temin and others contributed to the more interesting presentation of the published materials.

Before battle many men requested that they be considered communists or Komsomol members and wrote out applications to join the VKP(b) and the Komsomol. Let us give here just one such application found on the Red Armyman Bachurin who was killed in combat. "I request the Komsomol organization to admit me to the ranks of the Lenin Komsomol. I will be loyal to Lenin's teachings, I will fight for the victory of communism in our nation, and I will not spare my life for defending our motherland."[14]

Red Armyman Izmaylov before an attack wrote the following entry: "Borzya Station, Borzinskiy Rayon, the village of Alonda, to his father Izmaylov from the son Grigoriy Vasil'yevich. In the instance that I am killed for the motherland, consider me a communist. Inform all my comrades that I perished for the motherland."[15] He fought as a communist and died a hero's death.

Here are some data on the number of applications. While from 15 May through 23 June (over 69 days) 656 applications were submitted for admission to the party and 1,277 applications to the Komsomol, on the eve of the offensive (in 27 days), 918 and 1,081, respectively, were submitted, and over the 10 days of the offensive, 1,122 and 1,178.[16] All of this showed the enormous authority of our glorious Communist Party and its close ties with the masses of the rank-and-file soldiers and commanders. "The Communist Party and its front detachment, the army party organization," wrote G. K. Zhukov, "was the soul of the heroic actions of our men. By their courageous example the communists inspired the men to combat feats."[17]

Effective and concrete party-political work was also carried out in the air force units and formations (chief of the air force political department, Reg Commissar F. F. Vernov). During all the combat operations, this work contributed to the maintaining of a high moral-combat spirit of the fliers, and instilled in them a desire to destroy the enemy and create air superiority.[18]

The effectiveness of party-political work was manifested in the mass heroism of the men. In the Mongolian skies, Capt V. P. Kustov, Sr Lt V. F. Skovarikhin and Lt A. F. Moshin rammed Japanese planes. The military commissar of the 150th Air Regiment, Btln Commissar M. A. Yuyukin, committed an immortal feat. When his aircraft caught on fire from a hit, the courageous pilot dove the bomber into the center of the enemy battle formation.

Thousands of Soviet and Mongolian soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battles on Kharkhin-Gol received high governmental decorations of the USSR and Mongolia. In honor of the victory over the Japanese militarists, a chest medal "Khalkhin-Gol" was struck and this was presented to the participants in the combat operations.

The continuous and effective party-political work built up the offensive spirit and was a most important condition for the victory of the Soviet-Mongol troops over the Japanese militarists.

"Having shown true heroism and courage, in making crushing strikes against the foreign aggressors," pointed out the decree of the MNRP Central Committee on the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet-Mongolian troops over the troops of militarist Japan in the Khalkhin-Gol area, "the men of the Soviet and Mongolian armies in a single formation defended the freedom and independence of the Mongolian people and protected the common interests of Mongolia and the USSR."[19]

In the course of the battles, experience was gained in organizing joint political work during the actions of large army formations from two fraternal socialist armies in defeating a common enemy. "The Khalkhin-Gol victory," pointed out the decree of the MNRP Central Committee, "was a real-life school for the command and political personnel of the Soviet-Mongol troops to gain combat experience and the ability to organize the combat operations of the troops and to carry out offensive and defensive operations."[20]

The experience gained by the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in the period of the battles on Khalkhin-Gol was used during the years of the Great Patriotic War, and was an important step in further improving party political work in the Soviet Armed Forces and the MNRA. It has not lost its importance in our days as well. The military-political situation in the Far East requires from us a constant rise in vigilance and combat readiness.

FOOTNOTES

[1] TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 32113, inv. 2, file 201, sheets 3-9.

[2] Ibid., file 203, sheets 4, 16, 17.

[3] Ibid., file 201, sheet 6.

[4] Ibid., folio 9, inv. 36, file 3501, sheets 35, 71, 111.

[5] Ibid., file 3506, sheet 200; file 3832, sheet 120.

[6] Ibid., folio 32113, inv. 2, file 201, sheet 14.

[7] "Sovetsko-Mongol'skiye Otnosheniya. 1921-1974" [Soviet-Mongolian Relations. 1921-1974], Vol 1, Moscow, 1975, p 425.

[8] See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 August 1969.

[9] TsGASA, folio 32113, inv. 2, file 201, sheet 47.

[10] Ibid., sheets 51, 52.

[11] Ibid., sheet 123.

[12] "Sovetsko-Mongol'skiye Otnosheniya...," Vol 1, p 426.

[13]G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], Vol 1, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1978, p 161.

[14]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 August 1969.

[15]Ibid.

[16]TsGASA, folio 32113, inv. 2, file 20, sheet 94.

[17]G. K. Zhukov, op cit., Vol 1, p 166.

[18]TsGASA, folio 32113, inv. 2, file 204, sheets 117, 123, 124, 215.

[19]NOVOSTI MONGOLII, 9 February 1979.

[20]Ibid.

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10272
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WARTIME OPERATIONS: PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN NAVAL INFANTRY BATTALION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 80 signed to press 26 Aug 80 pp 65-67

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Information" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank V. Sologub: "Party-Political Work in the Seishin Amphibious Landing Operation (Based on the Experience of the 355th Separate Naval Infantry Battalion)"]

[Text] From 13 through 16 August 1945, the Pacific Fleet conducted the Seishin Operation. Its aim was to capture the enemy naval base on the North Korean Coast at Seishin through which Japanese troops maintained contact with the homeland. This city and port with the adjacent surroundings was a fortified zone defended by a garrison 4,500 men strong. Seawards it was protected by shore artillery.

The Pacific Fleet Command adopted the following plan: initially a reconnaissance detachment (commander, Sr Lt V. N. Leonov) was to conduct reconnaissance in force and dig in at the port. Then the main forces were to land in three waves. Upon the decision of Adm I. S. Yumashev, the first wave was made up of the 355th Separate Naval Infantry Battalion.

A little more than 8 hours were assigned to prepare the operation. In such a brief time, the commander of the separate battalion Maj M. P. Barabol'ko, his deputy for political affairs Capt M. I. Kochetkov and the party and Komsomol organizations, in the course of combat, had to mobilize the personnel to carry out a difficult combat mission. The effectively compiled plan for political work provided for the carrying out of party-political measures during the preparatory period, during the crossing by sea and in the course of combat.

In preparing the landing troops for combat, the commanders, political workers and the party and Komsomol activists gave talks to them on the subjects: "Japanese samurai--the age-old enemies of the Soviet people," "let us carry out the combat order with honor," "soldier, be vigilant on the territory liberated from the enemy," and others.

Of important significance was the meeting of the officers with the participants of the Novorossiysk landing operation conducted by the troops of the Northern Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet in September 1943. At it experienced commanders and political workers shared their experience in the landing and in organizing political work.

The member of the military council, Lt Gen Shore Serv S. Ye. Zakharov, devoted great attention to preparing for the landing. He was personally present at the point of embarkation of the naval infantrymen, he held a meeting for the commanders and the political workers of the landing party, he gave advice on how to better prepare the personnel and the combat equipment for loading, for the move by sea and for landing on the enemy shore, and checked the readiness for the landing.

Several hours before the embarkation of the battalion on the ships, the deputy commander for political affairs, Capt M. I. Kochetkov, instructed the party bodies and Komsomol organizers of the primary party and Komsomol organizations on how they could more quickly inform the personnel of the mission confronting the battalion and ensure a high offensive spirit among the naval infantrymen.

In order that the embarkation of the landing troops on the ships was carried out quickly and in an organized manner, Kochetkov indicated where the battalion party organizer, Sr Sgt N. G. Markelov, the Komsomol organizer Sgt D. A. Kalashnik and the other party and Komosmol activists should be during this time.

Directly before embarkation, the commander and the deputy commander for political affairs held a meeting. In opening it, Capt Kochetkov said that the battle would be fierce, and urged the landing troops to be steadfast, to follow the glorious examples of the heroes of the war against the German fascists, and to beat the enemy without missing and for good.

The Komsomol organizer of the company of naval infantrymen, Red Navyman A. N. Komarov, on behalf of his comrades, vowed to destroy the invaders mercilessly.

At the meeting, they read the appeal from the crew of the minesweeper TShch-278 which along with the EK-2 escort vessel, was to deliver the 355th Separate Naval Infantry Battalion to Seishin and support it with fire. In particular, it said: "In appealing to you, dear friends, we declare, sparing neither our forces and lives, in using...the military equipment, ships, our ability and naval daring, we will honorably carry out the combat mission--the ship will promptly arrive at the destination.... We appeal to you, dear friends, with the challenge and desire to successfully carry out the combat mission...."[1]

Immediately the text was adopted for a reply from the naval infantrymen to the crew of the ship: "Comrade sailors! Brothers in arms and in joint service on the Pacific! We, the naval infantrymen from the unit of Maj Barabol'ko, in response to your appeal assure you that we will carry out the order of the commander of the Pacific Fleet with dignity and honor. We will spare neither our forces nor our lives to fully destroy the bloody aggressor, the Japanese samurai."[2]

The meeting and all the party-political work done in the preparatory period played an important mobilizing role.

The embarkation of the men and the loading of the equipment on the ships were carried out in an organized and rapid manner.

During the crossing by sea, the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations concentrated their efforts on carrying out the next tasks. Due to the fact that among the landing troops there were many men who were on the

deck of a naval ship for the first time and had never seen the sea, the political work was aimed at acquainting the novices with the rules of conduct at sea, and explaining what to do with a combat alert, in disembarking on the shore, and how to carry out the battle for the beachhead.

The deputy commanders for political affairs and the party organizers from the ships instructed the agitators. Communists who had combat experience in landing operations during the war against Nazi Germany were assigned to work with the landing troops. Thus, landing participants from the Black Sea and Northern fleets related how they should dig in after the landing and neutralize the enemy firing points.

The agitator, Communist Kashirnyy, shared his experience in destroying firing points. He particularly advised them to watch stone buildings as enemy submachine gunners could be in them.[3]

As soon as the EK-2 escort vessel had set to sea, the party organizer, Comrade Linin, instructed all the communists to talk with the landing troops.

The publishing of combat leaflets was organized. During the crossing by sea, a meeting was held for the personnel of the ship and the landing troops. The sailors and naval infantrymen speaking at it promised to carry out the landing in an organized manner and successfully fulfill the given mission.

All of this, along with other measures, helped in carrying out the disembarkation on the shore in an organized manner, and it took just 25 minutes.[4]

In disembarking on the shore, the naval infantrymen carried out a decisive offensive. They captured a beachhead 2 km along the front and 1 km in depth. The enemy brought up an armored train and through a battalion of cadets and officers as well as an infantry battalion into combat. They surrounded our two platoons. At this critical moment, a detachment of sailors made up from the ship crew rushed to help the landing troops. It was led by Capt 3d Rank G. V. Ternovskiy. The enemy continued to strengthen the drive, endeavoring at any cost to regain the elevation captured by the naval infantrymen. For almost 2 days, the landing troops repelled the fierce enemy attacks, until on 15 August, early in the morning, ships with the second wave came into Seishin Bay, with the 13th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (commander, Maj Gen V. F. Trushin), with a total of around 5,000 men. During the second half of 16 August, the enemy was crushed.

The party-political work conducted in the course of combat helped the successful operations of the naval infantrymen on the shore. The battalion deputy commander for political affairs, Capt M. I. Kochetkov, directed it effectively, in making skillful use of various forms which were fitting for the situation. During a pause in hostilities, he succeeded in assembling separately the party organizers, the Komsomol organizers and the agitators, and gave them brief advice on how to work with the personnel in the individual stages of the battle and where they should be. He spoke on the same subject with the communists assigned to the assault groups. The deputy commander himself was constantly at the most dangerous places. When the commander of the submachine gun company Sr Lt I. M. Yarotskiy was wounded, Kochetkov replaced him. This subunit was holding onto one of the captured elevations, and it killed over 150 enemy soldiers and officers, and drove off 16 counterattacks. An inspiring example for the men was the company Komsomol organizer, the communist

A. N. Komarov, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Being wounded three times, he did not leave the battlefield.

Even under the difficult conditions of combat, Kochetkov organized the putting out of combat leaflets. Here are the titles of some of them: "Observer Fantikov," "The Score is Open," and "Avenge the Hero."

Moreover, in the brief halts between battles, the deputy commander wrote letters to the relatives of the outstanding men, and thanked them for the good upbringing of heroes. Such letters, for example, were sent to the parents of the medical worker Yelena Chernyuk who carried 41 wounded off the battlefield and personally went into the attack; to the relatives of Red Navyman Fedorov who showed high fighting qualities in a hand-to-hand engagement, and to others.[5]

We should also note the planning done by the deputy commander for the period of carrying out the combat mission. Here are certain points from his personal plan: "1. At a meeting of the officer personnel describe how an officer is to give the mission to the men during the taking of the city, and how to conduct party-political work in the course of the assault. 2. To hold a meeting with the communists of the assault groups on their role in carrying out the combat order. 3. During the period of the assault to be in the third company. 4. In the course of battle to popularize the outstanding men, describing the feats performed by them by telephone, and organize the putting out of express leaflets. 5. To organize the funerals of men who fell in battle."[6]

For bold and able operations during the landing, Capt M. I. Kochetkov, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 14 September 1945, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The party organization of the 355th Separate Marine Infantry Battalion headed by party organizer Sr Sgt N. G. Markelov also did good work in the combat situation. Prior to landing on the shore, he gave specific assignments to each member of the bureau and to the other activists. A personal example in combat was the main thing for all of them. The communists of the battalion successfully carried this out.

For example, the party organizer of the machine gun company, Sgt K. P. Biryulya, fought stubbornly against the enemies. When the commander was severely wounded, he assumed command and skillfully led the subunit in assaulting a height. He was also awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.[7]

The agitator, machine gunner Volisov, heroically defended his firing position. His weapon was damaged by the explosion of a grenade. Volisov was not at a loss. Having quickly eliminated the malfunction, he continued to repel the enemy attack.

If the communists were an example for all the personnel, the battalion party organizer, Sr Sgt N. G. Markelov, served as the model for them. During the battle he was in the 1st Rifle Company. When it was approaching a hill which predominated over the city, it encountered strong machine gun fire. N. Markelov, together with the Komsomol member A. Kuts, made their way into the enemy rear and threw antitank grenades at four Japanese machine guns. And they managed to capture one intact. The bold men began firing it against the enemy. The company made use of this opportunity. It went over to the attack and captured the hill. For the skillful

organization of the party-political work under combat conditions, for heroism and valor of the battalion, Sr Sgt N. G. Markelov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.[8]

Of the 129 communists in the battalion, 118 were submitted for governmental decorations. Its commander, Maj M. P. Barabol'ko, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For the exemplary fulfillment of combat missions, the 355th Separate Naval Infantry Battalion became a guards unit.

FOOTNOTES

[1]A. Makarov and A. Dem'yanchuk, "30 Let na Boyevom Postu" [30 Years at Battle Stations], Primorskoye Kn. Izd-vo, 1962, p 97.

[2]BOYEVAYA VAKHTA, 29 September 1971.

[3]OTsVMA ["Central Naval Archives], folio 291, file 24086, sheet 230.

[4]Ibid., sheet 248.

[5]Ibid., sheet 240.

[6]Ibid.

[7]See V. Korolev, "Geroi Velikogo Okeana" [Heroes of the Great Ocean], Vladivostok, Dal'giz, 1972, pp 195-198.

[8]OTsVMA, folio 291, file 24086, sheet 255.

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10272
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EDITOR'S MAILBAG: REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ON MILITARY HISTORY

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[Unattributed replies to reader questions]

[Excerpt] [Question] Certain memoirs, writes M. I. Levin (the village of Dubenin, Mordovian ASSR), for example, in the books of Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy "Delo Vsey Zhizni" [A Cause of One's Entire Life] (Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, pp 191-193) and Gen Arm S. M. Shtemenko "General'nyy Shtab v Gody Voyny" [The General Staff in the War Years] (Voyenizdat, 1975, 2d edition, Book 1, pp 72-76) describe approximately the same events, but nevertheless they have certain discrepancies both in terms of time and on the essence of the facts. Why does this occur? Where can one obtain an answer to this?

[Answer] The editors of the journal are not concerned with the publishing of military history literature and are not involved in the editing of such books and memoirs. As for certain discrepancies found in the memoirs of various authors, including A. M. Vasilevskiy and S. M. Shtemenko, it must be kept in mind that their books are not documentary works, but rather memoirs which are written predominantly from memory. The precise time (hours and minutes) of events, as well as an accurate description of one or another fact can be established only from the archival documents (sources) and obviously the publishing houses do not always use such opportunities.

As for questions concerning the content of military history books and memoirs, it is best to turn directly to the publishing house which published the book. Here are kept the original manuscripts, the correspondence relating to the preparation of the book for print, materials of consultations, interviews with the author, and from these one can more easily obtain an answer to one or another disputed question.

[Question] K. M. Kosov (Ufa) as well as M. I. Levin (the village of Dubenin, Mordovian ASSR) write that in the book by P. I. Batov "V Pokhodakh i Boyakh" [In Campaigns and Battles] (Voyenizdat, 1974) it states that the operational group of the representative of Hq SHC, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov, established itself at the territory of the command post of the 65th Army (p 402). It was given 29 dugouts. Is this not an error, the readers ask. Certainly more than 200 persons could be housed in 29 dugouts. Gen Arm P. I. Batov in his memoirs does not mention such a size of the operational group.

[Answer] This is no error in the book "V Pokhodakh i Boyakh." The dugouts were designed not for the quartering and recreation of the personnel from the group of the representative of Hq SHK, but rather for operational work with a large number of maps, diagrams and tables. This obviously has misled the readers on the approximate number of officers and generals working at that time with Mar SU G. K. Zhukov in the 65th Army to prepare for the Belorussian Operation.

[Question] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, write L. V. Pechenkin (Sverdlovsk), a special guards insignia was established for naval personnel. What sort of distinction was this?

[Answer] For the personnel of the guards ships and units of the USSR Navy, the following distinguishing guards insignias were introduced: for the command and superior personnel, a rectangular chest plate edged in orange moire ribbon with black longitudinal strips (guards ribbon), and for the rank-and-file, the same ribbon on the sailor's cap. By the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, the Guards Naval Flag was established, and on 31 July 1942, the "Regulation Governing the Guards of the USSR Navy" was introduced.

[Question] In military history and memoir literature, the names Kursk and Orel fronts are encountered, writes S. K. Gavrilov (Mogilev). However the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia (Vols 4 and 6) does not mention them. Were there such fronts, who commanded them and for how long?

[Answer] After the successful offensive in the winter of 1942-1943, the Soviet Army liberated Kursk, and by the spring of 1943 had reached the line of the so-called Kursk Salient. In fact a new operational sector had been formed. Considering this, Hq SHK on 23 March 1943 created the new Kursk Front. Col Gen M. A. Veyter was appointed commander, Lt Gen Tank Trps I. Z. Susaykov was the member of the military council, and Lt Gen L. M. Sandalov the chief of staff. On 27 March the Kursk Front was renamed the Orel Front, and on the following day, 28 March, the Orel Front was changed into the Bryansk Front (of the 3d Formation).

Thus, the Kursk Front existed just 5 days, and the Orel 2 days. For this reason, the literature mentions them very infrequently. Obviously for the same reason nothing is said of them in the "Soviet Military Encyclopaedia." The command of these fronts (Kursk, Orel and Bryansk) remained the same.

[Question] Who was the first person to use his body to block an enemy firing port, asks Yu. G. Bobrov (Krasnoyarsk)? How many persons committed such a feat?

[Answer] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, as we can learn from the presently studied documents, 284 Soviet soldiers and partisans used their body to block the firing ports of enemy firing points. Among them was Aleksandr Matrosov who committed his heroic feat on 23 February 1943 in the battle for the village of Chernushka in Pskovskaya Oblast. This was reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin, and precisely at that time the Soviet people and indeed the people of the entire world for the first time learned what a Soviet soldier was capable of for the sake of the socialist motherland.

This feat in the years of the Great Patriotic War was first carried out on 24 August 1941 by the company political leader of the 125th Tank Regiment of the 28th Tank

Division, Jr Polit Leader Aleksandr Konstantinovich Pankratov in the battle for Novgorod. On 16 March 1942, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For a long period of time the feat of A. K. Pankratov was not widely known among the Soviet public. The problem was that this occurred during a difficult time when the Soviet Army in being forced to retreat under the pressure of the Nazi Hordes was engaged in bloody battles. And naturally, at that moment there was neither the time nor the opportunity to report everything to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

[Question] Why was the commander of the 5th Assault Army N. E. Berzarin appointed the commandant of Berlin, asks I. K. Zmeyev (the town of Nadzornensk, Stavropol'skiy Kray) and M. T. Sidorov (Orel). Why was the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany signed in Karlshorst?

[Answer] The command of the First Belorussian Front appointed the commander of the 5th Assault Army, Col Gen Nikolay Erastovich Berzarin, as the first Soviet commandant of Berlin and the chief of the garrison. In appointing him, they considered the most successful advance of the 5th Assault Army in the taking of Berlin, as well as the personal qualities of the army commander.

In Karlshorst, in the eastern part of Berlin, several buildings had survived which could be used for the ceremony of the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany. The choice fell on the building of the former mess of the German Military Engineer School which was undamaged and best met the requirements for a room to sign the act.

Each of these facts can be read in the memoirs of Mar SU G. K. Zhukov (Vol 2, pp 354, 370-374).

[Question] Please tell about the Lenin, State and Nobel Prizes, requests I. K. Lyakhov (Minsk) and I. K. Zmeyev (the town of Nadzornensk, Stavropol'skiy Kray).

[Answer] The USSR State Prizes are one of the forms for commending Soviet citizens for outstanding creative achievements in the area of science and technology, literature and art. They were established by the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 9 September 1966, 26 March 1969 and 11 August 1969.

The USSR Lenin Prize is one of the higher forms of commending citizens for the most important achievements in the area of science, technology, literature, art and architecture. It was established in 1925. The current regulation governing the USSR Lenin Prize was established by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 February 1967.

The annual international Novel Prizes are awarded for work in the area of physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature, as well as for activities in the area of strengthening peace. The prizes are named after their founder, the Swedish engineer, inventor and industrialist, Alfred Bernhard Nobel. According to Nobel's will, all the capital remaining after his death was to form the fund for the honorary prizes. The Royal Academy of Sciences, the Royal Caroline Medical-Sergical Institute and the Swedish Academy in Stockholm have the right to award the prizes in the area of science and literature, while the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament gives the prize for peace.

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ACADEMY OF ARMORED TROOPS: 50TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED

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[Article by professor, doctor of historical sciences, Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Krupchenko, honored scientist of the RSFSR: "Order of Lenin Red Banner Armored Academy"]

[Text] 1 October of this year marks the 50th anniversary of the Order of Lenin, Red Banner Military Academy of the Armored Troops imeni Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy. The entire 50-year history of the VUZ is inseparably linked to the rise and development of the Soviet tank troops the birth of which was presided over by V. I. Lenin. The first step in training specialists with a higher military technical education for the tank troops was the creation, in May 1930 of a faculty for mechanization and motorization under the Military-Technical Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. At the beginning of October 1930, there was the graduation of the first group of military tank engineers, and this was the official beginning to the system for training higher-skilled personnel for the Soviet tank troops. Over the 2 years, the faculty trained 137 tank engineers, among whom was Zh. Ya. Kotin who subsequently became one of the most prominent Soviet tank designers.

The year 1932 holds a special place in the history of the development of the tank troops. During this year large-series production was started on the then-new T-26 and BT-2 tanks. This made it possible to undertake the formation of mechanized formations and tank units. An acute need arose for training highly skilled commanders and tank engineers. Industry also needed specialists for designing and organizing the production of armored equipment. The faculty for mechanization and motorization under the Military Technical Academy could not carry out this mission. On the basis of a decree of the USSR Council of Labor and Defense, by an order of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] published in May 1932, an independent Military Academy for the mechanization and motorization of the RKKA Worker-Peasant Red Army was formed on the basis of the faculty as well as the military-industrial and military-design faculties of the Moscow Motor and Tractor Institute imeni M. V. Lomonosov. Initially it turned out commanders and engineers for the tank troops as well as specialists for the designing and production of armored equipment and the means for its maintenance and repair. Subsequently its basic task was only the training of command-staff and engineer personnel for the troops. By the end of the 1930's, the academy graduates comprised the backbone of the leading command and engineer personnel in the Soviet Tank Troops. Many of them even in the prewar years were commended by governmental decorations for courage and heroism shown in

the battles at Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin-Gol River, in Republic Spain, and during the Soviet-Finnish Armed Conflict, while Gens V. I. Baranov, V. N. Kashuba and M. F. Terekhin, Col P. M. Arman and others were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the academy, for outstanding successes in training personnel for the Soviet Tank Troops, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the Ukase of 22 February 1941, awarded the academy the Order of Lenin. This was high praise by the party and the government for the activities of the academy.

With the start of the Great Patriotic War the VUZ was confronted with particularly important and responsible missions in the area of training command and engineer personnel for the tank troops. In a short period of time it was essential to alter the entire system of training the commanders and military engineers. Regardless of significant difficulties, the academy successful met the given missions. Its basic faculties during the war years graduated more than 3,000 commanders and engineers. As a total around 8,000 men were trained, including the courses for advanced training of officer personnel.

From among the academy's graduates into the Great Patriotic War came such prominent military leaders as Gen I. D. Chernyakhovskiy who commanded a front, Gen S. M. Shtemenko who during the war years headed the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Eight academy graduates commanded armies (Gens V. M. Badanov, S. I. Bagdanov, V. T. Vol'skiy, M. Ye. Katukov, I. T. Korovnikov, A. G. Rodin, M. D. Sinenko and V. I. Chuykov), three were members of army military councils (Gens A. A. Yepishev, A. M. Krivulin and P. M. Latyshev), and five were chiefs of staffs of tank armies (Gens V. N. Baskakov, D. D. Bakhmet'yev, M. I. Kalinichenko, A. Ya. Netsvetaylo and G. S. Sidorovich), more than 100 men commanded the armored and mechanized troops of fronts and armies, and 29 commanded tank and mechanized corps. Hundreds of academy graduates commanded tank brigades and regiments and directed the technical support of the tank troops.

The motherland had high praise for the combat actions of the academy graduates. Thousands of them were awarded orders and medals. More than 270 generals and officers became Heroes of the Soviet Union, and 10 of them received this title twice. In the postwar years, 5 academy graduates received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, while 17 persons received Lenin and State prizes for outstanding scientific and technical discoveries and inventions.

Many academy graduates who became prominent military leaders today are dedicating their energy and knowledge to strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces. Among them are Mars SU S. L. Sokolov and V. I. Chuykov, Gens Arm S. F. Akhromeyev, I. A. Gerasimov, A. L. Getman, A. A. Yepishev, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, S. K. Kurkotkin, B. I. Obaturov, V. F. Tolubko, I. Ye. Shavrov, I. N. Shkadov and I. K. Yakovlev, Mar Armd Trps P. P. Poluboyarov, Col Gens V. A. Belikov, M. M. Zaytsev, Yu. F. Zarudin, N. A. Zotov, P. G. Lushev, S. K. Magometov, V. A. Makarov, Yu. M. Potapov, B. V. Snetkov, A. G. Smirnov, A. M. Tyagunov, V. Z. Yakushin and others.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the collective of the academy carried out a number of very complicated missions in reorganizing the training process, generalizing combat experience, and creating more modern training facilities. By the

1950's these had basically been carried out. Subsequently, in line with the revolution in military affairs, the party Central Committee placed new, higher demands upon the training level of military personnel. In this regard, in a short period of time the curricula were fundamentally revised as well as the methods and practices of training and indoctrinational work. Modern technical devices including the automation and mechanization of troop control processes were widely introduced in the training process. An important task of the academy is to carry out the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense on further improving field skills and the practical, professional and procedural training of the students with a constant high level of their theoretical knowledge. The command, the political department and the entire faculty are constantly making certain that the academy graduates, along with profound military and technical knowledge, acquire high ideological tempering, be able indoctrinators of subordinates and proponents of party policy, and themselves possess high moral-combat qualities.

Led for more than 10 years by Hero of the Soviet Union, Professor, Mar Armd Trps O. A. Losik, the academy has made a major contribution to strengthening the combat cooperation of the fraternal armies. It provides training and retraining for commanders and engineers of the tank troops and scientific-pedagogical and scientific personnel for the allied armies.

Over the years of its existence, the academy has become the main training and scientific center of the tank troops with highly developed training facilities. Its scientists are actively involved in working out the most important problems related to the development of equipment, combat use, support and organization of the tank troops. The successful carrying out of all scientific research at the VUZ is ensured primarily by the close interaction and creative cooperation of its scientific collectives with the troops, the ties with which are becoming ever-closer each year. The academy scientists are systematically involved in the exercises and maneuvers held in the troops, and give reports and lectures in the troop units and formations.

In the postwar years, such academy scientists as O. N. Brilev, S. Ye. Burtsev, P. D. Gudz', G. T. Zavizion, V. D. Zelenskiy, M. I. Maryutin, P. Ya. Oreshkin, N. G. Orlov, N. N. Rimskiy-Korsakov, G. Yu. Stepanov, N. N. Shishkin and others have made a great contribution to elaborating the question of the use of the tank troops and improving armored equipment

In 1965, the academy was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its great contribution to training officer personnel in the years of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar period. In 1970, it was awarded the Lenin Jubilee Diploma, and in 1980, the Lenin Diploma for unstinting military service and for carrying out the socialist obligations on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the birthday of V. I. Lenin.

The VUZ has been awarded the orders of the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia for the training of tank officers for the fraternal armies. Along with the training of commanders and military engineers for the tank troops, great attention is also paid to scientific research.

The academy collective is celebrating the 50th jubilee under the conditions of a high creative upsurge. With intensity and great responsibility it is working on carrying out the decisions of our party. In approaching the 26th Party Congress, it is fully determined to achieve new successes in the training of highly skilled officer personnel for the Soviet Armed Forces and for the armies of the fraternal socialist countries.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: GENERALIZING COMBAT EXPERIENCE

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[Two-part article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials": "On the Question of Generalizing War Experience"]

[Oct 80, pp 47-54, Part 1]

[Text] After the end of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, a great deal of important work was begun in the Soviet Army to generalize the accumulated combat experience. Scientific conferences were one way that this was done. At these conferences the results of research on troop combat experience were summarized and the organization and methods of controlling them which were recommended for use in troop and headquarters combat and operational training were analyzed. This promoted a further improvement in the training of army and navy personnel.

One of these conferences to generalize the combat experience of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the Iasi-Kishinev, Budapest, and Vienna offensive operations and the Balaton defensive operation was held in the Southern Group of Forces in April 1946. Participants included 103 generals and senior officers, including representatives of the General Staff, Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, and the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze.

Reports were presented on each operation by generals and officers of group headquarters and chiefs of the combat arms and services; in addition, generals and officers who took part in these operations made statements. After the conference brief operational and tactical conclusions for each arm of troops and service were prepared on the basis of the reports and statements and sent to the General Staff.

We present below excerpts from the statement of Mar SU F. I. Tolbukhin, commander of the Southern Group of Forces who directed the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the above-mentioned operations, at the conference.

Excerpts from the Statement by Mar SU F. I. Tolbukhin, Commander of the Southern Group of Forces, During Summarization of the Military Science Conference of 12 April 1946

In late 1944 Comrade Malinovskiy[1] and I were called to the Headquarters Supreme High Command (HqSHC). There Comrade Stalin personally gave us the mission to surround and wipe out the entire German fascist grouping facing the Red Army in the south, particularly in front of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

The Supreme Commander told us that both fronts should combine in the Husi region in Romania, that is, that the troops of our front should come from the east toward the Prut River into the Husi region while the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were to reach the same region in five days, but coming from the north.

At this time, to the best of my memory, Comrade Stalin said that because the gap between the strikes of the 2nd Ukrainian Front northwest of Iasi and our front from the Bendery region was on an arc up to 300 kilometers long and the main grouping of Germans was located in the region north and east of Kishinev, he was afraid that when we attacked this grouping would break away immediately and strike us in the flank.

Here (pointing to the region north and east of Kishinev on the map) there was just one Romanian division and the others were German; but west of the Prut River there were just 6-7 German divisions and the rest were Romanian.

Therefore, Comrade Stalin said to me, "Conduct your actions so that the enemy is prevented for as long as possible from breaking away to go against the 5th Assault Army."

When we were flying back from Moscow, we had already outlined a plan of action to draw enemy attention to the sector of the 5th Assault Army. On the same day we began carrying out this plan, and after a time (eight days) received instructions from the General Staff on the matter. Comrade Biryuzov[2] believes that by this time we had already submitted our plan to the HqSHC.

The offensive encirclement operation by the front. During the last war offensive encirclement operation , especially by us in the Red Army, came of age. It became a rule for us in every Red Army operation to try to develop a break through the front into a general or at least partial encirclement and destruction of the enemy.

The encirclement operation is one of the most complex forms of operational maneuver. Its execution demands, in addition to supporting maneuvers with essential men and equipment, that every senior officer regardless of rank be able to carry out maneuvers.

We have many examples of operational encirclement. Above all there is the Stalingrad operation. It made it possible to wipe out the German Stalingrad grouping. As a result 330,000 enemy troops were surrounded. The same thing was done in the Crimean operation and later in the Iasi-Kishinev operation, in which our front alone wiped out more than 250,000 enemy troops. Next came our joint operation with the 2nd Ukrainian Front at Budapest. It was also completed by encircling and completely eliminating the entire enemy grouping.

Before the war the Germans and we too had studied encirclement on the basis of a single operation, Cannae. But that was long ago, and conditions then were different. If we recall World War I, there were no completely successful encirclement operations in it, although the allied forces did attempt quite a few operations to encircle and destroy during this war.

Training troops in the encirclement maneuver. At the present time the modified organizational structure of the rifle corps and the inclusion of a mechanized division in it greatly increases the rate of advance, makes it easier to wipe out reserves, and creates the necessary conditions for encircling the enemy.

Therefore, the basis of training for all elements of general and officer personnel beginning from the battalion commander and ending with the commander of armies, both with and without troops, should be learning the maneuver to encircle the enemy, on no matter what scale. It must be established that every officer and general is obliged to try by every means to encircle and finally destroy the enemy in battle.

Conditions for success of the encirclement operation. What factors bring about success in an encirclement operation? They are the things that we did not have in World War I and the Civil War: above all mechanized and tank troops, powerful artillery and aviation, mastery of operational art, and greater skill on the part of our generals and senior officers.

Selecting the axis of the main strike. The armies of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts had enough examples in this respect from their own experience of earlier operations.

For example, there was the Crimean operation, which, it must be admitted, was a fairly serious operation. Many people thought it was impossible to break through the Sivash, but nonetheless the Sivash was selected as the axis of the strike, not across the Perekop. This enabled us to come out in the rear of the enemy's strongly fortified Ishun' position.

The Iasi-Kishinev operation. I remember on 25 May 1944 arriving at the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (now I can talk about it!). Comrade Malinovskiy, turning over the front, told me that in case of an offensive it had been decided to strike at Kishinev.

After studying the enemy it became clear to me that his primary grouping was located in the region east and north of Kishinev (pointing to the map). And therefore I told Comrade Malinovskiy at that time that I would not do it and would ask for authorization to deliver the strike in a different place.

When I was in Moscow at the General Staff I was told that an operation by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts was planned and that the 2nd Ukrainian Front would strike at Iasi and the 3rd Ukrainian Front at Kishinev.

I stated that, in my opinion, a strike at Kishinev would not produce good results. (It would chiefly have divided the Kishenev grouping — editors.) But it could be encircled by delivering the strike south of Bendery.

The Army commanders, and Malinovskiy too, told me that it would be difficult and maybe even impossible to attack there. I traveled around the area a great deal with Sharokhin and Shlemin,[3] but I still concluded that this was the shortest distance to encircle the entire enemy grouping. I reported this to the General Staff and my suggestion was adopted.

In the Vienna operation it was the same; the axis chosen for the main strike was a fairly difficult one. As you remember, the main strike was delivered in forested mountainous terrain on a front of nine kilometers north of Seckeschvecherwar. Despite the difficult terrain, this axis made it possible to encircle the enemy grouping and come out on the northwest bank of Lake Balaton.

Selection of the axis of the main strike for encirclement of the enemy is, therefore, one of the decisive conditions for success.

Creating superior forces in the main axis. Another important factor is creating adequate superiority in forces in the main axis, as we had in the Iasi-Kishinev operation despite the fact that we did not have overall superiority in manpower (in the 3rd Ukrainian Front — editors).

I remember the answer Comrade Malinovskiy gave to Comrade Antonov[4] concerning the strength of the enemy facing his front. When I reported that we were facing 24 enemy divisions (and the composition of our front was small), Comrade Stalin did not exactly believe me. He asked Comrade Shtemenko,[5] "How many are there according to your information?" Steminko answered that the enemy forces were one division stronger.

When the question of reinforcing the fronts arose, there was a great and well-founded temptation to reinforce Malinovskiy even further. Comrade Antonov wanted to do it, and leave nothing for us. Then the Supreme Commander said, "What do you mean? All the enemy forces are facing Tolbukhin's front and you do not give him anything." The reinforcement plan had to be reviewed to give us the necessary forces. In addition, Comrade Stalin told Malinovskiy, "Share your strength with Tolbukhin and give him one mechanized corps." Malinovskiy transferred the 7th Mechanized Corps to us and we used it.

Considerable attention was devoted to the rate of advance, which is one of the decisive factors in success. Here, Comrade Sharokhin said that his infantry moved at 25 kilometers a day. In the 46th Army the infantry advanced at a rate of 40 kilometers a day for several days.

To prevent the enemy from avoiding encirclement or breaking out of it it was essential to build up forces during the operation and maintain reserves of adequate strength. During this operation after the break through to the full tactical depth of the front disposition, we had just 12 fresh divisions in addition to the mechanized corps.

We had figured that if Malinovskiy did not reach Husi the enemy would be able to break out in that region. So if Malinovskiy was unable to reach Husi, the 4th Mechanized Corps would be committed there.

Creation of the external front of encirclement and strong and reliable support on the flanks of the breakthrough. Many examples can be given where this was not taken into account and the breakthrough failed. This did not happen with us, but on some fronts it did (Crimea, 1942). But in the 3rd Ukrainian Front when we were approaching the Dnepr in the spring of 1943 the Germans cut off our strung-out units, and in the 2nd Ukrainian Front west of the Gron River, at Budapest, and in the attack on Komarno the outer flank of the attacking troops was not supported and the enemy was able to strike this flank with small forces and compel the units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to draw back.

In this operation we envisioned support on the flanks of the breakthrough. I asked Comrade Stalin to give me one mechanized corps, one rifle corps, and an artillery battery for the breakthrough, and then the mission of supporting the break would be accomplished. He agreed with me and gave me a mechanized corps and a rifle corps at the expense of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

There cannot be a fixed ratio of forces between the external and internal fronts in supporting the external front of an encirclement; everything depends on the situation, and both must be strong.

Preparation for the offensive operation. The experience of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in conducting operations illustrates that the minimum time necessary to prepare a front for an operation is 20-30 days.

If I recall preparations for the 2nd Mius operation (we attacked there twice, on 20 August and 20 September, as comrades Tsvetayev[6] and Biryuzov can testify), they were completed in 20 days. Preparation for the Crimean operation, for reasons not depending on us, took longer because of the Sivash. It was more difficult for us than the Danube. It is four kilometers wide and the bottom is sticky. If it had been deeper it would have been easier, but we had to take tanks across on a ferry, and the ferry was pulled by people because it did not float, but crawled along the ground. We were able to build bridges 4-4.5 kilometers. There were two of them, one floating and one wooden. We set up timbering for the tanks, because there was time. The Supreme Commander was not pushing us. He said, "It is better not to hurry, but prepare properly and when you are ready, report to me." Under such conditions, of course, it was easy to prepare for an operation.

Preparation for the Iasi-Kishinev operation took 20 days after receiving the directive, but in reality it had begun earlier because I had already received the agreement in principle of the General Staff to prepare a springboard south of Bendery.

If we had not begun work ahead of time, preparations for the Iasi-Kishinev operation could not have been done in 20 days; it would have taken at least 30.

The Vienna Operation. There, I have to say, there was no time to delay and preparations for the attack with all forces available as well as fresh units from the 9th Guards Army (divisions of 12,000) and the 6th Tank Army were actually completed in 10 days.

What does preparations for an operation involve? Above all it involves regrouping troops and creating appropriate groups and densities. Preparation of artillery, photography, development of plans and delivery to the troops, and preparing the combined arms units are important facets.

During preparations for the Vienna operation we did not have full-strength divisions and had to look around for resources; this is something that strategy and operational art do not foresee. The only unit given to us was the 9th Guards Army, which did not need replacements. But the other units had to be brought up to strength, which required us to shift men from one unit to another and bring them from the rear. This takes a great deal of time. It took away from the work of the transport trains, and of course more time was needed for training.

Preparation of the base of operations (springboard) plays an enormous part. Logistics is equally important. The success of the operation is directly dependent on how well and thoroughly preparations are done.

Recalling the words of our famous military leader Suvorov that "Every fighting man must know his own maneuver," I concluded that in modern warfare "every commander must foresee his own maneuver."

So on this basis I personally prepared for an operation so that the division commander (generally the most important person), in addition to studying the springboard could foresee his own maneuver. To do this he would have to analyze how the operation might go and then work it through with the division commanders in the form of a military game on maps and briefly on the sand table. This is what Comrade Sharokhin did in all operations; it was that way in the Mius operation and in the Iasi-Kishinev operation.

I consider this correct despite the idea that exists in the German doctrine, which I understood to be that division commanders should have a narrow understanding of their missions. The German commander knows the general situation but he performs his mission only in the way he has been ordered, and therefore in battle cases often occurred where the Germans, on the attack, responded poorly to changes in the situation.

I consider it necessary to borrow the experience of the 37th and 46th armies where the division commander used a sand table and map to study what he might encounter and what he would do, what decisions would have to be made, in various situations almost all the way to Husi and then base preparations for the operation on this.

I believe that this is very useful for division commanders.

It was helpful during the Iasi-Kishinev operation and made it possible to attain the right rate of advance.

In the Crimean operation our 19th Tank Corps moved out at exactly 0500 despite the fact that at 2000 of the previous evening the corps commander, his deputy, and other important commanders had been wounded during a bombing attack. Junior officers took command, and I thought that any of them would be able to handle the situation because the plan had been distributed to each commander,

it was fairly well developed, all actions were described from the brigade to battalion level, and everything was foreseen.

The role of measures to deceive the enemy as a means of achieving a surprise strike. In the Crimean operation the enemy was fooled by our attack across the Sivash, which he never expected. The enemy did not know that we had concentrated a tank corps and tank brigade, in addition to an entire army, because he expected the attack on the Perekop Isthmus. To confirm the enemy's expectation, twice before the attack we began firing 203-millimeter guns at enemy positions on the isthmus (the guns were new in this area). We shelled his pillboxes for two days. This was what the enemy expected there and he was content, but nonetheless we delivered the main strike unexpectedly across the Sivash.

Later when we reached the region of Mekenziyeva Mountain and Sapun Mountain near Sevastopol' in the Crimea (1944), the enemy expected our attack along the only possible route (several comrades were there) — along the Balaklava Highway which follows the Black Sea coast. The enemy put almost all his artillery into this defile.

We had no hope of getting through anywhere else. So we were forced to undertake a diversionary attack in the Mekenziyeva Mountain sector, moving from west to east. For three days the 2nd Guards Army and cavalry carried on the feint there; in the three days our aviation flew 3,000 missions into these mountains.

I recall how we were waiting for the time when the enemy would finally begin pulling his units back from the Balaklava sector. And then early on the morning of the third day it was established that parts of the artillery had been removed to Mekenziyeva Mountain, and at 0700 of the fourth day we delivered the main strike south of Sapun Mountain.

By 1900 in the evening Sapun Mountain had been taken, and on the second day after this Sevastopol' was taken. In other words, under these conditions the Germans, even having a significant superiority in numbers, were unable to hold Sevastopol'.

In 1942 Sevastopol' was defended for eight months and abandoned only on orders from above; in 1944 our troops deceived the enemy and liberated Sevastopol' in five day.

That is what confusing the enemy means!

The same thing happened in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. The enemy did not know that we were going to attack there, from a base of operations south of Bendery. He expected the strike in a different place, with only a subsidiary attack there. In this sector he put only the 13th Tank Division and the 153rd Field Training Division at depth, believing that this would be adequate to stop our attack.

When we broke through the front south of Bendery and developed the strike, the enemy facing the 5th Assault Army sat in place for two days. What was he

expecting and why did he stay put? He was expecting the main strike against Kishinev. And only when the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps reached Tarutino and turned northwest toward Husi (this was on the third day of the operation) did the Germans understand that our troops were delivering the main strike south of Bendery.

It was growing light. I said that we would soon receive a report that the enemy had begun to withdraw. I anticipated that the enemy withdrawal would begin within three hours, and at 0700 reconnaissance discovered that they had begun. At this time the German radio stations were screaming that the main Russian forces had turned north. Berzarin was warned in time. His 5th Assault Army held up the enemy, preventing him from breaking away, and then contained him during the pursuit.

Units of our front and the 2nd Ukrainian Front joined up on the fourth day and the enemy was encircled. Some of the enemy forces which had slipped through our ring in the sector of the 7th Mechanized Corps and further north were captured by the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

The importance of preparing for an operation. You have seen how careful the preparation for an operation was. Therefore, comrades, I do not allow even the thought that it is impossible to break through an enemy defense if appropriate means are given and if the offensive operation is prepared as we prepared ours.

In 1943 I was in the Northwestern Front when the major operations to wipe out the Demyansk bulge were begun. The 1st Tank Army was operating in this sector; my army was in the second echelon. Our troops tried to attack several times, but did not advance a single meter.

What was the problem? It was not exactly proper for me to talk to my senior officers, of course. But in the mess hall I said, joking, that if I were given a chance I would break through. This was immediately reported to Comrade Zhukov. I was given authorization, but had just five days to prepare. The front ran along the Lovat' River. The army was 60 kilometers from the front. To reach the river would take four days, leaving one day to prepare the troops. Nonetheless, after running through the actions in advance with the commanders of the divisions, regiments, and battalions on the terrain and at the sand table, we were able to cross the Lovat' River at night and break through the defense during the day. In three days we had covered 18 kilometers.

I want to emphasize that preparatory measures are properly considered exceptionally important in both offensive operations and on defense. Take Hungary. The defense was well organized there, all defensive structures were available and the artillery was fully ready. So the 57th Army drove back all attacks and held its lines. I believe that careful preparation for an operation guarantees us success.

I think that this exceptional role of preparation should be reflected in our regulations and manuals on operational preparations. The troops should, of course, consider this and rehearse the actions expected to arise during the attack, just as we did during preparation for operations.

Preparing troops for upcoming actions. Long ago Suvorov, preparing to take Ismail, constructed a mock-up of the fort in order to study it and train his troops. I mean to say that this method of troop preparation is still appropriate for us today. Despite the modernization of the army, we must study all past experience and take from it those things that are good and appropriate today.

Engineering preparation of the base of operations should be mandatory during organization of the breakthrough. I must note the special importance of our trenches and foxholes both during the preparatory period before the attack and especially on defense.

Engineering preparations (trenches and communications passages) insure concealed concentration of forces, reduce losses, create conditions for command and control, give a reliable guarantee that there will be no gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of the attack, and make it easier for senior officers to monitor activities. Such a system of trenches and communications passages should be set up at a distance of 100-200 meters from the enemy.

Reconnaissance. No matter how well the enemy's system of defense may be studied, it is still necessary to test it, especially the forward edge, by fighting before the beginning of the offensive.

This does not mean, of course, that after taking up its starting position each involved regiment must send out a battalion. New units that have been brought up to the front line should not be revealed.

For reconnaissance it is necessary to use the units which were at the place before regrouping or reconnaissance can be done a few hours before the start of the attack so that the enemy cannot take prisoners and use the information gained from them.

The construction of battle formations. Our rifle division breaks through the enemy's field defense on a front of 3-4 kilometers. But this is too much for a medium-strength division. When breaking through a prepared enemy field defense such a division should receive a front of attack of 2-2.5 kilometers.

The experience of the Iasi-Kishinev and other operations of our forces demonstrates that with such a front of attack the division can overcome the full depth of the main zone of enemy defense, that is, to a depth of 5-6 kilometers, with its own troops, without committing the second echelons of the corps. I believe that a division attack on a front of 2-2.5 kilometers should be considered the norm.

It is said that with such a narrow front of attack the division will have an oversaturated first line at the starting position. But this is only an apparent oversaturation. In reality, up to 30 percent of the men in such an attack are not in the line (commanders, observers, control groups, and the like). With a 2-2.5 kilometer front of division attack the actual line will have a normal density.

The construction of division battle formations may vary greatly. There cannot be any hard and fast rules. Everything depends on the situation, missions, and density and depth of the enemy defense.

But the general principle from which we should begin in constructing battle formations is simplicity of command and control and rapid movement. In all cases the construction of the battle formation should meet these requirements.

A mandatory condition for constructing battle formations for a breakthrough is great depth so that they can insure a constant buildup of forces during the fighting. This applies to all elements, the regiment, division, corps, and army.

Planning the operation and formulating missions for the troops. According to the experience of many operations, the front is the basic unit that plans and conducts the operation as a whole. Planning in detail is done to the extent of the immediate mission, while planning in outline is done for the subsequent mission. The basic units of calculation in planning are the rifle division and kilometer of front line. At the army level calculations will be detailed for the actions of each regiment in the main axis.

The army is an operational-technical unit. In certain front operations, of course, the army operates on a very narrow front of 6-8 kilometers; in this case operational art cannot be displayed. But subsequently, tactical actions by an army often develop into actions of operational significance. Thus, in the case of our operations the encirclement of the enemy South Group by the 46th Army and the actions of the 57th Army in the defensive operation at Lake Balaton were independent actions of operational significance.

This shows that the army operation begun on the tactical plane often becomes operational in nature during the action, but it is developed within the general system of the front operation.

One more example is the Belgrade operation of the 57th Army. In this case the army advanced against Belgrade in an independent operational axis and although the front had planned the direction of movement and composition of columns for it, the army nonetheless was performing an independent operational mission.

The depth of formulation of missions. Improved means of neutralization make it possible to increase the depth of formulation of missions, especially when a mechanized division is included in the corps.

Experience shows that troops understand better if missions are given by days, not just in terms of immediate and subsequent period. The breakdown of the enemy defense, its tactical depth and subsequent elements, must be taken into account in formulating missions.

Under present conditions the rifle division should have a first-day mission of breaking through the entire main zone of defense (5-6 kilometers), and so the troops should be instructed to cover this space in battle formations without stopping.

The depth of the front operation. The depth of the front operation is determined by the missions, terrain, and existence of natural lines, but in any case it should be more than we used to think, that is, more than 150-200 kilometers.

In the Iasi-Kishinev operation where the scope was limited by the Prut River the depth of the operation was no more than 120-150 kilometers, but under other conditions, for example in the Vienna operation where the mission involved delivering a counterstrike and taking the city, the depth of the operation was much greater.

Artillery in a front offensive operation. Comrade Nedelin[9] dealt in detail with questions of the artillery offensive. I want to say that adequate artillery density must be established to support the break through the fortified defensive zone. Based on the experience of the 3rd Ukrainian Front such density averages 200 guns and mortars per kilometer of front (in the breakthrough sector). This density is achieved through the T/O artillery of the troops making the breakthrough, the artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme Command, the second echelons, and even the artillery of the troops designated to deliver a subsidiary strike. When artillery weapons are inadequate, subsidiary strikes in the sector of the front should not be carried out.

The artillery grouping should provide for centralized fire control in the main axis of the army during the period of artillery preparation and support. Artillery groups must be formed in all elements, from the rifle regiment to the army, keeping the basic nuclei of these groups together to the full depth of the offensive operation.

The artillery groups under the control of the combined arms commander give him an instrument with which he may influence the course of fighting in the decisive sector.

The breakthrough artillery division attached to the rifle corps should be the corps artillery group; in this case some of the brigades (2-3) can be used to form the artillery groups of the rifle divisions.

The army artillery group is formed from army artillery cannon brigades and divisions. The artillery corps did not particularly distinguish itself. It did not participate in fire control, and as a result highly qualified artillery officers, the command and headquarters of the corps, were not employed. The opinion has been expressed here that this form of organization will not be needed in the future. I agree.

I believe that correct organization of artillery command and control is one of the important conditions for the success of an operation.

The structure of artillery preparation must not follow hard and fast rules. Fire strikes against limited areas and unobserved but more accurately prepared concentrated fire should be combined with observed fire at specific targets. There is no doubt that aimed fire should be used, if only for a short time.

The length of artillery preparation must be determined depending on the situation; under average conditions it will last 1-2 hours, as was the case in our operations.

I consider the double moving barrage by artillery and mortars combined with consistent concentrated fire to be the most effective method of artillery support for the attack.

[Nov 80, pp 45-49 Part II]

[Text] The front defensive operation. Comrades, it may be that I have given you too much detail on certain points, but when you have lived through it all you must sum it up. I mean that you are younger than me and possibly you will have to fight some day too. You must never forget that our military art, of which I have been speaking, makes it possible to defeat the enemy, and it should be studied over and over.

I now move on to the defensive operation. I would like to discuss several fundamental issues.

Characteristics of the defensive battles of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in January-March 1945. The enemy made three attacks, each presenting a different situation. In each case the objective of the defensive operation was determined by the specific features of the situation. Therefore, the methods and procedures by which they were done differed.

The counterstrikes by fascist forces on 2 and 18 January at Bitsche, Seckeschvecherwar occurred in the course of a front offensive operation before the objective of the operation, taking Budapest, had been accomplished.

In the axis of the enemy strike our troops had just reached the assigned line. If you recall, on 31 December the order was given to go over to the defense on this line (pointing at the map), and during the night before 2 January the enemy went on the attack. Thus, our troops had just one day to prepare the defense. The forward edge was on a forested mountain crest; only forward units had reached it, and the remaining forces were just moving up. In this respect, of course, the strike was unexpected.

We adopted a decision to withdraw to a new rear line. I was asked why we were withdrawing so far. We figured simply that it would take a minimum amount of time to bring up the main forces and dig in. It was a favorable line, but it was also possible to stop at intermediate lines. In the last analysis, we had to prevent the enemy from joining up with his troops surrounded in Budapest. In this case 5-10 kilometers meant nothing to us.

Thirteen days passed. During this fighting we were able to drive back two enemy counterstrikes. But in this time our units suffered losses and the situation with reserves became very critical. They had to be created during

the fighting, while beating off enemy attacks. Under these conditions we could not wait for the defensive operation to develop into an offensive operation. The objective of our defense in driving back both the first and second enemy attacks was to keep the operational advantages of our springboard on the west bank of the Danube for a later offensive against Vienna. An important fact at this time was that when the enemy attacked we had no reserves and no defense in depth, which made it necessary to gain time to organize the defense.

On 2 January, therefore, the decision was made to gain time by bringing the approaching units of the 93rd and 86th divisions, the 18th Tank Corps, and other forces to the point of the breakthrough and committing them to battle on the run, thus to stop and wear down the enemy while saving our forces to take Budapest.

The third enemy attack on 18 January was also a surprise to us. It caught us in a situation where we were performing the mission of cleaning up the enemy in the northern sector (pointing at the map). When we stopped the enemy, reserves were created immediately: a tank corps, a mechanized corps, and so on.

By 18 January all our main forces were in the region northwest of Budapest. The units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were far away and could not help us, and in reality we had no forces in the breakthrough sector until we received reserves.

After the Nazis broke through on 18 January we faced a difficult situation at first. The southern flank of the breakthrough was open. Front headquarters was in Paks and enemy tank reconnaissance forces were approaching it. But we held out. The Supreme Commander gave us reserves for support, first one corps and then another.

As you know, by 6 March the Nazi command had again assembled new forces. I should say that according to our information, by 1 March we had definitely established that the enemy had assembled 11 tank divisions facing our front. But the intelligence director of the Red Army had a document which said that the Germans had moved the 6th SS Tank Army from the western front to Stettin (north of Berlin), and therefore no attack should be expected from the enemy on our front.

During this period we were also preparing to go over to a further offensive. We had the following objectives: by stubborn defense on prepared and deeply echeloned lines wear down and weaken the enemy as much as possible, using the least possible men and equipment, saving them for the decisive strike in the upcoming front offensive. We fulfilled these missions.

By this time the 27th Rifle Division and the 19th Artillery Division had been transferred to us, followed by the 9th Guards Division on 8 March and the 6th Tank Army on 14 March; they were concentrated north of Lake Velence for the decisive offensive.

It took willpower not to bring the 9th Guards Army into the defensive fighting in the attacked sector. It was a great temptation at this time when the enemy reached this point (pointing to the map). There was a real danger to

the 4th Guards Army. With his usual politeness the Supreme Commander said, "Please, do not use the 9th Guards Army in defensive fighting." I reported to him, "I would ask you, please, to authorize it in the extreme case, but everything will be done to avoid it." We were able to keep the army out until the offensive began.

Our method of driving back the enemy was stubborn defense of every meter taking full advantage of weapons dug into the ground. Counterattacks and counterstrikes were an exception, when there was an usually favorable situation or some important point or region had to be held.

At the same time we maneuvered with fire and counterattacks as well as by abandoning certain strongpoints to improve our position. I believe that this is correct; the methods of combat change in conformity with the objectives during different periods of the defense.

Broad and rapid maneuvers with reserves at the expense of other sectors of the front, a method common to all the periods of defense, was our basic technique in defensive operations. It made sense and worked out very well. Although our forces were not so strong, still we were able in both January and in March to hold our position, to prevent the defeat of our troops and stop the enemy from reaching Budapest.

The role of the front in the defensive operations. The experience of our defensive operations testifies that repulsing a major enemy offensive involving large tank forces is accomplished on operational scale through the efforts of the front and even, as the situation demonstrated, requires help from the HqSHC.

The front is the controlling element of every operation as a whole and the primary planning organization. The mission of the armies is to use their own and attached men and weapons according to the plan of the front. Rigorous centralization of troop command and control in the hands of the front is the decisive factor in a successful operation.

Our control did not hinder army initiative. It is true that we had to intervene in the internal affairs of the armies. The front received reconnaissance information before they did. Therefore, while the information was still being taken to the army the front was already making decisions and setting concrete missions for the armies. I would say that it was this that enabled us to achieve such excellent results.

General principles of organizing and waging a defensive operation. As the Regulations say, under all circumstances the defense should be stable, deeply echeloned, and capable of repulsing tanks. But when it is necessary to drive back a counterstrike by an enemy tank grouping during our offensive the basic characteristic is the operational maneuver with artillery and reserves, above all mechanized formations, to bring them to the breakthrough sector. The most important condition for the success of the maneuver is to gain the time necessary to create reserves and occupy defensive lines in depth.

Gaining time in defense makes it possible to nullify all the advantages of the attacker. This is accomplished in the following ways.

1. Above all by discovering the intention of the enemy's command and determining the probable direction of his strike. However, reconnaissance did not always provide timely information on the enemy, which put us in a difficult spot (especially on 18 January). The weather prevented flying and our plane had not conducted reconnaissance. The Nazis took advantage of this. We had the impression that the enemy was withdrawing, but in reality he drew units back to B'yer and Komarno to confuse us and then quickly move them north of Lake Balaton. It is essential to have a good reconnaissance aircraft that does not depend on the weather.

2. By setting up obstacles in the probable directions of enemy action that will retard his advance. To do this mobile obstacle detachments were formed everywhere, from the front to the troop units.

3. As soon as we learned that tanks were moving in a certain direction, all mobile reserves were concentrated there. Front aviation was also sent there with the mission of stopping the tanks.

Cooperation between aviation of the two fronts. I should mention, comrades, some special features of cooperation between the aviation of two fronts. Comrade Vorozheykin, aviation representative of the HqSHC, was with us at front headquarters and helped us very skillfully using aviation from the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

The situation at that time was such that our planes could not take off because of fog in our sector of the front (south of Budapest), but in the sector to the north of the city the weather was good. This is where the aviation of the 2nd Ukrainian Front helped us. There were days when its aviation was working for us. When necessary we also helped. That is how neighboring aviation forces helped one another in an operation.

Occupation of a rear defensive line should not be done by units withdrawing from the front, but rather by reserves moved up to this line.

Counterattacks in defensive battle. The main thing in defensive fighting is to wear down the enemy, deplete his forces, and then destroy him by going over to a decisive attack. This does not mean to disregard the use of counterattacks when it is necessary to gain time to organize the defense and create reserves. Under such conditions counterattacks are the best form of defense, and they should be used in every favorable situation.

In March 1945 we seldom employed counter attacks, taking advantage of a prepared defense. The defense was active nonetheless. It envisioned operational maneuvers and created all necessary conditions for going over to a decisive attack, which was done on 16 March.

Command and control in the defensive operation. The army and corps command points were as close as possible to the troops. This was justified by the course of events and assured continuous and firm control of all elements.

I must in all responsibility say that high-frequency communications played a large part in command and control of troops by the front. We had contact with any commander at any time; the simplicity of using this communications insured rapid transmission of orders.

The mobile forces of a future enemy. In future fighting against the probable enemy we may expect a large number of mechanized forces on his part. For this reason our conclusions are fully applicable to future operations as well. In this we must look ahead.

We have spoken here of adding mechanized divisions to the composition of the corps. This will make it possible to surround the enemy more rapidly and to attain a new, higher pace in the operation. But we must also consider the [illegible] of our enemy. After all, the Nazis used their forces lavishly on all fronts, at Stalingrad, Moscow, and Leningrad, and what we faced, especially after the Iasi-Kishinev operation and the breakthrough in the central sector, was a different enemy. The fascist army was no longer what it had been; it no longer had so many mobile units.

In the Iasi-Kishinev operation the 3rd Ukrainian Front faced just one enemy tank division. In the Balaton operation, it is true, 11 tank divisions were assembled, but in this case the German command was contemplating a major strategic and political goal.

Our future enemy, the one you may have to encounter, will have a mobile army. We cannot say in this case that we will be more mobile and the enemy will be left behind. He will be just as mobile and have just as much equipment. This must be kept in mind when studying these matters and when training the troops.

Artillery in the defensive operation. Artillery had a paramount role in the general system of fire in the defense. If tanks are dug into the ground they are also artillery.

The system of artillery fire should be organized so as to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy before the forward edge. Concentration of fire in any sector of the front (according to the situation) is accomplished by maneuvering with trajectories and organizing centralized fire control. In addition, maneuver on wheels is planned. Artillery is concentrated in the threatened sector both from the reserves and from other sectors of the front.

I think that this was fully accomplished in the sector of the 57th Army. It had been on the defense for 3-4 months and was able to do it. But we know cases where certain armies had been on the defense for as much as a year, but still had not properly organized the system of artillery fire.

Repelling massed tank attacks. Artillery is the decisive force in the fight against tanks. To fight massed enemy tank attacks it is necessary to construct a deep (tactical and operational) defense and work out a unified plan of antitank defense on the scale of the army and even the front.

Direct-laying fire is the primary type of fire for reliably hitting tanks. A massed enemy tank attack should be met by direct-laying fire by all defensive artillery.

Heavy artillery (especially 100-millimeter canons) and antiaircraft artillery must be used to destroy heavy and super-heavy enemy tanks. For us the use of enemy antiaircraft artillery seized in Budapest was especially important.

All artillery in the defense must be ready to fire at tanks and to maneuver. This means that in the defense against large groups of tanks the distinction between antitank artillery and other artillery is meaningless.

Antitank defense in the primary axes of tank danger should be insured by organizing strong antitank regions (on the average — an artillery regiment).

Antitank reserves are created at all levels, from the rifle regiment to the front. After the enemy tank attack is repelled tank destroyer artillery and tanks are returned to the reserve for reorganization.

Based on the experience of the 3rd Ukrainian Front's fighting at Budapest, an initial artillery density of 25 guns and 10 mortars per kilometer of front in the first line and 10 guns and seven mortars in the second and subsequent lines at a depth of 10-25 kilometers was able to stop the enemy tanks and enable us to bring us reserves.

Centralization of the command and control over antitank defense men and equipment (artillery, tanks, infantry, and combat engineers) on the army and front level insures rapid organization of resistance and sufficient fire density in the axis of the main enemy strike.

I consider it correct to use mechanized units in the defense when artillery is inadequate to beat off an attack by eight enemy tank divisions. In this situation tanks dug into the ground were very important and fulfilled their mission. But where artillery is available in sufficient quantity it is advisable to hold the tanks in reserve to deliver rapid counterstrikes against the enemy.

General conclusion on the work of the conference. The results from the work of this conference will unquestionably be very useful to us. I would, of course, like to go even more deeply into these questions, but that would take even more time.

When we planned the work of the conference, we thought that it would be a strong impetus, a milestone in drawing conclusions from our operational experience. In order to take things further, it would be necessary to organize the work differently, but under present conditions we cannot take the corps and army commanders away from their work for this purpose.

The armies must study not only the large questions such as the army operation, but also go to lower levels, to the corps and division, study their experience in combat operations, study the details of each operation or engagement, draw the appropriate conclusions, and use them in operational and tactical training.

The experience of this war must be used fully, even more so today. We must take advantage of the time when we still have living witnesses and veterans

of the fighting in our divisions, corps, and armies. Many of them will be retiring in just 3-4 months, and then they may be demobilized and leave. So we must hurry with this work.

Similar conferences lasting 2-3 days should be held in the armies, and the experience from such conferences should be used.[13]

FOOTNOTES

1. Gen Army (after 10 September 1944 Mar SU) R. Ya. Malinovskiy commanded the 2nd Ukrainian Front from 22 May 1944 until 10 June 1945 (this and all following notes are by the editors.)

2. Col-Gen S. S. Biryuzov was chief of staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from 15 May to 29 October 1944.

3. Lt-Gen M. N. Sharokhin was commander of the 37th Army; Lt-Gen I. T. Shlemin was commander of the 46th Army.

4. Gen Army A. I. Antonov was first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army (from May 1943 to February 1945).

5. Col-Gen S. M. Shtemenko was chief of the operations directorate of the General Staff from May 1943 until the end of the war.

6. Col-Gen V. D. Tsvetayev was commander of the 33rd Army from 29 September 1944 until the end of the war.

7. Col-Gen N. E. Berzarin was commander of the 5th Assault Army from 27 May 1944 until the end of the war.

8. Lt-Gen F. I. Tolbukhin commanded the 68th Army from 3 February to 21 March 1943.

9. Col-Gen Arty M. I. Nedelin commanded the artillery of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

10. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 243, Inventory 267012, File 14, Sheets 156-178 (stenographic record).

11. During the repulsion of enemy counterstrikes southwest of Budapest in January 1945 and the Balaton defensive operation (6-15 March 1945).

12. The enemy delivered the second counterstrike on 7 January 1945.

13. TsAMO SSSR, Fund 243, Inventory 267012, File 14, Sheets 178-192 (stenographic record).

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NAVAL FORCES: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Training on Board Nuclear Submarine

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 80 p 8

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Aleshkin, deputy commander for political affairs on the nuclear submarine "60 let Velikogo Oktyabrya," Red-Banner Northern Fleet: "Following Ocean Criteria"]

[Text] In the last training year our submarine was the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy. The crew accomplished with honor its tough socialist pledges. The high degree of combat proficiency of these submariners is characterized in particular by the following figures. The number of master proficiency-rated crew members increased by more than 50 percent, while more than 60 percent of the men became specialists 1st and 2d class. The submarine received marks of excellent on all course problems and battle drills. The boat confirmed its lofty title of excellent.

A major contribution toward achievement of the overall success of this missile-armed nuclear submarine was made by the crew's warrant officers and petty officers -- veterans of many blue-water patrols and genuine experts at their job. With their own personal example they encouraged their subordinates, obtaining from each of them fulfillment of adopted pledges.

Rear Adm V. Naumov, commanding officer of the nuclear submarine "60 let Velikogo Oktyabrya"

Above the ocean days andnights marched by in alternation, but the missile-armed submarine continued to cleave the oceandepths without surfacing. Its powerful heart -- a nuclear reactor -- beat evenly and tirelessly. The measured routine of life at sea was continuing aboard the nuclear submarine, a life strictly regimented by the ship's routine and by combat and political training schedules. Mock alarms imperiously summoned the submariners to the nuclear reactor control consoles, missiles and torpedoes, undersea and surface situation boards. The crew had adopted ambitious socialist pledges specifying further shortening of the time required to make the boat battle-ready, increased vigilance, skillful mastery of the weapons and combat equipment, and they were now working hard to fulfill these pledges.

When we initiated competition on board at the beginning of the year for high-quality improvement of all military labor indices, we placed considerable hope on personal exemplariness and the organizing role of our crew's warrant officers and petty officers -- the most experienced and highly-trained segment of the crew. We also took into consideration the fact that many of the boat's petty officers and section commanders possessed blue-water experience and had the requisite skill for training and indoctrinating subordinates.

The submarine's commanding officer, Vladlen Vasil'yevich Naumov, and I eagerly examined the individual pledges of the junior commanders for the period of the extended ocean cruise, and this was understandable. On modern submarines such as ours, a master proficiency rating for a warrant officer is a normal, quite logical thing. And many first-hitch petty officers get very close to this proficiency level in some indices during their years of sea duty. Therefore nobody is surprised to read the following: "I pledge to become master proficiency-rated...." It is important that this pledge be backed up by the practical willingness of the individual to work hard to improve his proficiency rating and the ability to pass tough tests and to demonstrate knowledge and skills close to the level of an engineer.

We were pleased that the majority of warrant officers and petty officers intended to earn the next higher efficiency rating during this cruise. Again and again we carefully read through the pledges, picturing the concrete individual with his virtues and shortcomings, strong and weak points. Would a given commander be able to handle the burden? Would his promise be achieved by the end of the year? The cost of such failures to meet pledges is considerable. I am not talking about final performance figures proving to be not so nicely rounded off as they appeared in the pledges, although this per se does not embellish a collective. Losses in morale are much more perceptible here, for the prestige of the junior commander in the eyes of his subordinates suffers. This is why we were so insistent about the warrant officers and petty officers adopting tough but well-substantiated individual pledges.

Take, for example, Warrant Officer A. Starinskiy, in charge of engine room enlisted personnel. Aleksandr Stepanovich Starinskiy is a veteran crewman, but nevertheless only now has he resolved to become master proficiency-rated. At the time when on the basis of years in service it was time to boost his proficiency rating, this chief machinist's mate decided only to confirm first class.

"But with quite a margin," stressed Aleksandr Stepanovich. And he explained: "With a master-proficiency margin."

We gave Starinskiy support, and did not try to rush him, because sometimes it happens that one specialist grasps new skills immediately, while it is more difficult for another. It was difficult for Starinskiy. Of course we are dealing here not with the rudiments of a military occupational specialty but with heavier items -- at the level of technician, or even engineer. The industrious and persistent warrant officer worked hard, and was assisted by others. He steadily improved as a specialist, but he did not yet feel entitled to go for higher. And now finally that final, cherished move appeared in his pledges.

"Well, Warrant Officer Starinskiy is ready for it," the commanding officer remarked with satisfaction. I had to agree with him.

Very early into the cruise I had occasion to see that Aleksandr Stepanovich had not only become a genuine expert at his job but during his tenure on the crew he had grown a great deal as a person who is very anxious to achieve the common success and who feels personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the collective. Political instruction classes had just ended, and I was in my quarters, organizing the notes I had taken while checking several groups, when Warrant Officer Starinskiy knocked.

The chief machinist's mate shared the following observation with me: not all warrant officers in the group, when speaking at political instruction classes, closely coordinate the subject topic with the missions assigned to the boat, with the state of affairs in their detachment, and with the course of and results in socialist competition.

"And all because," Aleksandr Stepanovich summed up, "with some comrades a gap sometimes develops between word and deed, a unique gap. We should discuss this point at a warrant officers meeting."

Of course such a discussion was soon held. We began to be more severe with those who attempted to conceal behind idle talk shortcomings in organization of training and indoctrination work.

A noncommissioned officers advanced know-how school was operating with a high degree of effectiveness on board the submarine while at sea. Here the top warrant officers and petty officers passed on to their fellow crewmen their experience and know-how in training and indoctrinating subordinates, as well as skilled operation and maintenance of weapons and combat equipment. The commanding officer and other officers possessing a great deal of service experience addressed the junior commanders on several occasions, presenting reports and lectures on matters pertaining to modern training and indoctrination methods, and organization of socialist competition. These questions were raised and discussed at a warrant officers' meeting.

All this had beneficent effect on further improving the quality of special training conducted with subordinates by the detachment chiefs and section commanders. An atmosphere of competitiveness reigned at training classes and drills, and the junior commanders tolerated neither unnecessary simplifications nor unnecessary relaxation of demands.

The commanding officer and the party organization kept an unrelenting eye on the special training of the warrant officers and petty officers themselves. Many Communists presented reports at a bureau meeting on high-quality preparation for proficiency rating tests. Subunit officers held a number of consultation sessions for junior commanders preparing to become master proficiency-rated and specialists 1st class.

And here is the result: at the present time 45 percent of the submarine's warrant officers, including Warrant Officer Starinskiy, are master proficiency-rated, while some petty officers, such as PO 2d Class V. Vikhor, for example, a senior quartermaster-signalman specialist, have approached the master proficiency level in some indices. This is the way it must be: this nuclear submarine's crewmen must meet ocean criteria.

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Sonar Training Exercise Described

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 80 p 11

[Article by Capt-Lt A. Graborov, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet: "Seeing the Target"]

[Text] "Our submarine has borne the title of excellent warship for several years in a row now," stated political worker Capt 3d Rank G. Levashov. "And the crew's success has been achieved thanks to many components, including skillfully organized socialist competition on board this boat. Competition became particularly hot in connection with preparations for celebrating the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of Victory. Improvement in the skills of our specialists was fostered not only by a personal endeavor on the part of the men to increase their occupational knowledge and hone their skills, but also by improvement in methods of training personnel.

"Take the sonar operators, for example. They will long remember one of our cruises. In a submarine search area two targets appeared instead of the expected single target, appearing as blips on the plan position indicator. The sonar operator was about to establish contact with them and classify them. But then a new scenario instruction came in: one of the targets, initiating jamming, had left the scan sector. A faint shadow of confusion flitted across the face of PO 2d Class R. Vakhitov. He should have estimated the new situation and established contact with the targets without waiting for instructions from his superior. But the petty officer was slow in responding. Unsureness in the actions of one specialist was transmitted to other crewmen. As a result it became necessary to make up for lost time."

The importance of the element of surprise in modern combat has been much discussed, both in occupational specialty training classes and in practice drills. In practice, however, Warrant Officer V. Surov did not always take it into consideration when organizing sonar operator training. Target search drills, including searching for real targets, were held on a regular basis. But they frequently would be structured in a simplified arrangement: the specialist knew in advance that the target would not disappear from the scope until he established solid contact with it. The only thing required of him was fast reaction to commands. This method of course failed to develop in the sonar operators such qualities as maximum attention, precision actions, and swift reaction to an abruptly changing situation.

The second reason for the failure was superficial totaling of sonar operator performance results at practice drills by the chief sonarman. The men's errors and miscalculations would be merely recorded, but would not be analyzed in detail. Post-drill critiques would not include a discussion on improving search techniques and methods of meeting performance standards. Nor was competition organized between individuals and watch teams. It is therefore not surprising that the same mistakes would be repeated at subsequent drills. Thus a rigid routine in task performance became deeply rooted, and these deficiencies came out quite clearly in the complex situation which arose at the exercise.

A good lesson was learned. Chief sonarman Warrant Officer V. Surov revised his method of training his men. He now devotes particular attention to competition on tasks and performance standards.

Contests for the title of the best top specialist have also become a tradition. Before beginning training drills, Warrant Officer V. Surov stipulates the conditions of the competition and states the performance results achieved by the leading sonar operators in the preceding drill. The following detail is also important. When announcing a drill topic, the instructor always focuses the men on achieving a concrete performance result. What do the competitors gain from this? The submariners more clearly see the objective of the competition: the immediate objective is to earn the designation of best specialist, while the end objective is to increase that station's combat readiness.

One of the most recent training drills, for example, went as follows.

"Battle station prepared for action and for sea!" the instructor orders.

The watch team, consisting of Warrant Officer V. Lopatin and PO 2d Class O. Kuz'min, proceeds with training. A blip appears on the screen.

"Classify contact!"

Stopwatches inexorably tick off the sonar operators' working time. The search becomes more complicated. New blips appear on the screen. But the specialists manning the station work calmly and deliberately.

"Bearing.... Range...," the watch team commander soon reports.

The performance standard is met.

Another team takes its places at the simulators. Warrant Officer A. Mitansin and Sr Sn N. Kuz'min will be working on an equally complex problem: they will be classifying contact with two targets. Although the "aggressor" was engaged in elaborate maneuvering, the sonar team promptly detected the targets and tracked them until the "kill" was made.

Submariner combat training continues. The best performance recorded in meeting the performance standard yesterday is today merely another point in the progression. Each drill is a new step toward expertise. And training drills filled with unexpected scenario changes help sonar crewmen develop an instantaneous response to situation changes and help develop mutual understanding among the crew members under combat situation conditions.

The warrant officer utilizes instruments of competition at each stage in training. Practice drills are followed by a thorough critique, with analysis of the sonar operators' performance. Achieved results are entered onto the specialists' individual cards, which reflect their professional development. And the results of such an approach are in evidence. POs 2d Class O. Kuz'min and R. Vakhitov, and Sr Sn N. Kuz'min have attained the level of specialists 1st class. Other personnel are also preparing to boost their proficiency rating.

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SAM Exercise Described

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 27 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Shkurkin: "Missile Attack"]

[Text] Rocking from side to side in the choppy swell, the escort ship "Neukrotimyy" was following the prescribed course into the area where it would perform missile firing. The ship's company had been living and working in preparation for this for quite some time, filled with the enthusiasm of competition and high spirits evoked by preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress.

And now the launchers and the antiaircraft missiles they carried were ready, having been thoroughly checked over and inspected by Sr Sn P. Loyko and Sn M. Tolyakov. They had done considerable work preparing the missiles for firing.

In the compartments, crewmen were intent on their job. Multicolored lamps were winking mysteriously alongside illuminated displays. A systems check was in progress, and an avalanche of reports was streaming in to the command post of Sr Lt A. Chizhov, commander of Combat Department-2.

Things were proceeding on schedule.

Highly complex equipment simulated the flight of a target. It was rapidly closing the ship....

At sea one sometimes employs the assistance of a special simulator device which makes it possible to simulate the conditions of combat and to work on the most important standard elements under complex conditions. Combat training is organized according to the principle of teaching the men what is needed in war.

"Cleared to fire! Antiaircraft missile battery, destroy the air target!"

Just prior to this cruise the battery under the command of Sr Lt O. Filinov received new, green replacements. Nor had the battery commander himself, or chief gunner's mate Warrant Officer V. Zavadskiy independently performed such a mission.

The missile batteries had competed with one another for the honor of participating in the missile firing. Naturally it was not easy for Sr Lt O. Filinov's men to compete with their neighbors. The battery of Sr Lt V. Arkhipov had experience in practical missile firings. One must give credit to their rivals: they generously shared their own experience with their counterpart missile crewmen and gave them assistance. Party members officer V. Arkhipov and master proficiency-rated Warrant Officer V. Nosov worked particularly hard.

Aggressive party-political work was conducted during the preparatory period. A party meeting was held in Combat Department-2, at which party members discussed their tasks. Reports were presented at a meeting of the ship's party bureau by CPSU members Sr Lts A. Chizhov and O. Filinov. Activists V. Kornyushko, A. Lapshin and others worked with individual missile crewmen. They mobilized the men for exemplary performance of the assigned mission.

...A display flashed on at the battery commander's command post: "Target in zone." A range and time count was made.... Senior Lieutenant Filinov turned toward his men, in a state of concentrated composure. Was everything proceeding normally?

I was present observing, together with the ship's deputy commander for political affairs.

"Time equalling performance standards is of course an important indicator," he commented. "But today that alone is not enough. It is essential to take account of the criterion of quality of combat performance: who performs all operations with the greatest precision."

Missilemen have a term: launch readiness. It is connected primarily with the hardware, the weapons. But how does one measure the parameters of readiness of the hearts of the men who operate these weapons, their spiritual unity? It is expressed by such moral criteria as conscientious attitude toward performance of one's military duty and a high degree of personal responsibility....

The ship's commanding officer, Capt 2d Rank V. Kornyushko, glanced at his watch. It was H-hour! At this instant an orange flame erupted on the after launcher, and a missile surged skyward, like a flaming arrow, to intercept the "aggressor." We could clearly see on the scope that the missile blip had merged with the target blip -- kill accomplished!

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GROUND FORCES IN THE MOUNTAINS

Motorized Rifles

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 80 p 10

[Article by Gds Pfc A. Tarlykov, 2d Class driver-mechanic of Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Master Weapons and Equipment Expertly: Along Mountain Routes"]

[Text] Our company had to perform an enveloping maneuver under mountain conditions, proceed to a given area and attack the "enemy." We knew that the tactical exercise which had begun would be a serious test of combat schooling for all motorized riflemen and for us in particular who were at the controls of the BMP's [infantry fighting vehicles (IFV's)]. Not all the driver-mechanics previously had driven a combat vehicle in the mountains in winter.

At dawn the column of IFV's stretched into the gorge, which initially was wide, with gentle slopes. Snow evened off the irregularities and the frozen clumps of mud and rocks. The vehicle ahead was well visible in the vision device. This permitted maintaining the required distance and a sufficiently high speed confidently.

The gorge gradually narrowed and became tortuous. The vehicle ahead now often would disappear from the field of view after going around a projection of rocks. The IFV driver-mechanics noticeably began to reduce speed before the next turn, and the commanders and gunner-operators sharpened their attention to avoid collisions with a vehicle which suddenly halted beyond a sharp turn. Movement also was complicated by the roadless conditions. Windswept snowdrifts were encountered in places on the canyon bottom, and in others, washouts formed by mountain torrents.

Gds Pfc V. Videnkin's vehicle got into just such a wash-out during a sharp change in direction and one of the tracks was torn off. The IFV behind it was controlled by Gds Pfc A. Sidorov. The experienced soldier reported the incident to the commander over the intercom and received permission to continue movement. Putting on a burst of speed, Sidorov drove around the immobile vehicle across the slope.

The company continued the march, while motorized riflemen headed by Gds Jr Sgt V. Markovich stopped and began repairing the IFV. They quickly put the track in place and caught up with the subunit after a little while. The crew was helped out by its high technical schooling, and the knowledge and skills acquired while practicing the norms during combat training came in handy.

Classes held with personnel by Gds Capt A. Dzheyanov prior to the exercise on the topic "Features of Driving IFV's under Mountain Conditions" largely contributed to our driver-mechanics' confident actions on the mountain routes. The subunit gave great attention to preparing the equipment for upcoming operations in the mountains. The running gear was checked with special care. Worn track links, shackles and track cotters were changed and their tension adjusted. Where necessary, new load wheels were put on. For this reason each driver-mechanic was sure of the reliability of all assemblies and units.

To increase the field of view, I began to take the turns with the largest radius possible. For example, before changing direction I would press the vehicle to the right side of the gorge and, if the steepness permitted, would drive up on the slope in a left turn. Since a rather high speed was maintained, this technique helped cross snowdrifts on the move easily.

The march in the mountains became a serious test which checked the cohesiveness of the entire crew's actions. In one of the movement sectors the lead vehicle of platoon commander Gds Lt V. Koshcheyev ended up in a pocket of rocks after negotiating the next ascent. He had to return, but there was no place to turn around as the piles of rocks were a hindrance. Then Gds Pfc S. Drozdov backed the IFV up. This was difficult to do, but the driver-mechanic took the fighting vehicle onto another route, precisely following the officer's commands and skillfully using the foot and hand brakes.

I also had to act in response to commands of Gds Capt A. Dzhunushev, who was in the turret, when the vehicle was proceeding up a snow-covered steep ascent. The uplifted hull nose hindered me in choosing a route, and so I would drive around individual obstacles encountered along the way, guided by the officer's instructions. If the snow was not deep and there were no obstacles, I would proceed up a slope with slight, smooth yawing right and left. This helped see the slope in front of the tracks through the lateral vision devices. We took steep sectors with deep snow in long zigzags. Crushing the snow, the vehicles seemingly proceeded along a rut.

Much time was spent negotiating talus along the way. Small stones would sift downhill from under the tracks of the lead vehicle. For this reason we had to stop and wait out this moment. If they got between the rollers and the track, the rocks lifted the rollers and the track might fly off on a steep turn.

The success of a march in the mountains is determined largely by the driver-mechanics' ability to control the vehicle and choose the route correctly. This is particularly important on descents. There is no time for long reflection. Here is where the automatism in performing driving operations acquired in training practice helps.

In one place we were awaited by a steep descent and below that a turn. The IFV's negotiated the difficult sector one after the other. It was apparent from how they moved that the soldiers were shifting to low gear in time and smoothly reducing speed before the turn.

The fighting vehicle driven by Gds Jr Sgt Yu. Vasil'yev already had begun the descent. Suddenly the driver-mechanic heard a grinding sound between the idler wheel and the track links. That happens when rocks get in there. Vasil'yev lost his head and was not able to shift to low gear. He had to turn sharply below and as a result the vehicle threw a track.

But all difficulties of the complicated enveloping march were successfully overcome and our subunit moved to the designated area in full strength and on time. We struck the "enemy" at the given time and the assigned mission was accomplished.

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Motorized Rifles, Small Subunit Tactics

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "Small Subunit Tactics: Analysis, Experience, Problems: Seizure of a Pass"]

[Text] After suffering a defeat in the foothills, the "enemy" retreated to the mountains. Here in the difficult terrain he counted on halting the attackers and winning time for drawing up reserves from the depth by holding the pass.

The motorized rifle company commanded by Sr Lt B. Vasil'yev received the mission of taking the pass.

An estimate of the situation at hand with consideration of information received from reconnaissance led the officer to the conclusion that a frontal attack could not be counted on for success. The key to the pass was the hill immediately adjacent to it. But how could it be seized when the only road leading to it was under "enemy" fire?

"A way must be found for a sudden attack on the hill from the rear," decided the commander. He carefully studied the terrain where upcoming actions would take place on a large-scale map, directing attention to the fact that south of the hill located directly at the pass there was a mountain path leading into the defenders' rear, and he made the following decision: to advance one platoon to the pass and with the onset of darkness begin active preparations for an attack, revealing themselves at times and thus attracting the "enemy's" attention. The two other platoons, including WO Fedorov's platoon, were to make an enveloping maneuver, move to the rear of the hill adjacent to the pass, capture it at dawn, then take the pass in coordination with the platoon operating from the front.

WO Fedorov assigned the combat mission to subordinates:

The "enemy" is defending the pass in the vicinity of mountains with spot elevations 934.2 and 1012.7 (see diagram) [diagram not reproduced] with a reinforced platoon, attempting to hold it until the arrival of his reserves and to prevent our subunits from penetrating into the valley of the Losna River. The main weapons are located on the south slopes of hills adjacent to the pass.

Our platoon received the mission of moving to the "enemy" rear by using the mountain trail passing west of Benchmark 798.0 and east of Mt. Orel Dvukhglavyy and coordinating with 2d Platoon, routing him by a simultaneous attack from the front and rear and taking the pass.

The attached mortar battery conducts brief, intense shellfire against "enemy" positions on the south slopes of the mountains.

While moving up, 1st Squad is the patrol. Remaining squads are to perform local security and continuous surveillance along the entire movement route.

With the arrival at the line of departure, 1st Squad attacks in the center of the combat formation and destroys the "enemy" in the position in the vicinity of Benchmark 955.1. The 2d Squad attacks on the right and destroys the "enemy" in the position in the vicinity west of Benchmark 955.1. The 3d Squad attacks on the left.

The signal for the concerted attack is a red smoke flare. A green flare denotes my position.

My deputy is 1st Squad commander Sgt N. Krylov.

During the envelopment of the subunit, WO Fedorov paid special attention to camouflage, reconnaissance and security. Moving in single file, the motorized riflemen made short halts to preserve strength for the battle.

The platoon moved to the line of deployment for attacking the elevation at exactly the designated time. Suddenly there was a surprise. Patrols noticed an "enemy" column moving along the road toward the pass. A report followed to the platoon commander. Estimating the situation, WO Fedorov realized that if the "enemy" reserve succeeded in approaching the pass unhindered, the attackers' mission would be complicated considerably.

With the company commander's approval and with consideration of the changed situation, the warrant officer updated the combat mission to the squads. He ordered two of them to proceed swiftly to the gorge, occupy the hillcrest facing the road and bring down fire on the approaching reserve. The platoon commander himself, WO Fedorov, headed this group. On instructions from the senior chief, Sgt N. Maliyev's 3d Squad was attached to the 2d msv [Motorized Rifle Platoon] to attack the "enemy" from the rear. Motorized riflemen commanded by WO Fedorov acted with initiative. After moving to the gorge, they took up a defense on the hillcrest.

Then the "enemy" appeared, a patrol squad moving in front. The platoon commander ordered that the reconnaissance element be let by. As soon as the main column drew fully into the narrow gorge, the motorized riflemen opened up aimed fire at a common command. Several fighting vehicles in the column were disabled by accurate rounds of grenade launchers. Deprived of an opportunity to maneuver, the "enemy" suffered heavy losses.

Then a red flare soared on high, followed by a brief period of intense shellfire by the attached mortar battery. The daring surprise attack from the front and rear sowed panic in the "enemy" ranks. Without permitting him to come to his senses, the motorized riflemen accurately hit the surviving "enemy" personnel and weapons and took the pass.

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Infantry Tactics

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Col M. Mordas: "Small Subunit Tactics: Mountain Operations: A Platoon Assigned to Security"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

> [Text] Editors of the journal ZNAMENOSETS are beginning the publication of a series of articles on techniques and operating methods of the soldier, squad and platoon in battle. Small subunit commanders will find answers in them to urgent questions involving the training of subordinates in competent actions in the primary kinds of warfare under different terrain conditions. We recommend that warrant officers and NCO's use these articles in preparing and conducting tactical problems and exercises.

March in Dismounted Formation

A platoon in the mountains usually operates independently.

Using as an example the actions of a motorized rifle platoon in an advance party (GPZ), we will examine just a few of the methods of performing combat missions.

During the period of preparations for the march, the commander pays particular attention to ensure that the service personnel distribute the gear evenly on their shoulders and small of the back and at the same time that all objects carried do not hinder freedom of action and are easily removed for use.

Overcoats usually are carried in a roll and, when put on, the flaps are tucked under the belt at the waist. The knife-bayonet is removed from the weapon and placed in a scabbard.

Before the beginning of each move the platoon commander chooses the route and carefully studies its passability from the map and the terrain.

The personnel's pace when moving in the mountains should be of average length and even (no more than 60-80 paces per minute).

The foot is placed down fully during movement along mountain paths. If the trail is strewn with small talus or individual stones, try not to step on insecure rocks. The distance between soldiers is set from 1 to 3 or more meters depending on the steepness of slopes.

Rain, snow and frost greatly deteriorate trails, and then movement is accomplished at doubled distances and the place for putting down one's foot is chosen with more care. The body weight is shifted to the other foot only when it is standing firmly on the path. Mass belaying in the form of a rope railing stretched along the trail is organized on steep and dangerous sectors (Fig. 1). Each soldier fastens a snap hook to such a railing and advances by slipping along the rope.

Grassy slopes are negotiated using various methods, the primary ones being:

/"Head-on" ascent/ -- This method is used when it is necessary to negotiate short grassy slopes of varying steepness quickly. Feet are placed down fully, toes spread at an angle to each other in a herringbone pattern.

With an increase in steepness, the angle between the feet increases and the pace is shorter. An ice axe (or mountain stick) is used as an additional point of support or held at the ready position in front;

The /"zigzag" ascent/ is used on long grassy slopes of varying steepness. The soldiers often change direction of movement aslant the slope while climbing. The size of the zigzags depends on the width and steepness of the slopes. The feet are placed as follows: the higher one with toe facing direction of movement, the lower one with toe facing downward and turned slightly. An ice axe (mountain stick) for self-belaying is held with the point toward the slope (Fig. 2).

An ascent of small, unstable talus slopes "head-on" or aslant the slope supported by an ice axe or mountain stick is made by using the full foot surface and turning the toes outward, with the next shift of the feet made after movement of the talus has stopped completely (Fig. 3).

Step first on the heel during a descent, particularly on soft soil. This makes it possible to obtain some support. Descend with back to slope, supported by a mountain stick or ice axe.

At times it is more convenient and easier to descend sideways on talus slopes, putting down one foot on the inner edge and the other on the outer edge.

For safety purposes, subunits' descent and ascent of talus and rocky slopes are made in a single-rank open order formation, and the crossing of such slopes is done in single file.

When ascending in the mountains one must breathe through the mouth and nose to take in more air and unbutton collars when it is warm. There should be no smoking, as it is more difficult to breathe after smoking. Drink water in small swallows and only with the commander's permission, but it is even better simply to rinse the throat and mouth. After reaching a pass, immediately descend at least a few meters, since cold, penetrating winds always are blowing in passes.

One or two minute halts are made to rest during ascents. At a prearranged signal or the command "Halt," each soldier stops where he is when the command is given.

Long halts are not made during moves, which saves time for a longer rest for the night. Short halts are planned of 10 minutes every 50 minutes of movement. Five-minute stops are made every 20-25 minutes of movement during an ascent of steep trails.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Reconnaissance and Security on the March

Reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy are of very great importance during mountain operations. Only the terrain and the road along which reconnaissance has passed can be considered known and passable respectively.

On very broken terrain the enemy is located on dominant heights. He blockades or secures the narrowest spots on roads and bridges. He organizes obstructions, demolitions and minefields, straddles mountain passes and organizes ambushes.

When a platoon makes a march as a GPZ, a patrol squad is sent forward and two-man patrols sent to the platoon flanks. Surprise enemy actions should be expected in defiles, narrow passages, gorges, ravines, and on roads and trails. It is here that the enemy most often will organize ambushes and make raids. His tactics may be the simplest--let the reconnaissance and security by, then hit the main body by surprise fire.

For this reason perimeter surveillance is arranged in squads and suspicious areas are subjected to careful inspection. Special attention should be given to reconnoitering hills adjacent to a defile, for which patrol members climb the hill slopes on both sides of the canyon and inspect them. Groves of trees, thickets, rocky sectors and caves are reconnoitered carefully, since the enemy may set up ambushes in these locations.

In inspecting a ravine, one patrol member moves along its bottom and the other above, giving fire cover to the first member's actions (Fig. 4).

After discovering an obstruction or obstacle, the patrol squad determines the barrier's limits, then reconnoiters and marks possible passages or detours.

When encountering a small enemy group, the patrol squad attacks it boldly and resolutely. The main body of the advance party performs continuous observation of the enemy and the patrol squad's signals. On encountering an equal enemy, the patrol squad sets up surveillance while the main body of the advance party maneuvers to the enemy's flank and rear, deploys into combat formation and attacks swiftly. But if the GPZ encounters superior forces, the platoon occupies a line favoring defense under cover of the patrol squad, sets up a multilayered fire plan, prevents the enemy's advance along the canyon or ridge and provides conditions for the guarded column to deploy and enter battle. When the main body moves into the attack, the platoon advances in the designated direction and, regardless of difficulties, employs wide and close envelopments and uses open accesses and dead space to close and deliver surprise attacks. The platoon's maneuver actions and its bold, resolute attacks always lead to destruction of superior enemy forces.

Motorized rifle subunits attack together with tanks and BMP's [infantry fighting vehicles--IFV's] (APC's) along mountain plateaus if the terrain is accessible. If this is impossible, the tanks and IFV's (APC's) advance along roads with local security in front and link up with their own or supporting subunits when terrain conditions permit.

During development of an attack in the depth, the closest approaches to the pass, exits from canyons, defiles, roads and paths usually are covered by enemy fire, obstacles and the actions of small groups. The mission of destroying these groups is assigned to the GPZ, while the main body proceeds to the pass quickly and under cover by a daring maneuver over difficult sectors of mountain terrain and takes the hills dominating the pass by an attack from a favorable direction. Then destruction of the enemy at the pass is completed by an attack from above.

A platoon on the defense may hold an individual strongpoint in isolation from the remaining platoons in the company. Squad positions are chosen to provide for destruction of the enemy by flanking and crossfire and to preclude the presence of dead space.

Weapons are disposed in layers in checkerboard fashion, both on hill slopes facing the enemy and on the reverse slopes. This arrangement of weapons makes it possible to fire over the heads of friendly troops in front without the fear of hitting them and to make the necessary maneuver. Positions should be occupied along a ridge on slopes facing the enemy. It is extremely important that terrain sectors

not occupied by the subunits are inaccessible to the enemy or are screened by obstacles and are under crossfire from all kinds of weapons.

Firing positions and other emplacements are arranged primarily as partially dug-in or filled types using rocks covered by a layer of soil as well as bags of soil. Barbed-wire entanglements are set up on prongs. Undefended approaches are blown up or prepared for detonation. Cave-type shelters and parapets are used to screen personnel against enemy artillery fire.

When defensive combat is waged, small enemy groups are allowed to come as close as possible to the positions and destroyed by assigned weapons. As the enemy's main body approaches the defenses, platoon fire builds up and is taken to the highest intensity.

The maneuver of fire, forces and weapons from a strongpoint sector not under attack is widely used to destroy an enemy who has wedged into the platoon strongpoint from the front or who has enveloped the strongpoint from a flank. There is a concealed maneuver of weapons and personnel to alternate positions and to connecting passages adapted for defense, reverse slopes of hills and other typical elements of the mountain relief.

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Reconnaissance in Mountains

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Col N. Ivanov: "Methodology is the Art of Training: Reconnaissance in the Mountains"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] One of the main criteria of soldiers' field schooling is the ability to detect enemy weapons and concentrations of personnel promptly.

Surveillance of enemy actions is performed in the subunit by the commander personally and with the help of observers. This mission is assigned to the best trained and most resourceful soldiers who are able to designate a detected target precisely and intersect a new one at the most tense moments of combat. But this does not mean that individual privates and NCO's alone should be taught the techniques of reconnaissance: All personnel of motorized rifle, tank, artillery and other subunits interworking among themselves to accomplish assigned missions are obligated to perform reconnaissance of enemy weapons and personnel.

The performance of reconnaissance during combat operations in the mountains is no simple matter. The terrain panorama observed here changes sharply even with slight moves, and the large number of ravines and gulleys, the diversity of vegetative cover and rocky ground considerably hinder the location of targets. This naturally requires a scout-observer to display high activeness, maneuverability, initiative, cunning, as well as knowledge and observance of the fundamental rules developed on the basis of experience of combat operations in mountainous terrain during the Great Patriotic War and of peacetime tactical exercises.

The most favorable conditions for training privates and NCO's to perform reconnaissance by observation are created in tactical drill problems and tactical problems. In organizing such problems, WO G. Aleksashin, commander of an outstanding motorized rifle platoon, always provides for training subordinates in accomplishing reconnaissance missions under conditions of the mountainous terrain along with other training questions.

Depending on the content of the problems being worked, the warrant officer preselects an area on the tactical training field and instructs the target situation operator on procedures for denoting the "enemy."

Personnel training also is conducted ahead of time. Under the direction of NCO's, the privates go over on a terrain model questions of the organization and tactics of the probable enemy. Squad commanders see that subordinates gain a firm understanding of possible locations of weapons in the "enemy's" combat formations during operations on mountainous terrain and remind them that machinegun positions usually are located on the spurs of hills (but not on the very top) and on projections of cliffs so that gullies, canyons and ravines can be brought under fire.

The revealing signs of machineguns in a position are: Terrain in the sector of fire has been cleared of rocks and vegetation; the machinegun position usually is located separately under the cover of the projections of cliffs, boulders, trees and rock piles. The machinegun also can be detected from the characteristic sound of firing.

The NCO's further direct their subordinates' attention to distinctions in the location of positions of other "enemy" weapons. For example, in the mountains antitank rocket launchers are usually located near roads, passes and hollows where the movement of tracked and wheeled equipment is possible. They reveal themselves by a bright flame and the cloud of smoke and dust which forms during firing. Antitank guns also are set up on avenues of probable tank approach in the foothills, in bushes and in planted areas near the roads. Their positions not only may be on the near slopes of hills, but on the reverse slopes as well. The revealing signs of firing positions of the antitank guns include the appearance of people in one and the same location and typical outlines of the tube and upper part of the shield cover.

ATGM's also usually are located on avenues of probable tank approach. Their revealing signs include smoke and dust at the firing position during launches and the stream of heated gases (the trace) along the entire trajectory of the projectile's flight. ATGM's installed on vehicles have additional revealing signs inherent to vehicular equipment and the toothed silhouette in the upper part of the launcher.

After taking the platoon to the mountain training field on the day of problems, WO Aleksashin announces the topic, training questions and procedure for working them to the personnel. Then he designates reference points and indicates their position on the terrain, emphasizing in so doing that reference points to be picked above all in the mountains are those local terrain features which would be difficult to destroy in actual combat: the crests of hills, spurs of ravines, rocky projections, large boulders, intersections of mountain roads or trails and

so on. /The reference points to be designated should be at least 2-00 from each other in line,/ which makes it possible to give target designations rather precisely and rapidly using only the binoculars. But in the depth it is best to choose local terrain features on the effective fire line of the weapons in the subunit. For convenience of observation, /all the terrain in front is conditionally divided into three zones: the near zone up to 400 m, the middle zone from 400 to 800 m and the far zone from 800 m./ With consideration of these zones, reference points are designated from right to left and from oneself into the depth.

The warrant officer then places the personnel in the tactical situation, announces the necessary information on the "enemy" and assigns the mission for performing reconnaissance by observation from in place. As was decided ahead of time, the squad commanders monitor their own subordinates and the warrant officer observes the actions of young soldiers.

Privates Yu. Mamedbayev and V. Kornev quickly chose a site for [illegible] began performing the mission. But the platoon commander gave them the command "As you were!" and pointed out the mistakes [illegible] the privates right at the positions they chose: The view of a portion of the terrain was poor due to a small hill in front; in order to see local terrain features, Pvt Mamedbayev had moved to the top of the hill, thus ignoring concealment, while Pvt Kornev attempted to organize his position so noisily that the rattle of rocks and the shovel could be heard from afar. The warrant officer brought the young privates back, reminding them once again that a site for observation in the mountains should be chosen so that there are as few "dead spaces" as possible--on the slopes and spurs of dominating hills, near cliffs, precipices and passes--this makes it possible to perform observation in the designated sector to a great depth and simultaneously permits concealment from the enemy.

The warrant officer also reminded them of rules for concealment: Never locate yourself near clearly defined local features, let alone move to the crests of hills. Other kinds of concealment also should be observed.

Privates Mamedbayev and Kornev began to act more competently after moving up to the positions on command.

After working problems in performing reconnaissance by observation from in place, the platoon, under WO Aleksashin's direction, began working the second problem--performing reconnaissance during movement while the subunit was on patrol.

The warrant officer reminded his subordinates that performance of reconnaissance in the mountains during movement has its specific features. In particular, the enemy can be expected from any direction /in the mountains, particularly forested mountains,/ and so /reconnaissance should be all-around: from the front, to the flanks and even from the rear./ Based on this, the warrant officer determined the group's combat formation to be a "triangle"--two two-man patrols move in front at the distance of visual contact, a two-man patrol proceeds in the rear for observing the rear, and the main group (nucleus) is in the middle with the machine-gun and rocket launcher.



KEY:

1. North
2. Far zone
3. Middle zone
4. Near zone
5. 1st MRB
6. Round hill
7. Observer (scout)
8. Dry bushes
9. Reference point no...
10. Deep ravine
11. Green grove
12. Near village
13. Far village
14. Sharp hill
15. Two-man patrol
16. Nucleus
17. Commander
18. Observation sector

/The technique of performing reconnaissance in the mountains during movement consists of a consecutive occupation of points convenient for surveillance on hills and in terrain folds./ In working techniques of performing reconnaissance by observation, the warrant officer demanded that his subordinates strictly observe concealment. He taught them to proceed to the top of a hill under cover, along a lateral slope, to perform observation only from shelter, and to begin an inspection from the slopes and go around the hill along the sides, never appearing on the top, since even a solitary individual is easily seen from afar against the background of sky while on a slope it is considerably more difficult to pick him out.

After working this method of operation, the warrant officer explained to subordinates that when the patrols reached a designated observation post, the patrol or group commander proceeds to them under cover at their signal and personally performs reconnaissance by observation. The main group is located near the commander, ready for action. After inspecting the terrain ahead, the commander designates the location for the next observation post and orders the patrols to move forward. Then Aleksashin worked this method of operation with subordinates in practice.

After working the second training problem, WO Aleksashin summarized results of the problem with subordinates and announced grades for every motorized rifleman.

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MILITARY DISCIPLINE: VIOLATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 80 signed to press 20 Dec 79 p 15

[Article by Warrant Officer N. Goncharenko, chairman, Warrant Officers Comradely Honor Court, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "Protect Against Misdeed"]

[Text] The story has a sad ending. After several hours of deliberation of Leonid Goryayev's misdeed, the warrant officers comradely honor court reached a decision to petition the commanding officer to muster him out to reserve status in an early discharge. The commanding officer carried out this request.

Could this outcome have been prevented? Unquestionably. However, we noted Goryayev's drinking problem too late. We were not prompt in finding out how he was spending his free time, determining whether he had a library card, and what he was reading. Nor did we pay attention to the fact that this capable young warrant officer was not enrolled in any courses and had no goals in life. In short, we overlooked him.

This incident happened quite some time ago, but we members of the warrant officers comradely court of honor remember well the causes and are endeavoring to do everything possible to ensure that a similar case does not occur in the future. As they say, it is easier to prevent sickness than to cure it later.

But how can this be done? What preventive measures can be taken to prevent violation of military discipline, especially such a dangerous phenomenon as drunkenness?

My experience in the military, which totals almost 15 years, and an analysis of disciplinary infractions which I have witnessed convince me that as a rule breaches of military discipline are committed by those who lack a developed sense of personal responsibility, who fail to set for themselves a lofty moral goal, who live by the following simple principle: yesterday is past history, so forget it.

That warrant officer who, having bound his life with the military, does not seek to achieve the highest level in military affairs, to become an expert, is doing the wrong thing. An expert with a capital E, such as warrant officers Viktor Marchenko and Sergey Subbotin. For several years in a row now the subunits under their command have been excellent-rated. Both warrant officers completed secondary school by correspondence study and earned technician-maintenance engineer diplomas. Viktor passed the examinations for service school as an extern, was accepted to party membership, and has been elected by his comrades several times to the post of secretary of our court. Sergey works actively in the Komsomol bureau. Since they

themselves served the compulsory term of military service, they know and understand the soul and heart of the soldier and have the ability to lead others, to educate them without resorting to shouting or administrative punishment. They proceed as they should: rolling up their sleeves, they work together with the men on their equipment, teach and demonstrate. The life experience and military expertise of warrant officers Barchenko and Subbotin enable them to function as reliable officer's assistants.

We members of the court of honor also view dissemination of the advanced know-how of such individuals, and education through positive example as the principal task in efforts to prevent breaches of military discipline. A discussion next to a display stand entitled "Top Personnel in the Unit," an appropriate statement at a meeting, in the wall newspaper, in the "Photo Bulletin," in a local radio broadcast, which is broadcast throughout the entire military base, and a respectful comment by comrades -- this is only a partial list of everything we do to acquaint the men with the unit's top warrant officers.

Another important area of our work is patronage of young warrant officers who have just completed training subunits, who have barely crossed the threshold, as they say, from enlisted man and noncommissioned officer to the officer's first assistant, for a special approach must be used with the warrant officer: both as a specialist who bears a high degree of moral and legal responsibility for his work area and as a professional military man whose duties include indoctrinating and training subordinates. But when one has insufficient knowledge and experience (I know this from personal experience), it can be very difficult at first. Thirteen years ago, if there had not been by my side at such a critical moment people who were generous with solicitude and assistance -- executive officer Maj A. Amochkin and Warrant Officer M. Barabanov -- my fate would have been quite different.

And we, members of a court of honor, under the direction of commanding officer, political worker, and party bureau headed by Maj I. Andrus, also show attention and solicitude to our colleagues. To each is assigned an experienced mentor, who is totally committed both by military service and in his heart, from getting the new arrival squared away in his new duty assignment to the area of his personal and civic interests: what he reads, what kind of work he conducts in the Komsomol organization, where he is continuing his education, and how he spends his free time. This should not be taken literally, to mean that a young man should not be permitted to take a single step without supervision. Of course not. Every individual is free to arrange his life according to his own aspirations. But it is important that these aspirations be in conformity with our societal ideals. In this area the collective cannot stand by idly. We do not force assistance but offer it sincerely and tactfully, with heartfelt warmth and kindness.

I remember we were once about to discuss matters with administrative platoon commander Warrant Officer B. Barinov. He brushed us aside: "I'm busy. Am I committing a breach of discipline?! No complaints about my job performance?! Then what is there to talk about?"

We had to summon him to a meeting, to explain just what the comradely court of honor does, and at the same time we explained to him that he, Barinov, was responsible not only for procurement of foodstuffs for the winter and their safekeeping but also for indoctrination of his subordinates, which he unfortunately was

shunning. We demanded that he change his attitude toward his job. Vyacheslav Ivanovich got the point: now things are going better in his platoon.

We have also helped other young commanders. It seems that it was only yesterday that present warrant officers V. Vitoshkin, A. Morozov, V. Skrabotun, V. Kravchenko, M. Plakhotnyuk and N. Tomin were enlisted personnel in our unit. Warrant officers Barchenko and Aleynik, members of our court, and officers Shkirya and Bolotin assumed patronage over these men. Today one is hard put to imagine a technical quiz game without the active participation of Komsomol committee member Morozov and the unit's best communications specialist, Tomin. A visitor to the library will frequently see there taking notes from primary sources either Skrabotun, who is enrolled in an evening university of Marxism-Leninism, or Vitoshkin, who is preparing to enter college. Kravchenko and Plakhotnyuk are completing secondary school. When a person's heart and mind are busy with a large and important task, he is not drawn toward whiling away the time in an idle manner.

I should like to mention one other area of reserve potential for preventing breaching of military discipline -- families. For some reason it is erroneously assumed that there is no need to discuss this point: everything is quite obvious. But if a person enters the military, while his thoughts are on problems at home, how can he do a good job? Therefore in our unit personnel living conditions and helping a young family get squared away are matters not only for the women's council and the deputy commander for political affairs. We work actively to assist them. We help teenagers sign up in sports sections, since we have the capability to do so: there is a Palace of Sports with an indoor swimming pool on the base, and we maintain contacts with a schoo' and Palace of Culture. When fathers are on duty, we make an effort to ensure that their children are not at loose ends. We also sometimes talk to those who avoid concerning themselves with the affairs of their families by claiming that they are too busy with their job. One must intervene in such cases, for otherwise false tactfulness can lead to trouble.

It is not true that the warrant officers comradely court of honor is a punishing agency. For two years now we have been gathering at our meetings without a "criminal" case to discuss. And the reason for this is that we approach indoctrinational work in a comprehensive manner, making an effort to prevent offenses.

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SOVIET VIEWS ON U.S. EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL

Cruise Missiles

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 80 p 30

[Article by Col B. Fedorov: "From Foreign Press Materials: U.S. Strategic Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] The world public is disturbed at the new flare-up in the arms race in the West and in the United States of America above all. The Tomahawk strategic cruise missile and its various modifications hold a special place among the means of attack which the imperialists now are brandishing.

What are these missiles like?

The U.S. Navy's Tomahawk SLCM [Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile]

The United States began studies back in 1972 to create a cruise missile which could be launched from the torpedo tube of a submarine, surface ships, from ground launchers, and from aircraft. Twelve firms took part in competitive development. The U.S. Navy command announced in March 1976 the selection of the firm of General Dynamics for subsequent development of the Tomahawk missile in two versions--a strategic and a tactical (antiship) version.

The foreign press has published the following data on the missile: a length of 6.4 m, a body diameter of 0.53 m, and a launch weight of 1,360 kg. The flight range in the strategic version is over 2,000 km, with a cruising speed of Mach 0.7. The cylindrical body of the SLCM is made of aluminum alloy. A narrow rectangular folding wing is mounted in the central portion and homing system equipment is accommodated in the nose section, followed by the warhead section. A 450 kg high-explosive fragmentation charge is installed in the tactical version. The strategic version has a 200 KT nuclear warhead. The single-duct turbofan engine with an operating time of from 6 to 10 hours has low fuel consumption, since it is designed for one given speed. In addition to a sustainer engine, the missile has a solid fuel booster with a thrust of 3,180 kg. For underwater launch, the missile is housed in a protective capsule, the dimensions of which correspond to those of a torpedo, and it is easily accommodated in the tube. The submarine's hydraulic system ejects the capsule, and the missile emerges from it. The booster engine starts up at a depth of 15 m. It operates 6-7

seconds and ensures the missile's acceleration on the underwater leg, emergence from the water, and ascent to a height of 300 m. Then the sustainer engine starts up. The missile rises to a height of 600 m and proceeds along the route at a speed of 880 km/hr. It drops to an altitude of 60-150 m on approaching enemy territory.

Foreign specialists state that deflection from target in a flight at full range will be within the limits of 200 m. The missile has a small radar reflective surface and weak infrared radiation, which hinders its detection and destruction by air defense weapons.

As reported in the foreign press, a version of the Tomahawk missile is being developed for employment with the B-52 bomber and with wide-body transport aircraft. After appropriate modification of attachment points, the B-52 will be able to accommodate 21 missiles: nine in the bomb bay and twelve on the underwing pylons.

It is planned to begin developing a shortened aircraft version of the Tomahawk with a range of 1,300 km. In this case it will be accommodated on SRAM missile launchers. A GLCM guided missile intended for suppressing enemy air defense weapons is being developed on the basis of the Tomahawk missile. It will be developed in two versions: with ranges of 650 km and up to 2,400 km.

The ALCM [Air-Launched Cruise Missile]

The ALCM is intended for arming U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command bombers. It is being developed in two versions: the ALCM-A, which is the primary version, and the ALCM-B, a version with increased flight range. The Air Force plans to manufacture a sum total of 2,328 missiles. One missile costs $500,000. An official comparison performed by the Department of the Air Force in March 1976 stated that the ALCM has twice the range of the Hound Dog guided missile when flying at low altitude, ten times greater accuracy on targets, five times less weight, and more than ten times less radar cross-section.

The ALCM is being developed for the existing drum-type launcher for SRAM missiles and for underwing suspension. In the latter instance suspension of an auxiliary fuel tank on the missile is possible.

The missile is 4.27 m long, with a wingspan of 2.9 m and fuselage diameter of 0.64 m. Take-off weight with auxiliary tank is 1,100 kg. It has a top speed of Mach 0.7-0.85, a range of 2,400 km with auxiliary tank, and 1,200 km without it.

The ALCM-B version is distinguished by an additional middle fuselage section, which allows increasing the fuel reserve and flight range to 2,400 km. Both versions will be equipped with a 200 KT nuclear warhead.

It is planned to install a turbofan engine with a thrust of 270 kg on the ALCM missile. It has a low by-pass ratio and a self-contained lubrication and ignition system. It has a hydromechanical fuel control system.

When the missile is on the launcher, the wing consoles, tail fins and air intake fold up. The tail fin and ailerons are to open up with the help of a pyrotechnic drive 0.5 seconds after the missile separates from the launcher. To ensure maximum flight range the missile must be launched at an altitude of 13,700 m. The primary flight will take place at an altitude of 1,500-3,000 m, and--in the last 80 km of flight--within the limits of 15 m above the terrain relief.

All cruise missile versions will be outfitted with the TERCOM combination navigation system. The operating principle of this system consists of a comparison of data stored in the memory of the onboard electronic computer concerning a flight route preselected from a contour map with a measurement of the height of terrain over which the flight takes place. During the guidance process the missile can be retargeted to one of ten preselected targets.

In connection with the fact that the TERCOM system can function only from ground relief, an inertial guidance system is installed on the missile for flying over the water's surface. It issues data on the missile's position with respect to a known starting point. The joint operation of the two navigation systems considerably improve the missile's accuracy on targets. In this instance, with data on the launch site and on the programmed flight route, the inertial guidance system provides information on the missile's position with respect to the first control point. Here the guidance system uses the TERCOM system to correct any deviations from the given flight route and directs the missile to the next control point. The missile thus flies from one control point to another while continuously updating its location.

A radio altimeter with beam directed vertically downward is installed for measuring flight altitude. The cruise missile surpasses intercontinental ballistic missiles in accuracy of guidance to target. In the future it is planned to use the global satellite navigation system for increasing accuracy. It will consist of 24 satellites placed in such a manner that it will be possible to observe at least four satellites at any given moment of time at any point on the globe. They will give out coded signals, which will be picked up by a special receiver.

The work of modifying the B-52 bombers and wide-body C-5, Boeing-747, DC-10, C-14, C-15, and other transports as aircraft platforms is being conducted simultaneously with the missiles' development. As foreign observers note, the first aircraft-based cruise missiles should be placed in a state of combat readiness early this year.

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Artillery-Launched TV Camera

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 80 p 28

[Article by Engr-Col V. Nazarenko: "Military-Technical Thinking Abroad: (Artillery-) Fired Television Camera"]

[Text] This is not the first year that work has been performed abroad to introduce to the troops television reconnaissance capabilities which permit successful

accomplishment of the mission of observing small-size targets on the battlefield with transmission of an image to several CP's simultaneously.

A press report about a demonstration in the U.S. Naval Surface Weapons Center of a fundamentally new television reconnaissance set delivered to the vicinity of targets using an artillery projectile generated special interest in the Pentagon. The Ground Forces command immediately took steps to accelerate the development of such capabilities for ground units.

The projectile in question is no different in size or weight from a standard 155-mm howitzer illuminating shell. But inside there is a television set, radio transmitter and parachute in place of the illuminating charge. It is planned to use a so-called charge-communications grid on sensitive elements as a television tube in the miniature television camera, capable of w'thstanding the superhigh overloads arising during the firing.

The system's operating principle consists of the following (see diagram) [diagram not reproduced]: The special projectile is fired to the vicinity of ground targets located beyond the front line. A miniparachute in the projectile opens in the final leg of the trajectory and a capsule with the reconnaissance apparatus hovers above the objects of surveillance, descending slowly, taking a picture of the terrain and transmitting its image. The image can be received by several points simultaneously, which permits using the intelligence most efficiently. If necessary, the TV frames also are recorded. There are provisions for the capsule's self-destruction.

Just what advantages does such a system of aerial surveillance of ground targets have? In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the most important of them is the capability of performing lengthy and continuous reconnaissance to a great depth, limited only by the artillery's firing range. The system's merits also include its attribute of receiving operational-tactical data in real time.

The effectiveness of artillery always was extremely limited when firing from indirect positions against moving targets. With the introduction of the new tactical aerial reconnaissance system into the troops, ideas of transforming every howitzer into a weapon for hitting point targets at long ranges become a reality. The opportunity appears for conducting effective fire against tanks from indirect positions.

Adherents of [artillery-] fired TV cameras also intend them for accomplishing other missions. For example, for target designation to direct air support aircraft in the tactical zone of combat operations and for adjusting mortar and artillery fire and tactical missiles. Interest in the new technical system for performing reconnaissance is growing, but for now it is difficult to judge its actual combat attributes.

PHOTO CAPTION

1. p 28. Operating principle of battlefield TV image transmission system: 1. Projectile; 2. Power source; 3. Antenna; 4. Radio transmitting device; 5. TV camera; 6. Telemetry; 7. Control post.

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Naval Infantry

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 80 p 30

[Article by Col Z. Moseyev: "From Foreign Press Materials: The American Marine Platoon"]

[Text] The Marines hold a special place in the U.S. Armed Forces. Being a naval arm, they are intended for capturing bases of operation and sectors on the enemy coast to set up forward naval bases and naval basing points. They are also used as a first echelon in conducting amphibious operations.

The Marine battalion is the basic tactical subunit and consists of a headquarters, four Marine companies and a headquarters company. The Marine company in turn includes a command element, three platoons of Marines and a weapons platoon.

The Marine platoon consists of three squads of Marines, a grenade launcher squad and a command element. The platoon totals some 50 persons. Forty-four foot-soldiers are armed with the M16A1 5.56-mm automatic rifles. In addition, the platoon is armed with ten M203A1 40-mm grenade-launcher attachments and one XM-174 40-mm automatic grenade launcher. In conducting combat operations a Marine platoon may be reinforced with an M29 81-mm mortar, a 12.7-mm heavy machinegun, M2A1 man-pack flamethrower, a Dragon ATGM team, an M60 7.62-mm machinegun and up to a squad of combat engineers.

The Marine squad consists of the commander, grenade launcher, and three fire teams of four persons each. Fire team commanders and their subordinates fight with the M16A1 automatic rifles, while the grenade launcher and squad commander have the M3A1 11.43-mm submachinegun as personal weapons.

In the opinion of American military specialists, this organizational structure meets the demands of modern warfare.

Various means are used to deliver Marine subunits to the assault location: landing ships, amphibious assault ships capable of taking aboard up to 40 helicopters and a reinforced Marine battalion, general-purpose amphibious assault ships, amphibious transport docks and other vessels. Tank landing scows, landing craft, tracked amphibious assault APC's and other amphibious means are used for the immediate landing of an assault party on shore.

As foreign military specialists note, the organization and conduct of amphibious operations are a complex form of combat operations. In particular, American military observers and specialists view them as a special form of offensive action from the sea, conducted jointly with naval, ground and airborne forces and tactical aviation. But a significant role is played by the Marines during the landing of an amphibious assault force. Their subunits usually operate in the first assault wave.

The Marines can be landed by one of the following methods depending on the specific situation in the landing area: a. "Shore-to-shore," used when landing points are a comparatively short distance from the assault force's point of embarkation

aboard ships and when the coastline provides an opportunity to proceed freely to the water's edge; b. "Ship-to-shore," where the assault force is transloaded from the ships to assault landing craft; c. A combined method, where the first assault wave is landed directly ashore, and subsequent waves are transloaded to assault landing craft.

As noted in American regulations, the Marine platoon lands as part of the company and seizes a beachhead 500-600 m wide and 400-500 m deep.

Landing of the assault force is preceded by delivery of air strikes using conventional or nuclear weapons against the enemy's antilanding defenses. Fire support ships and minesweeping forces depart for the landing area 1-3 hours or a day ahead of time. The landing ships and vessels arrive at the landing area at night, approximately 2-3 hours before the beginning of combat operations.

On order from the command ship, the assault landing craft head from the initial line in line abreast to the landing points. With the wave assembly area 5.5-7.5 km from shore, the initial line 3-4 km from shore and the speed of the assault landing craft 10-12 km/hr, they cover these distances in 30 and 15 minutes respectively.

Engineer vehicles (minesweepers) are first to go ashore. Their actions are screened by amphibious tanks. Then amphibious personnel carriers and vehicles accommodating the squads and weapons attached to the platoon go ashore. The platoon also can be landed on fast hydrofoil boats or air cushion vessels. We will note that a battalion assault team goes ashore in 5-7 waves, formed by amphibious tanks, APC's, and assault boats. The platoon can operate as part of any element in the team's combat formation. The first wave usually includes 2-3 amphibious engineer vehicles and 6-8 amphibious tanks, and subsequent waves include 6-8 amphibious APC's, boats and vehicles. The assault company is moved ashore in the first waves, and the assault force's main body in subsequent waves. There is a 2-3 minute time interval between the first and second waves and up to 15 minutes between subsequent ones. The lateral distance between adjacent assault elements in a wave varies from 50 to 100 m.

The reinforced Marine platoon also can operate as a helicopter assault force from a helicopter carrier or landing ship dock. It can be landed as part of a company or on its own to a depth of 1,500-2,000 m from shore in the battalion's interests. Helicopters also fly in waves, three in each wave, with intervals of 3-4 minutes and at an altitude of 200-300 m. A helicopter assault force is landed simultaneously or somewhat after the landing of the amphibious force. The platoon may operate in the first wave as an assault platoon. In this instance it supports the landing of the main body of the helicopter assault force. There is a 10-15 minute time interval between waves.

After landing on the enemy shore, the platoon seizes its assigned objective and digs in. It subsequently prepares to develop the attack into the depth of the enemy defenses.

In conformity with the American regulation, squads of the Marine platoon conduct an attack on the beachhead in the following phases. The approach and landing ashore, fire pressure on the enemy, capture of the attack objective ashore, consolidation

of the captured objective or line, and the pursuit. The platoon attacks with a frontage of up to 250 m and the squad with a frontage of 60-100 m on the beachhead.

Actions of the subunits landed ashore are supported by the fire of ships' guns and missiles and by carrier-based, tactical and Marine aircraft. Field artillery, AAA, and engineer, support and headquarters subunits are landed following the assault wave. A Marine platoon may defend a strongpoint on the captured sector of coast or set up on the flanks to prevent a penetration of the enemy's attack and counter-attacking groups to the landing area. Foreign specialists believe this to be especially dangerous prior to the moment of approach and landing of subsequent waves of the assault force.

The landing force assumes a defense on the captured beachhead where necessary. The platoon can defend a front of 250-400 m, and a squad can defend from 50 to 120 m frontage. The squad, like the platoon, sometimes may operate on its own, screening a specific axis favoring enemy movement.

In addition, a Marine platoon may perform reconnaissance on its given axis, patrol a designated area or line, and perform missions in battle outposts or local security in front of and on the flanks of troops operating on the beachhead.

The U.S. Navy command continues to improve not only the structure of Marine subunits, but also their operating methods under varying conditions. Great emphasis is placed on ideological conditioning of personnel and the attempt to indoctrinate obedient performers of aggressive acts of American imperialism.

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NCO TRAINING IN FIELD EXERCISE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 80 pp 3, 5

[Article by Cols Yu. Baskalov and Ye. Chernyshov, Main Directorate for Ground Forces Combat Training: "Field Exercise"]

[Text] 1. Make an Exercise Comprehensive

Soviet military education science has defined a number of directions and areas in troop training. These include first and foremost intensification of the training process, improvement of training methods, availability and full utilization of training facilities, training means, and combining of knowledge, skills and abilities on all training topics in the course of tactical training.

Combining of exercises is acquiring particular importance. One of the most effective and instructive forms of combining is the field exercise, which is conducted for the purpose of improving the level of field proficiency and developing in training subunit personnel excellent moral-fighting qualities, physical stamina and psychological stability. In the course of such exercises the future NCOs learn to conduct aggressive actions: movement forward and deployment into approach march and battle formation, negotiation of various obstacles, to destroy the enemy in trenches, on exposed terrain, in the forest and when capturing a single building or group of buildings, execution of maneuver, repelling enemy counterattacks and shift to pursuit, a staunch defense, performance of measures to protect against weapons of mass destruction and to reestablish battleworthiness, independent organization of rest with the aid of materials at hand and meal preparation, etc.

The field exercise is held at the end of the joint training period. During the first month the NCO candidates, working on training single individuals, gradually ready themselves for heavy physical stresses in order to ensure that they are able at the field exercise, in the course of accomplishing mock combat missions, definitely to cover 60-80 km across rugged terrain, day or night. In route selection it is necessary more extensively and fully to utilize available tactical training areas, gunnery training areas, tank training areas, engineer and other training facilities. In all cases the terrain should present varying topography: woods, rivers, field cart tracks, and built-up areas.

Chiefs of services are enlisted to prepare and conduct exercises at training locations. The engineer service chief, for example, prepares barriers, minefields, river reconnoiter and crossing sites; the chemical warfare service chief prepares

fumigation tents to test and fit gas masks, "contaminated" areas, and sites for meeting performance standards; the intelligence chief prepares an area in which the men will be operating as a squad-size patrol as well as sites for platoon ambush actions; food supply service officers arrange for the NCO candidates to receive instruction at day's halt and night halt locations in meal preparation under field conditions; the physical training chief readies a short forced march area, and during the first month of training monitors progress in physical toughening of NCO candidates and junior commanders, and in winter conditions ensure that they learn to ski. In preparing training locations all chiefs of services should endeavor to create a situation which is in maximum conformity with the conditions of action by a real adversary, in order to develop in the men deliberate and skilled actions in various conditions of modern combined-arms combat.

Several days before the field exercise begins, demonstration or instructor-methods classes are held for the training platoon and company commanders, as well as for instructors at training sites, in the course of which one of the subunits is used to demonstrate the entire sequence of work on training items during the field exercise, the specific features of organization and subunit actions at certain stages.

We should emphasize that the training squad and platoon commanders are the principal field exercise executing individuals. From the very first day of instruction they prepare each NCO candidate, developing skills for independent actions under field conditions and maintain a detailed record on the proficiency and preparedness of each NCO candidate both physically, theoretically, and moral-psychologically.

2. Thorough Test

Each trainee must be able correctly to perform individual tactical moves within the specified performance-standard time, must be able to hit moving and stationary targets with accuracy employing organic weapons, and must develop excellent moral-fighting qualities, physical stamina and psychological stability.

The field exercise is one of the forms used to prepare the soldier for combat. It is a test of his courage, strength of will, and character, a test of his attitude toward his comrades and ability to assist them at a time of difficulty.

We shall discuss the experience of a well-conducted field exercise, examining only the most complex items pertaining to organization and actions by commanders and subunits. On the eve of the exercise the NCOs thoroughly checked the men's gear and equipment and appointed trainee commanders, agitators, and news bulletin editors, who were responsible for organization of the overnight bivouac and meal preparation. The trainees received an additional briefing on the field exercise schedule displayed in the Lenin Room, as well as the route of movement displayed on a terrain model. The company commander mustered the company for inspection, pointed out deficiencies and specified a time frame for correcting them. The men listened attentively to the noncommissioned officers who had previous field exercise experience.

The bugle sounded assembly at 0500 hours. At the starting point the platoon leader announced the objective of the exercise, training items to be covered during the first 24 hours of the field exercise and their sequence, briefed them on the tactical scenario, and assigned the squads specific combat missions. The trainees worked on actions as a squad and commenced the exercise at the gunnery training area, where they made the combat training vehicles combat ready.

The squad leaders then led their men out onto the route of march and proceeded to teach the men how to get their bearings in the field, with and without a map.

The platoon leader then handed each NCO compass bearings for the march, the routes of which led the squads to the firing range. The firing exercise differs somewhat from that specified by the firing course: firing time was unlimited, and each man was given five rounds. The number of target hits by each individual, squad and platoon was recorded when the field exercise and socialist pledge performance results were totaled up. Minimum time was spent at this training site, since a target had been prepared for each man (Number 4, upper-body figure target with target rings), the platoon fired in a single round and continued along the route without waiting for results to be announced. One of the unit staff officers examined the targets and recorded firing results.

Effective, accurate fire in combat can be of decisive significance in achieving victory, can inflict considerable losses on the adversary and can decisively weaken the stability of his defense or aggressive spirit. Every man was familiar with this point and at this training site endeavored to display his ability to utilize to a maximum the combat capabilities of his weapon.

The platoon was at the tactical training ground from 1030 to 1200 hours. The squad leaders worked with their men on squad deployment into an extended line, movements on the battlefield employing various methods with concealed approach on the "enemy" and taking his fire into account, assault on the main line of resistance, hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches, and other items.

At 1200 hours the platoon leader assigned a patrol mission. Here each squad leader taught his men on the new route segment techniques of examining terrain and terrain features, signal responses, actions to take on encountering obstacles, small "enemy" groups and superior numbers.

A halt was called from 1400 to 1500 hours, with meals served from mobile field kitchens. During the rest period squad leaders totaled up performance results in fulfilling socialist pledges, tasks and performance standards, while agitators presented a report on outstanding performers and on recent events of the day. The winners were awarded badges, and "lightning" leaflets called upon the others to emulate the leaders.

After the meal, the NCOs continued the exercise in a new area of terrain, where they taught the men to operate on the basis of warning and command signals: "Air," "Radiation Danger," "CW Alarm," "Enemy to the Right," "Enemy to the Left," and others. They also worked on correct execution of tactical moves and worked on mastering knowledge of flag signaling and correct response to instructor scenario changes.

The first stage ended with work on procedures of setting up a bivouac. From 1830 to 2300 hours each squad of the training platoon functioned as a guard post. The trainees set up for themselves the bivouac site and prepared their meal.

3. Under Conditions of a Rapidly Changing Situation

The main task in teaching trainees, especially future noncommissioned officers, is to train them for the conduct of successful combat actions and to control a squad

(vehicle, weapon crew) and provide fire control under the complex conditions of modern combat.

Reveille sounded the next morning at 0500 hours. The trainees cooked their own breakfast, policed the bivouac sites and concealed all signs of their presence. Following a political information session, the platoon leader summarized the results of the first stage of the field exercise.

At 0645 hours the company commander briefed the men on the new tactical situation and assigned them the following mission. The platoon, following penetration of the defense, was to proceed by the shortest route through the woods to the rear of the "enemy" force and to assist the battalion main forces in capturing an important defended area. To achieve this, the platoon would need to capture approaches to the forest and, if landmined barriers were encountered there, to negotiate them.

The trainees' action began with an attack on the defending "enemy" from a position of close contact with him.

The commander of the 1st Motorized Rifle Training Platoon issued the operation order to the platoon and allocated one hour's time for the NCOs to work on organization for combat. (This work was performed by the group method by each training squad). Certain trainees were designated squad leaders. Subsequently the exercise was conducted by the battle drill method. The squads, on command by the officer and NCOs, worked on swiftly shifting to the attack, negotiating obstacle belts, attacking the enemy, destroying his firing points, executing squad and fire maneuver, and repulsing counterattacks.

Pursuing the retreating "enemy," the platoon entered the forest, where it encountered barriers mined with dummy antipersonnel mines and booby traps. Here the men acquired skills in detecting mines, disarming them, clearing lanes and negotiating abatises.

The platoon reached the rest halt site at 1400 hours. The company sergeant major had delivered a hot meal in insulated food containers to the site. During the brief rest and meal the results of the offensive engagement were totaled up and field news bulletins were released. Agitators conducted brief discussions.

At 1500 hours the company commander briefed the platoon on a new tactical situation and assigned the following mission: the platoon was to execute a march (8-10 km further along the route of march) and to proceed to defend an advantageous position, with the aim of delaying an advancing "aggressor" subunit, in order to enable the battalion's main forces to approach, deploy and engage.

Movement to a defensive position can occur under various situation conditions, and therefore one should demonstrate to the trainees organization of defense without close contact with the adversary, as well as while receiving hostile fire.

Upon reaching the designated position, the platoon proceeded to set up a strong point. The trainees learned to prepare range cards, to lay out trenches and emplacements, to conduct observation, to give target designations, to respond to warning signals, to repulse attacks by small groups and superior "aggressor" forces, to assist wounded and to prepare for night defensive combat. During the entire

night the platoon maintained defensive combat alert and conducted combat actions. The squad leaders tested on several occasions the alertness of the observation posts.

As the third day began, the trainees proceeded to train on performing as a company carrying out an advance party mission.

The subunit approached a river. The engineer service chief (the person in charge at this training site) explained and demonstrated techniques of reconnoitering a river (determination of depth, state of river bottom, banks, current velocity, search for fording sites). Then the trainees worked on these items in a practical manner. The exercise ended with crossing the river, after which the company continued to operate as advance party. In the course of performance of tactical missions, the trainees wiped out small "aggressor" groups, scouted out routes around roadblocks and other obstacles, repelled an air attack, and captured advantageous positions. They crossed in protective gear a "contaminated" area which could not be bypassed.

4. Every Individual Receives a Mark

They were approaching the end of the third day of the field exercise. The trainees had operated for three days and three nights in a complex tactical situation. Some of them had performed better than others, but all without exception mastered the rudiments of military skill and combat life in the field. The task of the platoon and squad leaders was as follows: to coordinate and reconcile their observations and to reach a final conclusion on the military occupational specialty (commander, gunner-operator, or driver-mechanic) in which to train each man in the future.

Following a meal and a brief rest period, in the final stage of the exercise the company executed a short forced march, in the course of which the squads crossed the test area of the tactical training area. Of the entire list of training items specified for this area, the only ones included were those connected with mastering practical actions pertaining to destroying the enemy, capturing enemy objectives, negotiating various obstacles, and conducting reconnaissance.

The field exercise was over. All officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and NCO candidates were graded on their personal performance and on that of their subunits. The men had become stronger, more mature, and toughened. As they say, they had breathed the air of the romance of army life.

The polevoy vykhod [field exercise] is not an ucheniye [more elaborate field exercise]. It does not pursue the aim of achieving smoothness of subunit performance. During this limited-scope field exercise trainees acquire essential skills in conduct of combat operations, certain practical experience in leading a squad, and learn to handle the stresses of field combat. The field exercise should be preceded by a considerable amount of political-indoctrination work with extensive enlistment of activists, a thorough medical examination, as well as comprehensive logistical support.

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AUTOMATIC GRENADE LAUNCHER TRAINING

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Jr Sgt V. Deputat, Red-Banner Kiev Military District: "AGS in Position"]

[Text] The automatic grenade launcher is a formidable weapon. It makes it possible to wage effective combat against enemy infantry, trucks and armored personnel carriers. Operating in teams, grenade launcher gunners, when the situation requires, can lay down on a threat axis a screen of fire capable of reliably covering the flanks of a subunit. An important feature of fire from the automatic grenade launcher is the capability to hit the enemy from indirect fire positions: infantry sheltered in foxholes, and targets concealed behind woods or a ridge crest.

Our subunit's grenade launcher crews work hard and persistently to master this potent weapon -- they study the construction and functioning of the AGS and the rules and procedures of delivering fire under any and all conditions. We devote particular attention to work on combat performance standards, for one may possess excellent knowledge of theory but be slow in performing fire missions and lose much time in taking up a fire position. It is no simple matter to carry a disassembled grenade launcher: the gunner carries the sight and tube, while the assistant gunner carries the mount and boxes with loaded belts. There may also be a third crew member -- ammunition bearer. We drill, however, with a two-man crew, bearing in mind that in actual combat considerable physical stresses will occur, and it is necessary to prepare oneself for this in advance.

Taking up a fire position does not mean merely carrying up and assembling the grenade launcher. Required of grenade launcher gunners are a good sense of directional bearings and the ability correctly to assess the terrain, in order later to conduct surveillance of the "aggressor." Within the arc of fire there should be no objects which the projectile can strike in flight. The fact is that the projectile's fuse, upon firing, is armed at a short distance from the tube and, if it strikes a tree branch, for example, it may detonate.

The most important condition for scoring target kills is accurate determination of range to target. We know from experience that knowledge of comparative distances to reference points or local features can be very helpful here. Therefore, if the situation allows, we prepare a range card for the crews.



Key to figure:

1. North
2. Kruglaya Wood
3. Reference point

I recall an incident which happened to grenade launcher gunner Pvt A. Belov. While performing a fire training drill, this soldier achieved poor results in firing at pop-up targets, although he possessed excellent knowledge of his weapon and firing procedures. We proceeded carefully to observe this man's actions and noted that when commands to fire at the targets were given, Private Belov would carry them out precisely, would set his sight and deflection correctly and would hit the targets on the first round fired. But as soon as the gunner proceeded with independent fire at popping-up targets, effectiveness of fire would drop off sharply. The gunner's error lay in incorrect determination of range to target. The crew was helped to improve range estimation by drills involving performance of preparatory exercises, in the course of which the gunner would independently determine range to various targets, set his sight and deflection, and aim the weapon. In order for the trainee to be able to see the results of his decision, he would fire from an assault rifle secured to the grenade launcher. The soldier learned to determine range to target not only by visual estimate but also with the aid of the sight graticule divisions using the "thousandth" formula:

$$D = \frac{V \times 1000}{U},$$

and his success improved. Private Belov began receiving marks of nothing below good and excellent for firing performance.

There was a time when it was difficult for us to fire from indirect fire positions. This was because after mounting grenade launchers in the fire position it was necessary to perform a number of procedures to plot a parallel sheaf -- to aim one of the grenade launchers (the pivot) in a designated direction, and then to align the barrel of the second grenade launcher parallel to the pivot; to determine the minimum elevations, that is, sight settings corresponding to the shortest range of fire at which the projectiles would not strike the crest of an obstacle out forward.

We were fairly successful in learning to determine minimum elevation in firing in a flat trajectory, utilizing a special table or employing a simple method developed for this purpose. But we had to do a great deal of work on plotting a parallel sheaf. It is one thing when there is a prominent reference point on the flank of the fire position at a distance of at least 5 kilometers. This greatly facilitates plotting the sheaf, since the distance between weapon crews is negligible (10-12 meters) in comparison with range to the reference point, and this quantity can be ignored. That is, the angle setting for the pivot grenade launcher is also taken for the other.

But how does one plot a sheaf on steppe or desert terrain?

In this instance a parallel sheaf is plotted according to the pivot weapon. The pivot weapon gunner performs topographical survey procedures, getting his bearings from nearby local features, by compass, or by setting out aiming posts, and aims the barrel in the indicated direction of fire. Then each assistant gunner places above the sight of his grenade launcher a special marker (during hours of darkness -- a flashlight). The gunner of the pivot weapon reads off the marker of the other weapon, for example: "Number Two, 44-50." Following the pivot gunner's report a command is given to the gunner of the second grenade launcher, taking into account that his sight is turned by angle 30-00: "Number 2, deflection 14-50." The gunner, using as a reference point the marker on the sight of the pivot weapon, sets the required deflection and brings the barrel of his grenade launcher parallel to the pivot.

When working on firing with a high trajectory from indirect fire positions, I draw the crews' attention to the fact that the distance of the fire position from the cover should be a minimum of twice the height of the cover. For example, when the height of the cover is 10 meters, distance to it from the fire position should be greater than 20 meters.

After thoroughly studying firing procedures with the automatic grenade launcher and successfully performing firing drills, personnel performed well at a recent tactical exercise.

At a critical stage in the battle we received the command to open fire on an "aggressor" column which was advancing from behind Kruglaya Wood.

The weapon crews performed smoothly: the results of their diligent practice were clearly in evidence. The gunners quickly got the weapons parallel and reported ready.

Calculating from the range card (see figure) that the target was at a range of 1,300 meters, the gunner determined from the sight setting table a sight figure of 10-52

for a high trajectory. Since when firing from an indirect fire position it is impossible to correct for target displacement, I gave the command for barrage fire: "At infantry, sight 10-52, with dispersion to right from center of arc, maximum rate, belt, continuous.... Fire!"

...We inflicted considerable casualties on the "aggressor." Part of the force, however, advanced from behind the woods to the road fork.

It was decided to destroy the infantry with concentrated fire. We determined range at 1,050 meters from reference point 5, which corresponds to 2-06 on the sight scale for a flat trajectory. A command was given to the weapon crews: "Infantry at road fork, sight setting 2-06, deflection 28-60, aim on target, three short bursts -- fire!"

We delivered direct fire on the small numbers of infantry and equipment which had managed to get through....

The "aggressor" was stopped. The firmness of the defense was ensured in large measure by the skilled actions of the grenade launcher crews.

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MILITARY DISCIPLINE: WEAPONS USE, MAINTENANCE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 21 Apr 80 p 27

[Article by Col Just V. Belyavskiy and Col Just A. Khalin: "Know and Care For Your Weapon"]

[Text] A caring and solicitous attitude toward weapons is a fine tradition of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was born together with establishment of the Red Army. The first Red Armyman's service guide, bearing V. I. Lenin's signature, emphasized that each and every serviceman should remember that he has in his care a weapon which was acquired at great cost. This meant that one must acquire a consummate mastery of one's weapon, care for and safeguard it as one's most precious possession.

This tradition lives on even more strongly today. It is sacredly honored in the Guards Red-Banner Sevastopol' Motorized Rifle Training Regiment imeni Latvian Riflemen. In this unit each man is taught from his first days of military service an affection for his weapon, and the demands of regulations that weapons be maintained at all times in good working order and ready for action are absolutely and strictly observed.

These efforts are organized particularly purposefully in the excellent-rated subunit under the command of Gds Sr Lt V. Gamlyavyy. Scheduled combat training activities in this subunit are supplemented by regular conduct of technical information sessions, contests, and interesting quiz games. All men participate in socialist competition for best knowledge and maintenance of their assigned weapons. This helps the subunit attain high results in weapon training.

Warrant officers and noncommissioned officers serve as active assistants to the officers in the area of instilling a solicitous attitude of affection for the combat equipment and weapons. Good things, for example, are being said in the unit about subunit sergeant major Gds Warrant Officer V. Asmolov. Possessing an excellent mastery of all company organic weapons, he skillfully passes on his knowledge and skills of an experienced weapons specialist. The men frequently hear from this warrant officer his favorite saying: "Weapons like tender loving care, cleaning and oiling." He unswervingly follows his own advice.

There are a great many such examples in our Armed Forces. They are grounded on the conscientiousness of Soviet servicemen, a deep comprehension of military duty, and a high degree of discipline. These qualities are instilled on a daily basis by the entire structure of military service and by vigorous and purposeful activities on the part of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations.

Unfortunately, however, one encounters instances of a careless attitude toward weapons on the part of some personnel and unskilled handling of them. Pvt Yu. Elstin'sh, for example, while mounting an armored personnel carrier, struck his assault rifle against the armor plate and dropped it. He subsequently was unable to perform the next assault rifle firing drill and received a mark of unsatisfactory, although previously he had shot well. A closer inspection revealed that the front sight had been knocked out of alignment.

Or take another example. At a tactical training drill Pvt M. Ivanov was instructed to dig a foxhole. Ivanov performed this task successfully, but he forgot about his weapon: his assault rifle became covered with sand. Soon there was a weapon drill. Ivanov failed to clean his assault rifle, as a result of which a cartridge jammed during firing. The target display time ran out while Ivanov was correcting the malfunction, and he was unable to score a single target hit.

In the above examples enlisted men were primarily to blame for these acts of negligence, but the junior command personnel -- Sergeants K. Khodanovich and N. Savitskiy, who failed to keep a close eye on the actions of their men, also deserve reproach.

Military personnel are obligated strictly to observe the rules of handling the weapons issued to them. These rules and procedures are spelled out in military regulations and in the appropriate small arms manuals. They synthesize and reflect the experience accumulated by the army both during the war years and in peacetime. Absolute observance of regulations and procedures and precise organization of handling weapons are a guarantee of their safe utilization. Any departure from the demands of regulations and manuals can lead and frequently does lead to serious, sometimes irreparable consequences. Warrant Officer A. Abdullayev, for example, was clearly thoughtless in handling a weapon. While serving as unit duty warrant officer, he loaded his pistol and proceeded to practice pistol handling, grossly violating the rules and procedures of handling small arms, which created a real danger to the lives of other military personnel.

The following also attests to the fact that not all junior commanders are yet an example of unconditional observance of the rules and procedures of handling weapons. IZh-22 air rifle competitions were scheduled for an off-duty day in Warrant Officer V. Bol'shakov's company. Warrant Officer Bol'shakov had received an appropriate briefing on organizing and holding this competition. Since he was busy with administrative duties, however, he assigned the job of conducting the competition to Warrant Officer A. Korshunenko. This latter, in violation of the regulations which require that firing activities be conducted at a site specially set up for that purpose and under the supervision of an officer or warrant officer, ordered Jr Sgt G. Sigayev to ready a firing site, but did not brief him and failed to specify where the competition was to be held.

The junior sergeant chose a location between a barracks and storage building. In order to test the air rifle given to him by Warrant Officer Korshunenko, Sigayev fired several pellets at a target. He grasped the loaded, breech-broken rifle with his right hand clasped around the buttstock, his index finger on the trigger. Hearing the approaching footsteps of the men of his company, Sigayev turned toward them. As he was turning, the breech snapped shut and the rifle fired, injuring Sigayev's best friend, Pvt S. Rozov. As a result of the above-described breaches of

regulations, Sigayev committed a criminal offense as specified by Article 114 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and was convicted by a military tribunal. The other guilty parties were also punished.

Law violations of this kind as well as others are extremely rare among military personnel, but those serious irreversible consequences which occur as a result of careless weapon handling make it incumbent upon all military personnel, particularly leaders, to respond most vigorously to all attempts to deviate from established rules and regulations. It sometimes happens that horseplaying soldiers point their weapon at their friends and even pull the trigger, erroneously assuming that the weapon will not fire. Such "jokes" can end in tragedy.

Great trust is placed in military personnel whose jobs involve the safeguarding of weapons and ammunition. As a rule warrant officers and extended-service personnel are assigned to such jobs. The safekeeping, accounting and condition of weapons and ammunition depend primarily on the proficiency, conscientiousness and discipline of these military personnel.

The absolute majority of warrant officers and extended-service personnel flawlessly perform their duties connected with storage and safekeeping of weapons and ammunition, but there are also those who are not yet fully aware of their responsibility, who are negligent and who abuse their position. Warrant Officer D. Lupu, for example, who was in charge of his unit's armory and ammunition stores, illegally took two pistols, left the base and engaged in target practice with civilian personnel.

We cannot accept such occurrences. They can promote loss and theft of weapons and ammunition and create a threat to public safety. This is why the law specifies criminal liability for gross violation of the rules and regulations of weapons and ammunition storage and safekeeping which result in their loss, damage or other harmful consequences.

Every serviceman should bear in mind that when handling weapons one should always act in strict conformity with the demands of regulations and procedures, with which one must not only be thoroughly familiar but which must be unswervingly observed.

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